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Summary 
 
In this dissertation I offer explanations for how sustainability reporting has developed from 
a peripheral practice into a more widely accepted and adopted one. I qualitatively analyse 
the history of sustainability reporting over the last 25 years by focusing on the Dutch 
sustainability reporting field. I draw on a combination of 94 semi-structured interviews and 
a collection of secondary data sources. Overall I question the organisation-centric, static, a-
historical and instrumental accounts that explain sustainability reporting based on a 
business case, managing legitimacy or stakeholder expectations. Instead, I draw on, and 
contribute to, various literatures (most notably institutional entrepreneurship, the garbage 
can model, commensuration and sociology of worth) to explain the more dynamic and 
historical aspects of sustainability reporting as a complex practice developing in a pluralistic 
institutional environment.  
 
First, I find that sustainability reporting’s institutionalisation was a muddled process in 
which serendipity played an important role in enabling collective action of distributed 
actors. I contribute to the institutional entrepreneurship literature by questioning the role 
of the heroic individual institutional entrepreneur endowed with a great deal of strategic 
agency. Instead, I draw on insights from the garbage can model and nuance these 
assumptions by stipulating the enabling role of historical contingencies and the collective 
processes involved in enacting these.  
 
Second, my study adds to our understanding of the dynamics of commensuration. I find that 
commensuration transformed sustainability reporting from a values-based to a value-based 
practice while it also changed from environmental to triple bottom line to integrated 
reporting. I chart various dimensions of commensuration and explain the process driving 
the development of these dimensions. In particular, shifts in the dominant dimensions of 
commensuration over time can be explained by emerging pathologies that drive the 
development of the succeeding phase. These pathologies emerge because of instances of 
means-ends disconnection, professional insulation and cultural contestation. 
 
Third, I analyse integrated reporting and focus on the possibility of, and impediments to, 
reconciling its multiple logics of valuation, or orders of worth, in order to forge a legitimate 
compromise. I find that a successful compromise based on finding a common interest, 
avoiding clarification and maintaining ambiguity is problematic to attain as integrated 
reporting risks being captured by investors and accountants privileging a market/industrial 
worth at the expense of a civic/green worth. This leads to a local private arrangement 
rather than a durable legitimate compromise. This contributes to unpacking the process 
through which a complex new accounting practice in a pluralistic environment gains 
legitimacy. 
 
In addition to these respective contributions, more generally I show how sustainability 
reporting is neither just a corporate smokescreen nor a panacea for corporate sustainability. 
It is a practice that is a consequence of its modern rational environment, yet at the same 
time constitutive of this very institutional environment as it helps to further elaborate and 
institutionalise sustainability (reporting) as an economy entity. Fully realising and acting 
upon the implications of this pivotal role of an accounting practice such as sustainability 
reporting may help policy makers and practitioners move towards a more sustainable world. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
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Sustainability and sustainability reporting 
Preoccupation with sustainability has become one of the emblematic features of current 
times. Broadly defined as “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment 
and Development, 1987: 8) the profusion of sustainability discourses and practices has been 
difficult to miss. Over the last decade we have witnessed the Nobel Peace Prize being 
awarded to Al Gore and the International Panel on Climate Change, an Oscar being won by a 
documentary on climate change, the emergence of hybrid and electric cars, sweatshop 
scandals and debates, the anticipation, participation and disillusionment around the 
Copenhagen Climate Conference and even the “neutral and objective” world of academia 
has become subject to sustainability controversy after allegations of manipulation of 
scientific research on climate change: the “climategate” scandal. In addition, carbon taxes 
and cap-and-trade schemes are fiercely debated, social responsible investment products 
and indices have popped up around the world, and markets for fair trade and organic food 
and goods have grown. Make a walk through your local supermarket or shopping mall and it 
will result in a bombardment of labels, logos and claims that declare a wide variety of 
products to be good for fish (MSC), forests (FSC), gold miners (CFGS) or more generally 
simply ecological, fair trade, organic or simply “pure and honest”, as a Dutch supermarket in 
the Netherlands has decided to label products to avoid label confusion and fatigue. This list 
is far from exhaustive but shows the wide range of spheres in which sustainability aspects 
can be observed today.  
 
Coinciding with this interest in sustainability, and situated in an age of globalisation and 
neo-liberalisation, is the general trend of the rise of corporate influence and power and 
with that increasing scrutiny on corporate impact on the social, economic and ecological 
state of the planet (e.g. Korten, 2001; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Unerman, Bebbington, & 
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O’Dwyer, 2007). By now corporations comprise almost half of the 100 largest economic 
entities and the revenues of Shell, Walmart and ExxonMobil are on par with the GDP of 
countries such as Argentina, Austria, and Belgium (Keys, Malnight, & Stoklund, 2013). As a 
backlash against this increasing power and impact of corporations a general interest in 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) has emerged (e.g. Matten & Crane, 2005; Matten & 
Moon, 2008; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; Visser, Matten, Pohl, & Tolhurst, 2010; Visser, 2011). 
One aspect of this corporate answer to sustainability has been demands for stronger and 
better accountability and transparency of firms (e.g. Gray, 2010; Korten, 1999). Arguably 
one of the most visible consequences of this has been the inclusion of ESG (environmental, 
social, governance) or sustainability information in corporate disclosure (Cooper & Owen, 
2007; Gray, 1992, 2002; Mathews, 1997; Owen, 2008). Labelled sustainability reporting 
throughout this dissertation it can be defined as “reporting which covers the environmental 
and social aspects of an organisation’s performance as well as the economic aspects” 
(Hubbard, 2009: 3). The latest G4 guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2013: 3), 
the de facto standard for reporting, describe its essence as follows: 
“Sustainability reporting helps organizations to set goals, measure performance, 
and manage change in order to make their operations more sustainable. A 
sustainability report conveys disclosures on an organization’s impacts – be they 
positive or negative – on the environment, society and the economy. In doing so, 
sustainability reporting makes abstract issues tangible and concrete, thereby 
assisting in understanding and managing the effects of sustainability developments 
on the organization’s activities and strategy”. 
 
A peripheral practice just over 15 years ago, by 2012 over 6000 firms, particularly larger 
ones, disclose a broad set of non-financial information in reports, according to the reports 
directory of CorporateRegister.com (2013). Of the largest 250 companies in the world 95% 
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published a sustainability report in 2011, compared to, for instance, only 35% in 1999 
(KPMG, 2011a). Governments (e.g. Sweden, Denmark, France, UK) and stock exchanges 
(e.g. South Africa, Singapore, Malaysia) increasingly demand this type of disclosure and in 
2013 the European Commission1 adopted a proposal for a directive asking larger firms to 
disclose environmental and social information in their annual reports, thereby further 
solidifying the acceptance of this form of non-financial disclosure and its importance for the 
firm.  
 
This brief overview shows that sustainability reporting aims to bring together multiple 
aspects (e.g. financial, social, environment) and concerns of various interested parties, 
making it overall a complex phenomenon. As this dissertation will show, it has taken root in 
a pluralistic political, social and cultural environment. Explaining the rise of reporting by 
focusing on the potential financial benefits has proved popular, but has had limited 
purchase thus far (e.g. Brown, Guidry, & Patten, 2010; Freedman & Jaggi, 1988; Murray, 
Sinclair, Power, & Gray, 2006; Richardson, Welker, & Hutchinson, 1999). The question thus 
arises how the development of sustainability reporting can be more persuasively explained? 
Put more generally, with this research project I aim to offer an explanation of how 
sustainability reporting has developed from a peripheral practice into a widely accepted and 
adopted one. Below I take stock of theoretical interpretations of sustainability reporting to 
date. I also explain how and why my research has been inspired by insights from the 
institutional literature and thereby put in context the three papers that form the core of this 
dissertation and briefly sketch their main contributions. I also explain why my analysis of the 
rise of sustainability reporting is not just insightful for empirical and practical reasons, but 
also contributes to our theoretical understanding of sustainability reporting and, moreover, 
organisation studies more broadly. 
                                                          
1
See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0207:FIN:EN:PDF Accessed at 09-08-
2013 
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Perspectives on sustainability reporting 
Reasons for disclosing sustainability information have developed over time and have been 
diverse, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters. For instance, they range from broader 
ethical concerns to specific economic and reputational benefits and from complying with 
external pressure to a wish for innovation and employee motivation (see e.g. Bebbington, 
Higgins, & Frame, 2009; Buhr, 2007; KPMG, 2011a; Parker, 2005). On a more theoretical 
level, extant studies have offered various perspectives to explain the development of 
sustainability reporting, most notably legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and, of most 
interest for this particular study, institutional theory.    
Legitimacy theory and sustainability reporting 
Legitimacy theory has been one of the dominant theoretical approaches in accounting for 
sustainability reporting (e.g. Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Cho & Patten, 2007; Deegan, Rankin, & 
Tobin, 2002; Deegan, 2002; Milne & Patten, 2002; O’Donovan, 2002; O’Dwyer, 2002; Patten, 
2002). Sustainability reporting here is “...understood to be motivated by a desire to 
demonstrate corporate conformity with societal expectations” (Owen, 2008: 247). The aim 
is to gain legitimacy in the sense of “a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). Legitimacy 
theorists argue that firms have a ‘social contract’ with the broader society and that they 
seek to achieve ‘fit’ between their value system and that of society (Deegan, 2002, 2007). 
When firms realise they need to gain, repair or maintain legitimacy they “typically rely upon 
targeted disclosures” (Deegan, 2007: 128) and purposeful manipulation of the strategic 
resource legitimacy (Deegan, 2002; Lindblom, 1994; Suchman, 1995), which is where it 
departs from more institutionally inspired analyses (Smith, Haniffa, & Fairbrass, 2011; 
Suchman, 1995). Reporting plays a strategic role here since “information is a major element 
that can be employed by the organisation to manage (or manipulate) the stakeholder in 
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order to gain their support and approval” (Gray, Bebbington, & Adams, 1996: 45) and 
establish legitimacy or license to operate.  
 
For instance, Cho and Patten (2007) suggest that firms with poor environmental 
performance or those operating in environmentally sensitive industries are more likely to 
disclose sustainability information as a legitimizing tool. Similarly, Deegan et al. (2002) 
found that in the wake of unfavourable media attention firms are more likely to disclose 
(positive) sustainability information for legitimating purposes. O’Dwyer (2002) in his study 
of voluntary corporate social disclosures in the Irish context also found evidence that this 
was purposefully done for legitimacy reasons. At the same time, however, he noticed 
scepticism among his interviewees towards reporting’s actual value to indeed lead to 
legitimacy as it only heightens further societal demands. Oftentimes the firms researched 
continued disclosing sustainability information nonetheless, opening up space for 
alternative theoretical explanations. In general, most of these studies have been better at 
describing reasons for reporting than explaining the practice (O’Dwyer, 2002; Parker, 2005). 
Moreover, extant work finds it difficult to account for the influence of a plurality of 
demands and values present in society as well as the more dynamic and temporal aspects 
of sustainability reporting’s development as it evolves as a result of the interactions 
between various parties (Deegan, 2007; Smith et al., 2011).         
Stakeholder theory and sustainability reporting 
A second, related, theoretical perspective has been stakeholder theory (e.g. Cooper & 
Owen, 2007; Deegan & Blomquist, 2006; Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998; Orij, 2010; 
Roberts, 1992). These studies build on Freeman’s (1984) general work on stakeholder 
management and Ullmann’s (1985) article on relating the stakeholder perspective to CSR 
and disclosure. Of principal importance here is that sustainability reporting is treated as 
either an ethical accountability instrument or an instrumental strategic management tool 
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with which to respond to demands of a broad set of groups, organisations and other 
interested parties (i.e. stakeholders). Decisions concerning the ‘what and how’ of 
sustainability disclosure are argued to be made based on an assessment of the stakeholder 
demands that influence and/or are influenced by the firm, with typically reporting tailored 
at those stakeholders with particularly powerful or salient positions (Mitchell, Agle, & 
Wood, 1997). For example, Roberts (1992) found support for the role of stakeholders as a 
determinant of firm disclosure of social responsibility activities. He argued that the 
disclosure was positively related to the relative power of stakeholders, to sound economic 
performance and to a positive strategic inclination towards social responsibility. Similarly, 
Neu et al. (1998) found evidence in their study of 33 Canadian public companies over a 10-
year period that when faced with multiple stakeholder demands firms were more likely to 
increase disclosure in response to powerful financial stakeholders and government 
regulators than to less powerful or important environmentalists. Van der Laan Smith et al. 
(2005) used in their comparative study between Norwegian/Danish and US companies a 
stakeholder framework to show how differences in the perceived  importance of social 
issues and the acceptance of a larger role of stakeholders affected the extent and quality of 
corporate social disclosure.  
 
Compared to legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory thus explicitly considers the multiplicity 
of demands on firms that form a determinant of disclosure and increase complexity. Both 
are critiqued, however, for being too concerned with business-interests and organisation-
centric management of stakeholders (see e.g. Gray, Dey, Owen, Evans, & Zadek, 1997; Smith 
et al., 2011). More fundamentally, however, the organisation-centric position of both of 
these theoretical perspectives makes them susceptible to overstate the strategic agency of 
organizations (Smith et al., 2011). By presenting legitimacy as a resource to be manipulated 
they risk downplaying the structural influence of the institutional macro-context (Deegan, 
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2002; Parker, 2005). Most of these studies have furthermore relied on a “static and a-
historical model” (Seo & Creed, 2002: 431), ill-equipped to explain the more dynamic 
aspects of the development of sustainability reporting, the mechanisms underpinning this 
trajectory and the inherent difficulties and complexities involved in the interactions 
between various stakeholders and firms (e.g. Owen, 2008; Smith et al., 2011). As a result, an 
account of the history of sustainability reporting and its gradual trajectory has been largely 
missing thus far (Parker, 2005). These more historical process dynamics, however, are 
important “to understand how consensus is built around the meaning of sustainability and 
how concepts or practices associated with sustainability are developed and diffused among 
organizations” (Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995: 1015). In order to better understand and 
explain how sustainability reporting as a phenomenon has progressed from a peripheral 
practice to one that has become increasingly commonplace, more sociologically inclined 
insights from organisation theory can be of help. Following Davis and Marquis (2005: 337), 
it can be particularly insightful to draw on institutional insights and use a more contextual 
portrayal of actors in an attempt “to use organizational mechanisms to explain social 
phenomena”. This can aid an analysis of how settlements around new practices at the 
interface between business and society (e.g. sustainability reporting) emerge and develop. 
This makes it possible to go beyond the more voluntaristic and functionalist explanations to 
date and pay more attention to, for instance, the “historical and political determinants of 
whether and in what forms corporations take on social responsibilities” (Brammer, Jackson, 
& Matten, 2012: 3).  
Institutional theory and sustainability reporting 
As the institutional family lives in a rather big tent by now, a brief overview of some strands 
avoids conceptual confusion (for an extensive overview, see e.g. Scott, 2008). In short, 
within economics there exists a more rational and functional strand that focuses on the 
importance of institutions as coordination mechanisms for managing uncertainty and 
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transaction costs (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1995) and solving collective action problems 
(Moe, 1990). There also is an institutional branch in political science where the focus is 
more on how historically developed macro-level institutions influence political and 
economic decision making (Morgan, Campbell, Crouch, Pedersen, & Whitley, 2010; Steinmo 
& Thelen, 1992). Institutions here are often seen as formal organizations and governance 
systems, and the rules or conventions promulgated by formal organization, and how these 
tend to differ among countries due to path dependencies that cause a lock-in effect where 
decisions made and institutions build in the past are still influencing the possibilities of the 
future.    
 
Of interest for this study, as well as in the limited number of extant studies on sustainability 
reporting (e.g. Bebbington et al., 2009; Brown, de Jong, & Lessidrenska, 2009; Etzion & 
Ferraro, 2010; Larrinaga-González, 2007), is the more sociological branch of organisational 
institutionalism. Before turning attention to institutionally inspired reporting studies I 
briefly sketch the main idea of this line of inquiry more generally. Institutional accounts 
emphasise the influence of broader social structures and thereby question accounts 
primarily based on rational actor models and instrumental rationality (Scott, 2008). 
Institutions are social constructions and as such discursively and subjectively created and 
reproduced shared patterns of meaning that stabilise over time and offer legitimate scripts 
for action (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Jepperson, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2008; 
Zucker, 1977). For instance, by now a corporate focus on sustainability “has become a 
strongly institutionalized feature of the contemporary corporate landscape in advanced 
industrial economies. The idea that corporations should engage in some form of responsible 
behaviour has become a legitimate expectation” (Brammer et al., 2012: 10). Institutions are 
understood to “… consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities 
that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. Institutions are transported by 
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various carriers – culture, structures, and routines – and they operate at multiple levels of 
jurisdiction” (Scott, 1995: 33). A central tenet of institutional thinking is that legitimacy is 
gained by adaptation to a socially constructed external institutional environment rather 
than only tailoring actions, structures and practices to technical requirements (see e.g. 
Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008). It is at the broader field level that analysis typically takes 
place and where actors construct their “collective rationality” (Scott, 2008: 217). Fields are 
understood here as recognised areas of institutional life (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) where 
“…. participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors 
outside the field” (Scott, 1995: 6).   
 
To be sure, sociological institutionalism comes in many shapes and colours as well. Old 
institutionalism with its more agentic focus on individual organizations, treated as a 
dependent variable, and interest in power, interests and conflicts (e.g. Selznick, 1949, 1957; 
Stinchcombe, 1968), is typically distinguished from new-institutionalism (e.g. DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). The latter has a more 
structural focus where the organization becomes the independent variable and conformity 
and homogeneity at the field level through isomorphic processes that lead to legitimacy 
take control. More recent institutional studies have to an extent tried to overcome this 
dichotomy between old and new and look at issues such as institutional change, coping 
with institutional logics and complexity and institutional entrepreneurship and work 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Greenwood, Oliver, Suddaby, & Sahlin, 2008; Hirsch & 
Lounsbury, 1997; Lounsbury, 1997). In effect, institutionalists increasingly assert that 
behaviour is both enabled and constrained by the taken-for-granted patterns of shared 
meaning and “rationalized myths” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) that reach an almost inevitable 
rule-like status (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Scott, 2008). That is, organizations on the one 
hand succumb to isomorphism and conform ceremonially and symbolically to institutional 
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pressures to legitimate their actions. Yet, on the other hand it has become clear that human 
beings are not caught in a web of institutions without any sense of agency (DiMaggio, 1988; 
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Oliver, 1991, 1992). Rather, they interact with their institutional 
environment and therefore can (re)construct this context and at the same time being 
embedded (Seo & Creed, 2002) or nested (Holm, 1995) in it.  
 
These more structural and agentic institutional aspects also surface in work on sustainability 
reporting, although present studies on sustainability accounting and reporting have left the 
institutional perspective largely unexplored. Existing work has typically been exploratory 
(e.g. Adams & Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2007; Larrinaga-González, 2007) and most notably 
focused on the Global Reporting Initiative (e.g. Brown, de Jong, & Lessidrenska, 2009; 
Brown, de Jong, & Levy, 2009; Etzion & Ferraro, 2010; Levy, Brown, & De Jong, 2010) rather 
than on sustainability reporting more broadly. One line of work has focused on the more 
structural aspects of institutional theory, in particular on the institutional pressures on 
organisations towards isomorphism as an explanation for the rise of sustainability reporting. 
For instance, Bebbington et al. (2009: 615) analysed the influence of cultural-cognitive, 
normative and coercive isomorphic pressures on how sustainability reporting was shaped in 
six New Zealand firms. They found that for firms pursuing a sustainability agenda “… a 
number of different institutions interact with various organizational conditions to shape SDR 
*sustainable development reporting+ as an “appropriate” “normal” activity or “the right 
thing to do”. Larrinaga-Gonzalez (2007) similarly argued that regulative, normative and 
cognitive institutional pressures lead to convergence of sustainability reporting among 
firms. Although the influence of the institutional context is made apparent, the researchers 
are less informative about exactly how reporting is shaped as “normal”, a limitation that is 
further fuelled by their ahistorical focus on organisations rather than the field.  
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An alternative branch of institutional research on sustainability reporting has relied more on 
insights from the institutional entrepreneurship literature (e.g. Brown, de Jong, & 
Lessidrenska, 2009; Brown, de Jong, & Levy, 2009; Etzion & Ferraro, 2010; Levy et al., 2010). 
These studies focus on the work of strategic change agents rather than on isomorphic forces 
leading to conformity and stability. For instance, Brown et al. (2009) studied the 
institutionalisation of the guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and showed 
how through a combination of discursive, material (resource-based) and charismatic (being 
part of history) tactics GRI managed to institutionalise. These results were largely echoed by 
Levy et al. (2010) and extended by emphasising field level power relations. Etzion and 
Ferraro (2010) looked at analogies as a mechanism guiding the institutionalization of 
sustainability reporting. They found that in the early stages of institutionalization GRI 
employed an analogy to financial reporting that fostered legitimacy primarily on normative 
grounds. In a second phase the analogy was employed by highlighting differences with 
financial reporting rather than similarities, thereby spurring innovation and 
entrepreneurship. Although these studies have shown how aspects of sustainability 
reporting have developed, they can be (familiarly) criticised for overplaying the strategic 
and rational intentions of the institutional entrepreneur at the expense of unintended 
consequences and the embeddedness of actors in their institutional context.  
 
I have thus far taken stock of various streams of research on sustainability reporting, and 
zoomed in on the institutional perspective. Applying institutional insights to sustainability 
reporting research has been done only scarcely, whereas “... institutional theory’s refutation 
of exclusively rational economic motives of organizational behaviour may serve as a useful 
bridge to less instrumentally reasoned and more socially justified bases for studying 
societal-level harm” (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, et al. 2008: 25). It also permits going 
beyond explanations of sustainability reporting based on business cases and other more 
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functionalist and instrumental accounts, instead allowing for a more historically sensitive 
and dynamic analysis of the phenomenon. Considering the discussed multifaceted nature of 
sustainability reporting, in particular recent advancements on pluralistic and complex 
institutional environments and the position of organisations, ideas, structures, practices 
within these may be insightful (e.g. Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 
2011; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012).  
 
The complexities of the institutionalisation of sustainability reporting 
Not only is sustainability reporting multifaceted due to its moral or value-laden nature (e.g. 
combining profitability with being a good corporate and “doing the right thing”) and its  
attempt to balance social, environmental and economic concerns of a range of 
constituencies. Two further aspects that make it a good example of a pluralistic practice in 
an institutionally complex environment are its embeddedness in a more general discourse 
of rationalisation and, not unrelatedly, potential confusion over or decoupling of the exact 
means and ends of reporting.  
 
One of the most influential pressures in sustainability reporting’s institutional environment 
has arguably been an ongoing emphasis on rationalisation (Miller & Power, 2013), which is 
understood here as “... the cultural accounting of society and its environments in terms of 
articulated, unified, integrated, universalized, and causally and logically structured 
schemes” (Meyer & Jepperson, 2000: 102). This tendency towards rationalisation has 
influenced organisations as they felt institutional pressures towards accountability, 
assessment, and transparency (Bromley & Powell, 2012). As a result of this general 
rationalisation in (at least Western) society, “… a wider range of organizations face multiple 
and competing institutional pressures to expand their formal structures in new ways … The 
operating environment for organizations becomes more fragmented as the numbers and 
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types of uncoordinated actors on whom organizations depend for material resources and 
legitimacy increase” (Bromley & Powell, 2012: 488, emphasis added). Prior studies suggest 
that this fragmentation, i.e. the presence of multiple and oftentimes uncoordinated actors, 
of the institutional environment increases institutional complexity as multiple demands 
need to be considered to gain legitimacy (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010).  
 
A second aspect adding to sustainability reporting’s complex nature follows from this 
rationalisation and the call for accountability, assessment and transparency. One of the 
consequences of these institutional pressures is that firms in their disclosures are “… 
expected to display an increasingly wide array of the proper characteristics of members of 
society, particularly in such spheres as the environment and equality that may be far 
removed from (or even contradictory to) the core goal of production” (Bromley & Powell, 
2012: 485). Following the distinction made by Rose and Miller (1992) between programs 
and technologies, sustainability reporting becomes a technology (or means) towards a 
program (more aspirational goal or end). The problem is that the exact program or goal of 
sustainability is largely unclear, if not disputed (see e.g. Gray, 2006). The chapters below will 
make clear that some stakeholders claim that reporting serves to improve firm valuation. An 
alternative claim is that actually corporate accountability and transparency more broadly is 
what really matters. A third perspective holds that reporting is important because it 
functions as a stick for behavioural change towards a more sustainable world. For now it is 
important to note that “goals are expressions of the core system of values and references of 
organizational constituencies and are, as such, not easily challenged or negotiable” (Pache 
& Santos, 2010: 460). Not only can this lead to a decoupling of the means and ends of 
sustainability reporting (Bromley & Powell, 2012), also disagreements on goals are 
particularly challenging to resolve, adding to institutional complexity (Pache & Santos, 2010: 
460). For instance, Purdy and Gray (2009) examined the development of state offices of 
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dispute resolution in 32 US states. In this case one group argued that these offices should 
serve a democratic goal by including disputants in the decision process whereas others 
assigned a conflicting bureaucratic goal to the offices of handling more routine cases as 
efficiently as possible. The authors addressed the tensions arising from the presence of 
opposing institutional referents and the complexities it adds to institutionalisation.   
 
Taken together, a picture emerges of a multifaceted practice that has developed in a 
pluralistic institutional environment resulting in increased complexity. Notwithstanding that, 
reporting has grown steadily and established itself firmly in the corporate landscape. I will 
return to the above more explicitly in the conclusion chapter of this dissertation, for now it 
mainly serves to contextualise the environment in which sustainability reporting has 
developed and will loosely run as a connecting theme throughout the three empirical 
chapters. I have thus situated this study more broadly in the institutional literature and its 
current emphasis on complexity and pluralism.  
 
The three studies conducted for this particular dissertation can all be seen in this larger 
context and examine aspects of how such complexities are dealt with at the field level. One 
study focuses on the general historical trajectory of sustainability reporting’s 
institutionalisation, a second on the important mechanism of commensuration underlying 
reporting’s institutionalisation and coping with complexity and a third study zooms in on 
attempts to reconcile the inherent complexity of integrated reporting in forging a legitimate 
compromise. Whereas the first study is set quite explicitly as institutional, the second and 
third have with their respective focus on commensuration (an institutional mechanism) and 
orders of worth (an alternative to the popular institutional logics) a more implicit 
institutional flavour. All three studies go beyond rational actor explanations though. They all 
share an interest in the importance of context and external institutional influences and pay 
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specific attention to the consequences for sustainability reporting of pluralism and 
complexity.    
 
Contributions of empirical chapters 
In the following chapters I will analyse this rise of sustainability reporting in more detail. I 
focus on the Dutch context, one of the early adopters and frontrunners regarding this 
practice. To be sure, each chapter can be read as an individual study with its specific 
research questions, theoretical framework, methodological concerns and contributions. To 
allow for additional detail, the studies are somewhat extended compared to the 
conventional journal format though2.Whereas the studies discussed in Chapter Two, Three, 
and Four of this dissertation each have their specific ‘heart and soul’, what binds them 
loosely is in addition to their focus on sustainability reporting also an understanding and 
appreciation of the complex nature of sustainability reporting and its embeddedness in a 
pluralistic (institutional) environment that imposes multiple demands. In the fifth and final 
chapter of this dissertation I briefly summarise the three core chapters and also examine 
how they together can make us better understand sustainability reporting as an accounting 
practice that is a product of its environment and at the same time constitutive of it.   
 
In Chapter Two, I speak to the institutional literature explicitly and provide an alternative 
interpretation of sustainability reporting’s institutionalisation process. With sustainability 
reporting being a multifaceted practice linked to typically vague problems in a relatively 
emerging, uncertain and fragmented field, I draw on the lexicon of the garbage can model 
and its focus on decision making in organised anarchies. Rather than treating the 
institutionalisation as a fairly smooth and linear process driven by a heroic institutional 
entrepreneur, I stipulate its collective and distributed nature and the importance of 
                                                          
2
To be sure, these chapters have all been single authored up to this point. At a later stage, however, some may 
appear in a revised format as co-authored articles in journals or books. 
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chancelike events and historical contingencies. My analysis thus highlights the overall 
messiness of sustainability reporting’s institutionalisation. I depict the process as a 
collective form of institutional entrepreneurship where various actors are involved in the 
enactment of contingencies that open up spaces for action and eventually change as 
problems, solutions, and participants are momentarily matched. Overall, this chapter does 
not negate the role of human agency and purpose in processes of institutionalisation and 
change, but rather relaxes some of its assumptions and offers a lens that specifically makes 
room for the role of serendipity, timing, collectiveness and context and thereby adds a 
touch of realism and nuance to currently popular depictions of institutionalisation and 
change processes.  
 
In Chapter Three I explore how commensuration as a specific mechanism has played a role 
in sustainability reporting’s development. Although not framed explicitly as institutional 
(but see Espeland & Stevens, 1998; Stinchcombe, 2002), I show that the increasing 
commensuration of sustainability reporting exemplifies not only its rationalisation, but is 
also a way to manage the complexity and uncertainty around the practice. In particular I 
examine how a sequence of cognitive, technical and value dimensions of commensuration 
over time have constituted sustainability reporting’s evolution from a values-based practice 
towards a value-based one. I further argue that the transition between these dimensions 
can be explained by emerging pathologies that are underpinned by instances of means-ends 
disconnection, professional insulation and cultural contestation. Taken together, the chapter 
improves our understanding of commensuration as a social process. At the same time the 
chapter shows that commensuration simplifies reporting and makes it more tangible and 
concrete which supports the development of sustainability reporting but simultaneously 
impoverishes the practice by advocating those values that can be made commensurate at 
the expense of other, yet not less important, aspects.  
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In Chapter Four I zoom in even more on the pluralism of sustainability reporting by focusing 
on the various rationalities around integrated reporting, the latest form of sustainability 
reporting that aims to combine and merge financial and sustainability reporting. Drawing on 
the sociology of worth perspective popularised by the French pragmatist school (e.g. 
Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999, 2006), I show the multiplicity of logics of valuation that exist 
around integrated reporting. Moreover, I analyse the possibility of, and impediments to, 
reconciling these multiple rationales in a legitimate compromise. I analyse three 
mechanisms required for a legitimate compromise, namely finding a common interest, 
avoiding clarification and maintaining ambiguity. I argue that integrated reporting is 
typically denounced for privileging the concerns of the market at the expense of seriously 
advancing social and environmental justice. This complicates reaching a durable and shared 
compromise on the meaning and purpose of integrated reporting and rather indicates the 
presence of a limited private arrangement.  
 
Implications for sustainability reporting 
Whereas the specific contributions of the respective papers included in this dissertation 
form the heart of the work’s significance, more generally gaining insight into how 
sustainability reporting has developed over the last 25-odd years has theoretical, empirical 
and practical relevance as well.  
 
First, with this research I add to our understanding of sustainability reporting as an 
accounting practice. Thus far, most studies have offered an undersocialised view of 
sustainability reporting, with a prevalence of considering instrumental technical demands 
rather than acknowledging the importance of cultural, normative, cognitive or regulative 
influences as well. Although the studies that are included in this dissertation resemble 
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related lines of inquiry rather than an unitary conceptual paradigm (Powell & Bromley, 
forthcoming), they do all hint at the role of “historical struggles over prevailing 
understandings and rules of the game” (Brammer et al., 2012: 9). Moreover, a more 
historical and dynamic analysis of sustainability reporting shows the constitutive nature of 
this accounting practice in the sense that it helps to further rationalise business and society 
relations and ultimately aids to an environment in which “economization of organizational 
life becomes elaborated and institutionalized” (Miller & Power, 2013: 558).  In addition, my 
studies hint at how sustainability reporting’s rationalised and pluralistic institutional 
environment can give impetus to a decoupling of the means and ends of reporting, which of 
course has more practical concerns attached to it as well. Taken together, a more 
comprehensive picture of sustainability reporting emerges that highlights both its reactive 
functional elements and constitutive power. 
 
Second, this dissertation makes an empirical contribution to the sustainability accounting 
and reporting literature as it provides a rich historical account of sustainability reporting. 
These studies have been surprisingly absent to date, as observed by various scholars 
commenting on the general lack of in particular more in-depth qualitative work in the 
sustainability reporting field (e.g. Gray, 2002; Owen, 2008; Parker, 2005).  My study is a 
good example though of “direct researcher engagement in the field, via qualitative research 
and inductive theorising” (Parker, 2005: 856) that improves our understanding of how 
sustainability reporting came to be (e.g. possibly a less purposeful and more collective and 
random project than assumed), the driving forces behind its development (e.g. 
commensuration, its consequences and the actors involved) and also the challenges ahead 
in further developing the practice (e.g. integrated reporting and its impediments and 
potential). Overall, this account thus allows for a deeper and more dynamic understanding 
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of sustainability reporting and how it has developed compared to theoretical literature 
based studies or accounts based on surveys and content analyses.    
 
Finally, a better understanding of the rise of sustainability reporting presents a practical 
contribution too. Corporate sustainability initiatives such as reporting tend to attract a 
degree of criticism, even cynicism at times, when it comes to their sincerity and ultimate 
relevance. For instance, Boiral’s (2007: 127) study on the corporate adoption of the ISO 
14001-standard, and his claim that adoption often was “ceremonial behavior intended to 
superficially show that the certified organizations conformed to the standard” is a good 
example here. Accusations of sustainability reporting being a corporate smokescreen to 
hide unsustainability rather than a genuine effort towards accountability, transparency and 
a more sustainable world are thus easily made. Having paid attention to the plurality of 
different purposes, voices and opinions on sustainability reporting throughout all chapters 
of this dissertation, it can offer useful guidance on how to recognise and subsequently 
manage the tensions at the interface between business and society. Whereas the next 
chapter will stipulate the role of serendipity, this does not exclude practitioners from 
making the most of emerging opportunities, perhaps simply even slightly less cramped and 
controlled. Moreover, for a broadly accepted and meaningful form of reporting to continue, 
its increasing rationalisation and commensuration in combination with its complex nature 
highlights the importance of a more communicative approach that takes into account a 
multi-stakeholder view. Finally, in particular the justification framework of the fourth 
chapter stipulates the importance of a slightly ambiguous common interest and thereby 
alludes to compromise enhancing strategies.   
 
Taken as a whole, in this dissertation I thus illustrate how sustainability reporting has 
developed into a legitimate practice by examining its development over the last 25 years in 
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the Netherlands. The studies conducted here specifically aim to advance our historical 
understanding of how the complex and multifaceted practice of sustainability reporting has 
blossomed in its pluralistic institutional environment. I scrutinise institutionalisation and 
change processes more generally by highlighting how historical contingencies fortuitously 
bring for a moment order in the chaotic universe of problems, solutions and participants 
and thus create opportunities for change. Furthermore, my studies explore more specific 
mechanisms of coping with reporting’s muddle. I first propose that commensuration further 
rationalises reporting’s development and institutionalisation. Second, the conflicting 
rationales of valuation around integrated reporting require the forging of a legitimate 
compromise for which a sufficiently ambiguous common interest between actors has to be 
found.  
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Chapter 2 - Chance or genius?: A garbage can exploration of the 
institutionalisation of sustainability reporting in the 
Netherlands 
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“To study the laws of history we must completely change the subject of our 
observation, must leave aside kings, ministers, and generals, and study the 
common, infinitesimally small elements by which the masses are moved. No one can 
say in how far it is possible for man to advance in this way towards an 
understanding of the laws of history; but it is evident that only along that path does 
the possibility of discovering the laws of history lie” 
    (Excerpt from Tolstoy’s “War and Peace”, 2001: 653) 
 
“Sometimes there's a man, I won't say a hero, because what's a hero? But 
sometimes there’s a man.  ... Sometimes there's a man who, well, he's the man for 
his time and place, he fits right in there” 
    (‘The Stranger’ in ‘The Big Lebowski’) 
 
Introduction 
Since the early 1990s, sustainability reporting, or “reporting which covers the 
environmental and social aspects of an organisation’s performance as well as the economic 
aspects” (Hubbard, 2009: 3), has grown steadily, particularly among larger firms. From 
being marginal in the late 1980’s (Kolk, 2004a), by 2012 over 6000 firms disclose a broad set 
of non-financial information in reports, according to the reports directory of 
CorporateRegister.com (2013), and 95% of the world’s largest 250 companies published a 
sustainability report in 2011 (KPMG, 2011a). In 2013 the European Commission adopted a 
proposal for a directive asking larger firms to disclose environmental and social information 
in their annual reports, thereby further solidifying the acceptance of this form of non-
financial disclosure and its importance for the firm. This growth has been achieved despite 
sustainability reporting’s inherently complex nature keeping in mind the plurality of voices 
behind the economic, social and environmental aspects that it aims to bring together. I ask 
how sustainability reporting’s development can be explained and draw on insights from 
institutional theory and the garbage can model.   
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This rise of reporting has led some scholars to regard sustainability reporting as a case of 
institutionalisation (Brown, de Jong, & Lessidrenska, 2009; Etzion & Ferraro, 2010; Kolk, 
2010; Larrinaga-González, 2007), i.e. it has become an increasingly normalised and taken-
for-granted form of social behaviour upon which organisations routinely act (Barley, 2008; 
Hoffman, 1999; Jepperson, 1991). For some time, researchers have gone beyond their 
initial focus on isomorphism and the homogenising effects of reproductive institutional 
pressures (e.g. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Instead, they have 
started to puzzle over how institutions arise and change by focusing on the role of agency 
and actorhood (e.g. Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002; 
DiMaggio, 1988; Garud, Hardy, & Maguire, 2007; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007; Maguire, 
Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004), epitomised more than anything by the stream of studies on 
institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009; Garud et al., 2007; Hardy & Maguire, 
2008; Maguire et al., 2004).  
 
This literature typically focuses on “the activities of actors who have an interest in 
particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions 
or to transform existing ones” (Maguire et al., 2004: 657). This works, for instance, through 
creating a persuasive vision for change, assembling cultural, cognitive and material 
resources as well as mobilising allies and opportunities for change (see e.g. Battilana et al., 
2009; Garud et al., 2007; Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Pacheco, York, Dean, & 
Sarasvathy, 2010). These studies typically explain sustainability reporting’s 
institutionalisation by combining the interrelated assumptions that 1) a limited number of 
coordinated individual and organizational actors (institutional entrepreneurs) are 2) 
endowed with concentrated (strategic) agency and 3) typically aim to create or change 
institutions with an almost heroic foresight and purpose, thereby making institutional 
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processes look a rather mechanistic, linear and almost teleological affair (see e.g. Blackler & 
Regan, 2006; Delbridge & Edwards, 2008).  
 
These assumptions may indeed hold as long as issues are not too complex and take place in 
fields that are not highly fragmented and at least moderately institutionalised (see e.g. 
Dorado, 2005). Sustainability practices (e.g. sustainability reporting), however, are salient 
examples where this is not the case (Whiteman, Walker, & Perego, 2013). That is, these 
typically more multifaceted practices linked to complex social problems in relatively 
emerging, uncertain and heterogeneous fields where cause-effect relations remain unclear 
become more problematic to explain (Dorado, 2005; Greenwood et al., 2011), as current 
accounts offer too simplified a picture (Czarniawska, 2009; Dorado, 2005; Wijen & Ansari, 
2007). Some recent work has therefore started to problematise the assumption of 
concentrated agency of single actors and how it undermines the collective work 
undertaken by distributed actors (see e.g. Czarniawska, 2009; Delbridge & Edwards, 2008; 
Dorado, 2005; Wijen & Ansari, 2007). This work focuses on the “process of overcoming 
collective inaction and achieving sustained collaboration among numerous dispersed actors 
to create new institutions or transform existing ones” (Wijen & Ansari, 2007: 1079). Despite 
relaxing the assumptions of the intentionally strategic individual entrepreneur, most 
studies still maintain an unrealistic “heroic”, teleological and visionary flavour though that 
warrants further problematisation (see e.g. Aldrich, 2011; Czarniawska, 2009; Lounsbury & 
Crumley, 2007). 
 
Cziarniawska (2009: 438) in this respect coined the analogy of portraying institutions as 
‘anthills’ instead. This signifies not just institutional collectivity, complexity and multiplicity, 
but moreover refers to the observation that an  “anthill is not a building erected according 
to a plan; it is a practice of long standing, taken for granted by the ants ... and can be built 
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only in specific places where specific materials are available, and at specific times”. In short, 
historical contingencies, or the oftentimes arbitrary but forgotten, neglected or silenced 
historical events that have a constraining effect on institutional trajectories, are flagged up. 
She interestingly hints at the potential of the garbage can model (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 
1972; March & Olsen, 1976) as a lens that “purposefully dramatized” these more 
serendipitous aspects. This model views “organizational life as highly contextual, driven 
primarily by timing and coincidence” (Olsen, 2001: 193). It has at its core a concern for 
behaviour in a complex and uncertain environment (i.e. sustainability reporting) with an 
unstructured, loosely-coupled and serendipitous interplay between problems, solutions, 
decision makers and decision moments that comprise social order or institutions. In effect, 
the importance of an alternative interpretation along these lines rests in its potential that it 
allows for a compromise between “simple renderings of history that are inconsistent with 
reality and complex renderings that are inconsistent with human capacities for 
comprehension” (March & Olsen, 1998: 969).  
 
In this study I empirically analyse the historical trajectory of sustainability reporting in the 
Netherlands and its gradual institutionalisation. Interpreting institutional processes through 
the lens of the garbage can model first offers an increased sense of realism to many 
simplified, intentionalised and post-hoc rationalised institutional accounts (Czarniawska, 
2009; March & Olsen, 1998). Moreover, it is particularly apt for analysing more complex, 
fragmented and thus uncertain institutional processes. As the institutional environment in 
today’s global organisational landscape is increasingly characterised by complexity and 
pluralism (e.g. Bromley & Powell, 2012; Greenwood et al., 2011), combining institutional 
theory and the garbage can model can help to explain how institutionalisation and change 
function in such circumstances. Based on 94 interviews and secondary data sources I 
qualitatively explore how against a background of historical contingencies a plurality of 
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dispersed actors muddled through in the institutionalisation of sustainability reporting. I 
find that in the 1980’s first the environment becomes a management issue with disclosure 
largely internal and not publicly available. In the wake of the 1992 Earth Summit and Shell’s 
Brent Spar incident the importance of sustainability disclosure gets increasingly recognised 
and expected, and reporting slowly develops. Whereas regulation at the turn of the century 
fails to succeed, in the wake of accounting scandals and the GRI Guidelines investors and 
consultants get behind reporting as well which starts to get traction. In the second half of 
the decade guidelines professionalise and various rankings and benchmarks pop up that 
further popularise reporting as it becomes more concrete and eventually broadly accepted 
and expected.     
 
Overall I present an alternative interpretation of a more familiar institutional story. It 
should be noted here though that the aims of this study are both exploratory and modest. 
That is, rather than developing a full alternative model of institutional change and a radical 
overturning of institutional entrepreneurship, I primarily seek to flex some of the 
assumptions that underpin much of the literature by using insights from the garbage can 
model rather than applying it as a blueprint. I aim to show that in addition to the purposive 
work that certainly takes place, institutional processes contain many similarities with more 
uncertain and ambiguous garbage can processes which help us to better understand 
institutionalisation and change in a less teleological and more realistic light.  
 
With this study I make the following two broad contributions. First, I build on existing work 
on the process of institutional entrepreneurship and change (e.g. Battilana et al., 2009; 
Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002). In particular by relying on the garbage can model I 
consider the importance of historical contingencies as possible enabling factors of 
institutional change. I thereby also relax the dominant assumptions of intentionality and 
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purpose (see Aldrich, 2011; Blackler & Regan, 2006; Czarniawska, 2009) and question the 
portrayal of institutional entrepreneurship as a teleological deterministic process. Second, I 
empirically extend the few existing accounts of the role of distributed agency in 
institutional change (e.g. Delbridge & Edwards, 2008; Dorado, 2005; Lounsbury & Crumley, 
2007; Quack, 2007; Wijen & Ansari, 2007), thereby challenging the dominant notion of the 
heroic individual institutional entrepreneur. More precisely, the garbage can lexicon of 
problems, solutions and participants floating in a system and temporarily fixed around 
choices helps to explain how collective institutional action takes shape. It highlights, again, 
the importance of oftentimes serendipitous events and shows how actors muddle through, 
sometimes more and at other times less strategically and intentionally and together 
assemble a meaningful collage that matches chancelike events with the needs of the 
moment. 
 
The outline of this paper is as follows. First, I will discuss aspects of the literature on the 
role of agency in institutional change and in particular extant work on institutional 
entrepreneurship and more collective forms of this through distributed agency. I 
subsequently examine the oftentimes purposive and structured depiction of 
institutionalisation and change and the relative absence of its inevitable serendipitous and 
historically contingent facets. I consider how insights from the garbage can model can add 
to our understanding of institutional change. Next, I will discuss my empirical case and 
methods of data collection and analysis used. After presenting my findings I will discuss 
their implications for the institutional literature and propose interesting areas for future 
research.   
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Theoretical framework 
Institutional entrepreneurship: an uncertain, historical and collective process 
Institutionalisation and change has received much attention over the last two decades (see 
e.g. Dacin et al., 2002; Garud et al., 2007; Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, et al., 2008). It was a 
response against the structural turn of the earlier new institutionalism (e.g. DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) with its focus on isomorphism and diffusion 
through, predominantly, mimetic pressures (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). That is, rather than 
actors being caught in an all-capturing web of institutions without any sense of agency 
(DiMaggio, 1988; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Oliver, 1991, 1992), they at the same time 
actively interact with their institutional context and therefore can (re)construct this context 
while being embedded (Seo & Creed, 2002) or nested (Holm, 1995) in it. This so-called 
“paradox of embedded agency” (Seo & Creed, 2002: 228) has received much scholarly 
interest (Battilana, 2006; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). Extant work has put a lot of focus 
on the work of the actors involved in institutional change, most notably institutional 
entrepreneurs as legitimising change agents, and on understanding the general process of 
institutionalisation and change.  
 
To be sure, much of this research has focused on the institutional field level (e.g. Anand & 
Watson, 2004; Garud et al., 2002; Greenwood et al., 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; 
Munir & Phillips, 2005; Munir, 2005; Wooten & Hoffman, 2008). A field is here understood 
as the arena where combined organisations, actors and institutions constitute a recognised 
area of institutional life and create a common system of meaning (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983: 148). The Dutch sustainability reporting field sees actors as diverse as investors and 
accountants to environmental and human rights activists, and deals with a relatively new, 
fuzzy and multi-interpretable concept (sustainability), allowing a multitude of ideas 
entering the field, also from abroad.  
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Institutional theorists have developed convincing accounts of the role of institutional 
entrepreneurs in changing and developing institutions. We know that institutional  
entrepreneurs operate in mature (Beckert, 1999; Greenwood et al., 2002) and emerging 
fields (Garud et al., 2002; Maguire et al., 2004). We also know they engage in framing (Rao, 
1998; Zilber, 2002), utilise political tactics (Levy & Scully, 2007), mobilise resources 
(Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 2008), identify opportunities (Dorado, 2005), theorise new 
ideas (Greenwood et al., 2002), and occupy legitimate and strategic subject positions 
(Maguire et al., 2004). As noted by Lounsbury and Crumley (2007: 993), however, “the 
notion of ‘institutional entrepreneur’ too often invokes ‘hero’ imagery and deflects 
attention away from the wider array of actors and activities” and thus does not allow us to 
understand completely the collective dimensions of institutional change as it “…results 
from spatially dispersed, heterogeneous activity by actors with varying kinds and levels of 
resources”. One consequence of this is that studies run the risk of oversimplifying and 
overlooking the dynamics, messiness and complexities of institutional change (Delbridge & 
Edwards, 2008) as well as its dependence on historical contingencies (Czarniawska, 2009).  
 
Recently some studies have therefore started to analyse cases characterised by collective 
or distributed forms of agency (see e.g. Delbridge & Edwards, 2008; Dorado, 2005; Quack, 
2007; Reay & Hinings, 2005; Wijen & Ansari, 2007). For example, Wijen and Ansari (2007) 
studied the collective institutional entrepreneurship involved on a transnational level in 
global climate policy and thereby tried to explain cooperation in collective action domains. 
Combining institutional and regime theories, they identified mobilising bandwagons, 
manipulating power configurations, creating common ground, devising incentive structures, 
applying ethical guidelines and using implementation mechanisms as drivers employed by 
acts of convening. Delbridge and Edwards’ (2008) analysis of the superyacht industry 
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showed the various roles of a plurality of, oftentimes disconnected, actors involved and 
their embeddedness in a historical and social context. Whereas the skills of the institutional 
entrepreneur remain of importance, unexpected changes in regulation, advances in 
technologies, (un)intentional opportunity creation by actors and market changes were 
equally pivotal for institutional change to succeed. Although these accounts still often 
endow actors with considerable “...  strategic intentions, foresight, and sophisticated social 
skills” (Aldrich, 2011: 2), Delbridge and Edwards (2008) do interestingly hint at the 
importance of more serendipitous historical processes.  
 
These latter points thus start to question the tendency of intentionality and structured 
design that exists among institutional studies more generally. Studies typically portray 
institutionalisation and change as quite a linear and mechanistic process (Blackler & Regan, 
2006) in which foresighted actors hitting their targets seem to be the rule rather than the 
exception (Aldrich, 2011). This also shows in work that has concentrated on modelling the 
process of how new institutions emerge and develop, or how existing ones continue to 
change (see e.g. Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Battilana et al., 2009; Greenwood et al., 2002; 
Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983, 1996). For instance, Greenwood 
and colleagues (2002) build on earlier work by Tolbert and Zucker (1996) and offer a stage-
model where exogenous jolts destabilise the status quo and precipitate a period of 
deinstitutionalisation where institutional entrepreneurship becomes likely as new actors 
enter the scene or old ones rise to prominence. The technical innovation and 
experimentation of these actors could lead to pre-institutionalisation, after which the new 
practice needs to be both theorised as a justified solution to a specified organisational 
failing. Upon legitimate theorisation the practice could be further objectified and thereby 
diffused, ultimately leading to re-institutionalisation as a taken-for-granted practice.  
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By no means without merits, and arguably suitable for less complex and multifaceted fields, 
in many theoretical and empirical studies on institutional entrepreneurship and change 
“...little is said by these authors about the relevance of muddles, misunderstandings, false 
starts, conflicts and loose ends that are likely also to be attendant features of processes of 
institutional change” (Blackler & Regan, 2006: 1845). A similar observation has been made 
by March and Olsen (1998: 954) when they consider the possibility of treating institutional 
“history as inefficient, as following a meandering path affected by multiple equilibria and 
endogenous transformations of interests and resources” rather than “following a course 
that leads inexorably and relatively quickly to a unique equilibrium dictated by exogenously 
determined interests and resources”. In short, typically neglected are the often more 
random, muddled and historically contingent aspects of change (see Blackler & Regan, 
2006; Delbridge & Edwards, 2008; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007), perhaps unsurprising 
considering the discussed efficient and visionary portrayal of institutional entrepreneurs.  
 
In cases in which fields are homogeneous, little fragmented or more mature this may 
possibly not be very problematic. Current institutional accounts seem too simplified a 
depiction of reality though when confronted with situations in which actors are multiple, 
institutional change concerned with complex multi-dimensional social problems and 
institutionalisation still relatively low (Czarniawska, 2009; Dorado, 2005; Wijen & Ansari, 
2007). Sustainability-related practices are generally good examples of the latter scenario 
(Whiteman et al., 2013). To explore the specifics of “decision-making processes in 
opportunity hazy *i.e. uncertain+ environments” (Dorado, 2005: 402), such as sustainability 
reporting, a type of institutionalism that allows not just for a collective approach but that 
can also incorporate historical contingencies is potentially insightful. Despite the self-
evidence that eventually defines institutions, “their mundane origins lie in an unexamined 
distant past” (Aldrich, 2011: 3). We still know relatively little, however, about these less 
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purposeful and heroic but more mundane historical origins. That is, the more serendipitous 
nature of many events that affect an institutional trajectory and how they eventually guide 
the evolution of institutions with the help of collective actors and what may be called a 
mixture of ‘chance and genius’ is worth more attention (see e.g. Aldrich, 2011; Battilana et 
al., 2009; Czarniawska, 2009; Dorado, 2005; Wijen & Ansari, 2007). 
 
To address these concerns, I follow Cziarniawska’s (2009) suggestion that our 
understanding of institutionalisation and change can possibly be enhanced by applying 
insights derived from garbage can model situations (Cohen et al., 1972; March & Olsen, 
1976). Exploring this model within an institutional perspective allows not just for a 
multiplication of actors, but stresses their connections. Moreover, it specifically raises the 
possibility of envisioning institutionalisation as a more complex, random and historically 
contingent process rather than the relatively neat models that typically characterise the 
studies above. 
The garbage can model 
The garbage can model (Cohen et al., 1972) was developed to explain decision-making in 
‘organised anarchy’ or uncertain and ambiguous environments. These are situations 
characterised by problematic and ambiguous goals (e.g. What is sustainability reporting 
for?), unclear technologies (e.g. How are metrics in sustainability reporting measured?) and 
fluid participation of actors over time (e.g. Who is involved in the sustainability reporting 
field?). Rather than decisions being taken as part of a structured process in which generally 
purposive actors use their foresight, evaluations and rationality (i.e. concentrated agency 
by institutional entrepreneurs), more complex and uncertain decision situations are 
alternatively described as an interplay between fairly independent ‘streams’ of problems, 
solutions, decision makers, and choice opportunities (i.e. decision occasions). Choices 
resulting from these uncertain decision situations are dependent on the temporal flows of 
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these various streams and further influenced by structural elements. In the garbage can 
model choices are not necessarily made by neatly attaching them to solutions and 
problems. Although this can be the case (resolution), yet is rarely so, typically decisions and 
choices are made before an actual problem is attached to them (oversight), or when a 
problem has actually seized to be linked to a choice and has become attached to a different 
choice, with the decision thus being made yet without resolving the problem (flight) (Cohen 
et al., 1972; March & Olsen, 1984).  
 
Czarniawska (2009: 438) suggested a slight modification of this model for it to be utilised 
within an institutional framework by “equating garbage can with zeitgeist”. With the 
garbage can treating structure as largely exogenous, I follow Czarniawswka’s (2009) 
suggestion of paying more attention to the contextual and institutional elements, or ‘spirit 
of the time’ as influencing the institutional trajectory. Institutionalisation becomes a 
process in which it becomes possible to see “... collections of choices looking for problems, 
issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions 
looking for issues to which they might be an answer, and decision makers looking for work” 
(Cohen et al., 1972: 1). Clear from the above, conceptualising institutionalisation and 
change along these lines allows for a more distributed notion of agency and collective 
forms of entrepreneurship that make possible an appreciation of the importance of 
historical contingencies. As “*d+ecisions are produced to a large extent by the temporal 
linkages of problems, solutions, choice opportunities, and decision makers” (Olsen, 2001: 
193) this model lends itself well for a more longitudinal analysis of the institutionalisation of 
a practice over time. This will thus be the scope of this paper as it describes the temporal 
narrative of Dutch sustainability reporting. Ultimately, rather than viewing 
institutionalisation and change through institutional entrepreneurs as a linear and 
mechanistic process, the garbage can model potentially allows to examine it depending on 
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“... how that situation (and the participants in it) fit into a mosaic of simultaneous 
performances involving other individuals, other places, other concerns, and the phasing of 
other events. What happens is often the most fortuitous result of the intermeshing of 
loosely-coupled processes” (March & Olsen, 1976: 26). Decisions are thus often based on 
serendipitous timing where solutions and problems match a choice opportunity, or where 
decision makers are fortuitously attached to choice opportunities. The institutionalisation 
of sustainability reporting in this light is therefore not simply an efficient solution for a well-
defined problem but a messier and more complex story. Below I will explore the 
institutionalisation of sustainability reporting and apply the garbage can model to this case.  
 
Methods3 
For this research I draw on a single case study of the rise of sustainability reporting in the 
Netherlands from the early 1990’s until the mid-00’s of the 21st century. To tell the 
narrative of reporting I rely on a qualitative field analytic approach (Lounsbury & Crumley, 
2007; Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000) that 
helps to track changes over time in the evolution of the practice of sustainability reporting 
and the co-evolutionary dynamics of actors, problems, decisions and their operating 
context. I focus in particular on its development among larger enterprises and how they 
have approached sustainability reporting rather than the specific issue of SME reporting. 
The practice has evolved from peripheral and inconsequential, to one both common and 
generally expected (Appendix A) in my period of study. To be sure, this is not to say that 
sustainability reporting has by now fully institutionalised, yet it has become increasingly 
legitimate on both a pragmatic, normative and cognitive level.  
                                                          
3
 Some replication of the methods sections of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 cannot be avoided here as the respective 
chapters share a lot of methodological aspects.  
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Case selection 
I draw on the development of sustainability reporting in the Netherlands for a number of 
reasons. First, the Dutch sustainability reporting case can be characterised as a “complex 
social setting in which causal dynamics were not immediately apparent and the motivations 
of actors were obscure” (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006: 31). As suggested in the theoretical 
section above, a focus on relatively lowly institutionalised, complex and uncertain field 
(Dorado, 2005) with multiple actors involved (Delbridge & Edwards, 2008; Garud & Karnøe, 
2003) is most fitting for my study. A focus on sustainability reporting’s gradual evolution 
until the mid-00’s forms a good example of this. The sustainability reporting field (Etzion & 
Ferraro, 2010; Larrinaga-González, 2007) has emerged over time with firms, investors, 
government agencies, standard setters and civil society entering and leaving the field’s 
porous boundaries. Sustainability reporting is thus appropriate to study institutionally and 
forms a good exemplary case in which various subject positions, events, activities and  
decision moments are “transparently observable” allowing for theoretical development 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 537) and a better understanding of the historically contingent elements 
of collective entrepreneurship in complex and uncertain environments. 
 
Second, sustainability related practices are, despite their global aspects, typically local in 
character (e.g. Adams & Kuasirikun, 2000; Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995; Kolk, 2005), 
focusing on a specific country is appropriate. The Netherlands has been one of the early 
adopters and frontrunners in reporting (KPMG, 2011a), making it possible to examine its 
evolution over a longer period of time as reporting gradually matured and institutionalised. 
As the history of reporting is well documented, access to data both in terms of primary 
interviews with actors of the past and present, as well as supporting secondary data was 
possible. This makes it possible to carefully scrutinise the history of sustainability reporting 
and strengthen the validity of the case analysis.   
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Data collection 
In this study I combine interviews and a range of secondary sources such as newspaper 
articles and reports. This triangulation enhances trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), 
makes it easier to see the data in a historical context (Yin, 2009) while at the same time tells 
us about the experiences of the multiple actors involved  and the context in which instances 
of decision-making took place (Bryman & Bell, 2007).   
 
The first step of data collection was to have conversations with four key informants. These 
four people all had a minimum of ten years experience in various facets of the Dutch 
sustainability reporting field, as well as extensive knowledge of its international context. 
These conversations, in combination with a prior reading of the phenomenon under study, 
provided me with a good initial overview of the field’s ‘who, what, when, how’. Based on 
these initial conversations and reading, it became clear that the Dutch reporting field would 
be an interesting case to look into the matter of a more collective and contingent type of 
institutional change process. I thus commenced drawing up a first list of prospective 
interviewees, based on these prior talks, reading and conference attendance lists. After 
contacting the first wave of interviewees and subsequently conducting the interviews, a 
snowball sampling technique was applied based on further recommendations of 
interviewees (Bryman & Bell, 2007). This approach made it possible to efficiently 
concentrate on contacting field actors with desired characteristics fitting the framing of the 
study, more akin to theoretical sampling (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  
Table 1 Overview of interviewees 
Actor group Number of interviewees 
Public sector 12 
Civil society 24 
Investment community 13 
Reporting firms 25 
Academics 6 
Professional services firms 26 
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Table 2 Overview of data sources 
Type of data Detail of source Amount of 
data 
Data analysis 
Interviews 
with field 
informants 
Interviews with firms, civil 
society, investors/raters, 
consultants, accountants, 
policy officials, 
academics.  
94 
interviews 
with a total 
duration of 
approx. 100 
hours  
Transcribed interviews, 
analysed and coded the 
material. Through iterative 
analysis of data and literature 
the garbage can model surfaced 
and the data was analysed 
along its main tenets 
Secondary 
material 
Newspaper articles of 
Dutch press, consultancy 
reports, NGO studies, 
government legislation 
and reports; investor 
statements 
3100 pages Contextual reading and field 
familiarization. Background for 
interviews; enhanced credibility 
and further validation of 
interview data interpretations; 
identifying key events and 
developments.  
 
 
From February 2011 until February 2012 94 anonymous interviews were conducted (see 
table 1). The interviews were semi-structured with a broad interview outline as background 
guidance (Appendix F). These interviews lasted typically between 1 and 1,5 hours, and the 
total hours of interview material was just over 100. All but seven interviews were digitally 
recorded and transcribed. For those interviews that were not recorded extensive notes 
were taken. Conducting these interviews allowed for an in-depth understanding of both 
past and present moments, and the circumstances of these moments, that were of 
importance for the development of sustainability reporting (Malhotra & Birks, 2003). In 
order to avoid the risk of retrospective bias (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Morris, 1981), 
particularly an issue for interviews that discussed the more distant history of reporting, 
extensive prior research (e.g. internet search, documents, information from previous 
interviewees) was undertaken. This was done in order to be able to ask specific questions, 
assist interviewees in structuring their thoughts and memories, and come up with 
counterfactuals to test their statements in case required. The interviews progressed until 
both empirical and theoretical saturation levels were reached. The interviews focused on 
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the following main question areas: (a) understanding of sustainability reporting; (b) 
stakeholders involved in sustainability reporting; (c) important or critical moments in the 
development of sustainability reporting; (d) existence of conflicts or problems and ways to 
overcome them; (e) context in which aspects discussed under (c) and (d) took place.   
 
Second, I used a diverse collection of secondary data sources (see table 2). Articles in main 
Dutch business and general newspapers, government reports, publications of professional 
service firms, reports and statements of NGO’s and investors, academic publications and 
integrated reports of companies were consulted. The main purpose of this data was first for 
contextual reading and field familiarization. Subsequently, it was also used as preparatory 
reading for interviews and, together with the interview data, for setting up an event history 
database of important moments in the evolution of sustainability reporting. The secondary 
data enhanced credibility and further validated my interpretations of the primary interview 
data as it was used as a form of “checks and balances” against to test insights derived from 
interview material (Yin, 2009). Finally, of those documents considered particularly relevant 
for answering the research questions of this study, document summary forms were 
prepared and subsequently analysed together with the interview data, further enhancing 
triangulation, as explained below. Taken together, these various data sources accumulated 
into a data set from which robust conclusions could be drawn.  
Data analysis 
The data analysis process for this study consisted of several stages. The analysis was 
assisted by the use of NVivo software for qualitative data analysis. Not uncommon for more 
interpretative research based on rich qualitative data, I iteratively moved between the 
empirical material, generated concepts and prior theoretical constructs throughout the 
analysis (Locke, 2001).  
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In the first stage of my data analysis I tried to depict the evolution of sustainability 
reporting in the Netherlands. Rather than having a very specific research question in mind 
here, the aim of this phase was to get a better understanding of the ‘who, what, when, 
where and how’ of my particular case and an overarching concern for its 
institutionalisation. As is not uncommon in qualitative institutional studies, I analysed the 
empirical material and arranged it to construct a chronological database of salient events 
(see e.g. Ansari & Phillips, 2011; Maguire & Hardy, 2013). This overview (Appendix B) was 
used as the very broad basis of the description of the analysis below, as well as to gain 
insight into the complexity and multiplicity of the case and important events and changes of 
importance later in the analysis. 
 
In the second stage, based on the multiple systematic readings of the empirical material 
and the construction of the database it soon became apparent that some of the 
assumptions of most studies on institutionalisation and change were in contradiction with 
my observations. Most fundamentally, rather than a single identifiable institutional 
entrepreneur my case suggested the presence of multiple ‘entrepreneurs’, or perhaps 
rather ‘institutional ants’ (Czarniawska, 2009). In addition, analysing the rise of reporting 
did not seem to resemble a fairly neat linear and mechanistic process either, but rather a 
more muddled and random affair. This made me assess the possibility that some 
institutional assumptions may rather be ill-fitted for everyday reality. It was upon this 
realisation of the problematisation of commonly held assumptions (Alvesson & Sandberg, 
2011, 2013) that I consulted the literature again in search for an alternative explanation for 
the development of Dutch sustainability reporting. Here I considered the potential of the 
garbage can model. Thus, rather than having the garbage can model as a core concept from 
the outset it emerged from the empirical material during the analysis of the data.  
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In the third stage the initial inductive approach was replaced by what can best be described 
as a more abductive (Peirce, 1978) approach focused on answering my research question. 
That is, rather than swinging the pendulum radically toward a more hypothetical-deductive 
strategy I relied on a more middle-ground strategy of iteratively comparing the raw 
empirical material with the various dimensions identified by the garbage can model, as 
previously discussed in the theoretical section of this paper. The analysis of the data thus 
resulted in a tabular format (table 3) which will be narratively discussed in the findings 
section. In this stage I coded the empirical material by systematically looking for instances 
of choice opportunities, problems, solutions and participants. First, participants were 
examined by analysing transcripts and reports, indicating actors entering and leaving the 
field or their importance thriving and waning over time. In line with earlier work using this 
approach (e.g. Rommetveit, 1976: 143–48) I subsequently studied transcripts and 
documents to find out “what did the main groups of participants in each period perceive as 
problematic and what solutions were put forward in answer to these problems?” I then 
structured my analysis around carefully scrutinising important events and developments 
(and confirming these with interviewees) with the event history as the starting point, as 
inferred from the empirical material by cross-referencing insights derived from the 
interviews, documents and the developed database. What became choice opportunities 
were moments where routine reactions or reactions as a consequence of an external event 
were at play. Combining these elements formed the backbone of sustainability reporting’s 
institutional story over time.  
 
The resulting story thus resembles a narrative strategy, which is useful for “descriptively 
representing process data in a systematic organized form” (Langley, 1999: 707). As the aim 
of my research “is to achieve understanding of organizational phenomena not through 
formal oppositions but by providing "vicarious experience" of a real setting in all its richness 
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and complexity (Lincoln & Guba , 1985: 359)” (Langley, 1999: 695) I decided to employ this 
strategy, following for instance Czarniawska (2009) and Delbridge and Edwards (2008). A 
narrative strategy generally provides a very accurate account as it is deeply rooted in the 
data, yet possible at the expense of offering a simple and general theory (Langley, 1999).  
 
Findings 
As discussed in the theoretical section, my analysis is inspired by the assumptions and logic 
of the garbage can model. In my aim to show that reporting’s institutional trajectory 
contains similarities with more uncertain and ambiguous garbage can processes I draw on 
both the institutional and garbage can literature in the narrative explanation of a selection 
of developments in sustainability reporting’s institutionalisation below. The following story 
thus stipulates the historical contingencies in reporting’s trajectory and does so by framing 
this in the lexicon of problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities. First I 
present a short background of reporting.  
Table 3 Summary of the sequence of events 
Time period Participants Problems Solutions Choice 
opportunities 
Environmental 
management 
systems 
(<1990) 
Firms 
 
 
 
Civil 
society/NGO’s 
 
 
Government 
 
 
 
 
Consultants 
Lack of trust 
 
 
 
No access to firm 
data  
 
 
How to improve 
environmental 
monitoring and 
control? 
 
How to generate 
revenue? 
Showing care 
through 
management 
 
Publicly 
available data 
 
 
Management 
system  
 
 
 
New regulation 
and/or tools to 
consult on 
Introduction 
EMS 
 
 
Reporting 
aspect of EMS 
 
 
Conducive 
climate for EMS 
 
 
 
Introduction 
EMS  
Crisis and 
emerging( soft) 
law  
NGO’s 
 
 
Firms 
unaccountable 
for degradation 
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Prelude - Antecedents of reporting 
As for some antecedents of Dutch sustainability reporting, its exact start is hard to define, 
as a “... search for true beginnings is likely to end in infinite regress. No useful idea has a 
sharp beginning, for each beginning has an antecedent. Garbage can ideas are like that” 
(Cohen, March, & Olsen, 2012: 20). DSM, a Dutch chemical giant, was arguably the first to 
publish an environmental report in 1987 (Van Tulder & Van der Zwart, 2003), but this did 
not happen overnight. A conducive environment generally emerged with seminal 
publications such as Rachel Carson’s (1962) “Silent Spring”, the Club of Rome’s (1972) 
“Limits to Growth” and “Our Common Future” (1987) of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (WCED). In addition, disclosing corporate information was 
not a novel concept in the Netherlands as already in 1974 the Dutch made a start with the 
development of the Emission Register, which subsequently formed an inspiration and 
foundation for later global initiatives such as the European Directive on Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control (IPPC) in 1996, the European Pollutant Emission Register (EPER)  in 
2000 and the Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTR) in 2003. 
Initiatives such as the Emission Register were targeted at only a small group of heavy-
polluting facilities (currently 350 in the Netherlands) that had to disclose highly technical 
data on over 350 pollutants’ emissions to soil, water, air and waste to the government for 
monitoring and control purposes. Initially this information was not open to the public.  
Although the type of reporting demanded from these initiatives was thus quite different 
from what we would now consider to be sustainability reporting, it normalised for some 
firms the disclosure of non-financial information. It arguably sparked a concern for the 
environment and the influence of corporations on our natural world, preparing the ground 
for reporting. Below I explore the history of Dutch sustainability reporting as it unfolded 
after these initial developments.  
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Early days: the environment becomes a management issue (1980’s) 
In the Netherlands, and in line with the discussed broader trend of acknowledging 
environmental degradation as a problem requiring a solution, the emergence of 
environmental management systems (EMS) in the 1980’s is particularly significant. An EMS 
is the “integrated system of organizational, administrative and policy measures, targeted at 
gaining an insight in, and control and limitation of the influence on the environment by the 
company’s activities” (Tweede Kamer, 1989: 47, own translation). EMS were introduced as 
a solution to address the problem of how to better monitor, and potentially reduce, 
corporate impact on the environment (see e.g. Commissie Bedrijfsinterne 
milieuzorgsystemen, 1988; Hafkamp & Molenkamp, 1990; Van der Kolk, 1988), in particular 
through the enhanced enforcement of, and compliance with environmental regulation and 
legislation. The prominent role of the Dutch government as an active participant in this 
process (Evers, Mantz-Thijssen, & Van der Woerd, 1991; Tweede Kamer, 1989, 1993) 
happened in a period in which it “wished to be a leading, guiding and pioneering country 
and treated the topic very seriously” (Interview, consultant). 
 
Various documents of the time, and recollections of people involved, show that the case for 
EMS was also promoted by other participants such as consultancies sensing a market 
opportunity (Van der Kolk, 1988), and, more reluctantly, by the main employer organization 
VNO-NCW as firms “recognize their responsibility with regard to the environment (VNO-
NCW, 1987: 9). For reputational or business reasons some large multinational corporations 
(MNC) got more actively involved as well (Molenkamp, 1995; Schmidheiny, 1992). With this 
broader collective of participants, an instrument that had started primarily for policy 
monitoring and enforcement had as a side effect that it “caused the environment to be 
increasingly seen as a management-issue, rather than merely a technical concern, which 
was quite a revolutionary thought in that period” (Interview, consultant). A ‘logical’ yet 
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largely unintended consequence of the EMS than turned out to be a broader reporting 
purpose:  
 “When you are promoting an environmental management system at one point you 
will also start to wonder what you exactly want to do with it! Well, what do 
government agencies want to do with it? They want to have some instruments for 
better control and regulation. But very slowly the idea started to emerge that the 
public at large could also be informed better” (Interview, environmental lawyer).  
 
Rather than a ‘Eureka’ moment or visionary leadership, this was “actually a very gradual 
process. At a certain point in time this general concern for environmental issues was 
matched with the idea that disclosure towards the outside world, society, and stakeholders 
was actually part of it. But that went very gradually, not really with sharp demarcating 
moments or people” (Interview, consultant). As a result, in the Netherlands reporting thus 
slowly emerged in the late 1980’s when the first separate (environmental) reports started 
to come out, mainly as a consequence of the early Dutch acknowledgment of 
environmental management systems as a solution to the problem of regulation compliance 
and corporate non-sustainability. In the language of the garbage can model, first disclosure 
was primarily an internal solution to address a problem between firms and regulators, but 
once in place became somewhat coincidentally also targeted as a solution to the problem 
of enhancing transparency and accountability towards local communities, employees, 
NGO’s and other interested parties (see e.g. Evers et al., 1991).  
Setting things into motion: a crisis and emerging (soft) law (1990’s) 
The 1990’s saw a gradual advancement of the acceptance of corporate (environmental) 
responsibility and disclosure on this. Rather than a logical outcome of visionary leadership, 
my analysis suggests this was mostly due to a mixture of a serendipitous event (Shell’s 
Brent Spar) and the collective work of various actors.  
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Internationally, the earlier work of the Brundtland Commission was of influence in the 
build-up to the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de 
Janeiro, i.e. the "Earth Summit”. In its resulting plan of action (Agenda 21), one of the 
recommendations was for companies “to report annually on their environmental records, 
as well as on their use of energy and natural resources” (Agenda 21, 1992, art. 30.10). This, 
of course, created further momentum for disclosure in the Netherlands as it “affirmed 
existing sentiments” (Interview, consultant). It contributed to the growing acceptance of 
the existence of environmental problems and the idea that corporations carry responsibility 
for this and thus have a role to play in prevention and improvements.  
 
In particular for (environmental) NGO’s this “led to a desire for legislation on disclosure” 
(Interview, NGO). They saw it as a solution to combat the problem of both environmental 
destruction and the corporate silence on their role in this. In the Netherlands, and beyond, 
corporations tend to have a general aversion against government intervention and 
regulation though: “firms are almost by default suspicious of regulation and legislation. It is 
their first reflex” (Interview, civil servant). Agreement on a solution could thus not be 
agreed upon through legislation. Notwithstanding their opposition against regulation on 
disclosure, some action seemed required though. That is, firms increasingly saw themselves 
beleaguered by the Dutch government, which had in 1993 introduced the Environmental 
Protection Act that heightened the profile of the environment further. Moreover, at the 
same time NGO’s demanded better transparency “as they thought society needed to know 
this type of information, and also in order to gain better insight into these firms and 
confront them with their behaviour and consequences” (Interview, civil society). Reporting 
became by various participants thus pushed as a matching problem/solution combination, 
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yet it ultimately took some ‘lucky timing’ in the form of a corporate wake-up call to get 
reporting really moving.   
 
Instrumental here is in particular one event, namely Shell’s Brent Spar oil platform. 
Considered “a critical incident that keeps on being referred to” (Interview, academic), it is 
often regarded as having spurred Dutch reporting, in particular as an eye-opener for 
corporates. In short, Shell had decided to sink an old oil platform in the North Sea which 
caused considerable protests by NGO’s and the general public (see e.g. Zyglidopoulos, 
2002). Informants often mentioned the case as a wake-up call for the business community 
in which “... everything came together because it made clear what the impact of these 
issues could be on reputation and legitimacy” (Interview, consultant). Whereas for NGO’s 
and the government perhaps not much changed (as it was more a confirmation of the need 
to improve environmental performance and disclosure), for companies, and by extension 
also investors, it did make a difference. First driven by NGO’s (in particular Greenpeace) and 
later also by consumers as well as politicians, it eventually showed “... that half of the 
motorists drive to a different gas station. The share price falls. So you can see that such an 
event has an impact. It really awakens, like ‘ah, we are moving into a different type of 
world’. With that understanding come different norms of behavior, different actions. And 
reporting and transparency were among them” (Interview, consultant).  
 
In the lexicon of the garbage can, this incident shows the serendipitous coming together of 
problems, solutions and participants. That is, the solution of environmental management 
and disclosure was by some actors (e.g. government, NGO) already tied to a problem (lack 
of corporate environmental compliance and accountability). However, reporting now also 
started to become a new solution to a problem of lack of trust in and legitimacy of 
corporates and, to a lesser extent, a valuation problem of investors (responsible investing 
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was in its infancy still and according to investor informants “for the dark green investor 
with sandals and woollen socks!”) as they recognised the potential financial impact of 
environmental scandals. Somewhat fortuitously the acceptability of sustainability reporting 
became thus more broadly shared by a range of participants who started for various 
reasons to see merits in the practice.   
 
One particularly noteworthy outcome of this emerging “ping-pong game” (Interview, NGO) 
between firms, NGO’s and government was the eventual introduction in the Netherlands of 
a revised Environmental Protection Act4. It stated that starting from 1999 around 300 
companies (heavy polluters) were required not only to report to the government on a 
variety of environmental management indicators (Government Report), but also had to 
publish a Public Report. The legislation as a solution did not match the problem at hand 
very well though, as suggested by the garbage can model (March & Olsen, 1984). Whereas 
evaluation research (KPMG, 2001, 2002a, 2003) shows that firms indeed started to engage 
in some form of reporting, the quality of reports varied greatly as specifications on 
structure, content and format were ill-defined (KPMG, 2003). In the end, the costs 
outweighed the benefits according to most participants and in 2005 the law was amended 
and only a Government Report on emissions of pollutants remained5. In garbage can 
terminology, the problem of corporate accountability and sustainability was not anymore 
attached to the choice (opting for legislation) as more suitable choices started to present 
themselves (e.g. GRI, see below). Still, rather than treating the legislative path as an 
outright failure “you have the voluntary stream that you see in the reporting landscape and 
the Public Report that was obligatory. The latter has pushed the former though I think. 
                                                          
4
Wet Milieubeheer, Staatsblad 1997, nr. 170. See Chapter 12, accessed on 14-06-2012 at: 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0003245/Hoofdstuk12/geldigheidsdatum_15-06-2012 
Wet van 10 April 1997, Staatsblad 1997, nr. 170 & Besluit Milieuverslaglegging of 17 November 1998, 
Staatsblad1998, nr. 655 
5
Staatsblad 2005, nr 317 and Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2004-2005, 29972, nr 1-5 
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Without the Public Report, the whole development of sustainability reporting in the 
Netherlands would not have progressed much” (Interview, sustainability lawyer).  
The wheels start turning: politics, emerging guidelines and some luck (2000-2004) 
Regulation thus turned out not to be the road to corporate sustainability. Nevertheless, the 
number of reports would increase over the next years, and arguably their quality and 
professionalism as well. Once again though, a ‘masterplan’ behind this seems not to be 
present. My analysis of the empirical material rather suggests that a timely overlap of 
initiatives of a range of actors created a supportive environment for sustainability reporting 
that set things in motion. 
 
A significant factor that raised awareness was the work of the Social and Economic Council 
of the Netherlands (SER). This influential governmental advisory body consisting of 
employers, unions and experts published its influential report De winst van waarden (The 
profit of values) in 2000. With its emphasis on long-term value creation by integrating 
social, environmental and economic aspects in the triple bottom line (Elkington, 1997) “it 
was treated by many companies as some sort of bible!” (Interview, civil servant). One of the 
recommendations of the report was to ask the Raad voor de Jaarverslaggeving (Council for 
Annual Reporting) for guidance on a possible voluntary reporting framework for Dutch 
companies to rely on, which it published in 2003 through a revision of the Annual Reporting 
Guideline 400 (RJ-400) and accompanying practical Guide to Sustainability Reporting.   
 
Despite the best of efforts, these guidelines never really took hold and “unfortunately have 
quite a sad history in the Netherlands as companies should actually pay more attention to 
them” (Interview, investor). Not only did they lack legal power (Lambooy & Hordijk, 2012), 
the general emphasis on voluntary reporting and the individual responsibility of companies 
being a central aspect of both the work of the government, SER and the Council did not 
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generate enough force either. Still, whereas promoting reporting by regulative or semi-
regulative measures did not lead to staggering growth, these initiatives did further create 
an environment or ‘zeitgeist’ in which sustainability reporting had a place. As a former CEO 
put it, “slowly but surely it became more than just a fad and something that was shared as 
being important on a very broad level”. Whereas plenty of interested participants thus 
started to see the potential value and importance of sustainability reporting, the new 
problem that emerged was exactly how to do it as in particular firms “were looking for 
certainty, something to hold on to in terms of reporting” (Interview, CSR manager). As it 
turned out, across the Atlantic a solution was being developed that would exactly target 
this problem.   
 
It was with the birth of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) that a dominant international 
reporting standard emerged that would provide more structure and clarity on what 
sustainability reporting actually was. Prior to the GRI, multiple (inter)national standards 
were being developed, but none took hold as much as the multi-stakeholder focused GRI. 
Much has been written about the GRI already (see e.g. Brown, de Jong, & Lessidrenska, 
2009; Etzion & Ferraro, 2010; Levy et al., 2010) and this is not the place to go into its 
particular institutional trajectory, but once again it seems to have presented itself as a 
fitting and timely solution to the recognised problems described above. In the Netherlands, 
one of the reasons these guidelines gained popularity and recognition already in an early 
stage was not only because of the general conducive environment and spirit of the time, 
but also because the first version was immediately translated into Dutch. This was 
instigated by a consultancy and the Dutch Association of Investors for Sustainable 
Development (VBDO), which was founded in 1995 to advance sustainability among listed 
companies. The relocation of GRI’s headquarters from Boston to Amsterdam in 2002 did 
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not hurt either, of course, yet was also the result of a Dutch public and private sector lobby 
and bid.  
 
Naturally, for consultants the GRI meant the possibility of new business as the GRI “reflects 
the main streaming of the issue. It says that, A) there's recognition that these are issues 
that need to be worked on, and B) that there's money to be made in it” (Interview, 
consultant). For the VBDO the emergence of the GRI was a solution worthy of support to 
tackle the sustainability problem. As its founder recalled: “We thought that the GRI was 
very welcome. It was even better that it was not our own invention so that we could refer 
to it as a development elsewhere that stipulated the importance of sustainability. So we 
embraced the GRI and at annual meetings appealed to firms to disclose more on 
sustainability reporting and do so by using the GRI guidelines.” GRI thus not only presented 
itself as a suitable solution to answer a specific problem, at the same time it resonated with 
several participants looking for work (Cohen et al., 1972) and confirmed their reasons to 
exist (e.g. consultants, VBDO). After all, in case of the consultants, they “would love to 
regulate the whole accountability and transparency idea on firms. Many of them are not 
familiar with these things, so it would generate good business for consultants”, and GRI 
offered a welcome respite here.   
 
Still, more was needed for reporting to take off. Helpfully, firms started to take matters 
more seriously too and recognised the potential value of reporting. One informant, a 
sustainability manager, recalled that “... suddenly the shareholders enter the picture, in the 
Netherlands also the VBDO. They start asking questions to companies on what their 
sustainability strategy and performance is. What you see is that this set something in 
motion” (Interview, sustainability manager). More luckily, the timing of these guidelines for 
sustainability reporting was also good. Not only were firms “looking for something to hold 
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on to” (Interview, rating agency) in terms of reporting, but they gained further momentum 
as the “… corporate accounting scandals at the start of the millennium have been very 
helpful here as suddenly extra-financial or non-financial information became interesting 
and seen as a reflection of a  behavioural component” (Interview, investor). So in sum, the 
growth of reporting in this period is a “consequence of the entire network around it. NGO’s, 
VBDO, sustainable investors, developments in society, simply the increase of transparency 
being regarded as something important” (Interview, consultant). In a way, the idea that 
there is value in reporting slowly started to land among a broader range of, also powerful, 
actors. For instance, with investors entering the arena as a powerful decision 
maker/participant who start to acknowledge lack of sustainability information as a 
problem, the solution of reporting gains thus additional momentum as it sticks itself to a 
new issue of firm valuation.  
Shifting up the gears: solidifying and mainstreaming reporting (2004<) 
A further boost to Dutch sustainability reporting was the introduction of the Transparency 
Benchmark in 2004. The benchmark compares the degree of transparency that firms show 
in their disclosure of sustainability information. The benchmark was initially developed by a 
Dutch consultancy firm, but caught the attention of the Ministry of Economic Affairs as it 
seemed a suitable instrument for a problem it was facing. As one civil servant of the time 
recalled:  
“Our ministry did not want legislation on reporting, something the social-democrats 
were pushing for. But we had to offer an alternative at some point as we could not 
withstand the pressure anymore. We were blamed for saying we stimulated and 
facilitated reporting but had too little to show for it. In order to prevent legislation 
or regulation we decided to introduce the benchmark as it is self-stimulating for 
firms!”  
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This rather fortuitous co-existence of the benchmark developed by the consultancy, the 
political pressure to boost reporting and the need for the Ministry of Economic Affairs to 
come with an alternative thus resulted in the adoption of the Transparency Benchmark by 
the Ministry. A further hurdle turned out to be the employer associations when “they asked 
whether this was all really necessary? We had the luck that the Minister was of the opinion 
that this was indeed necessary. So that was our luck, together with NGO’s that were at least 
not against it, and so it worked out with relatively broad support” (Interview, civil servant).  
 
Initially many firms (in particular lowly ranked ones) were sceptical of the Transparency 
Benchmark and wanted to opt out (which was not possible as they were included by 
default), but soon “after they had first complained, the next year they asked how they 
could climb and whether we could help them!” The Transparency Benchmark also came 
with an award (The Crystal) for the best reporting firm, but moreover resonated with firms 
as “we all want to have a stage on which we can be applauded and praised. Where we can 
distinguish ourselves” (Interview, sustainability manager). For consultants this turned out to 
be a profitable affair as well since they noticed that the Transparency Benchmark could be 
a solution for them in their quest for market growth. That is: “they saw it as a new market 
and because they actively approached clients they have further boosted the instrument and 
reporting, of course” (Interview, civil society).  
 
This short account of the Transparency Benchmark shows, once again, that rather than a 
powerful institutional entrepreneur working on a grand scheme, this instrument was both 
collectively developed and with a relatively random matching of participants with problems 
and desired solutions. It was created by a consultancy to generate business, unexpectedly 
caught the interest of a governmental agency in need of a solution to a political problem 
and was considered robust enough by NGO’s as well as flexible and non-threatening 
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enough by employer associations to support, or at least not oppose it. In turn, upon its 
success firms felt the need to do well on this ranking and consultants saw an opportunity 
for growth in it, further stimulating its growth. Once more, in a garbage can style of 
reasoning, the simultaneous coming together of participants with political problems and 
others with useful solutions led to the decision of developing the Transparency Benchmark 
as an instrument to promote sustainability reporting. In effect, the machine was set in 
motion.  
 
Alongside the Transparency Benchmark, other international rankings and sustainability 
indices (e.g. Dow Jones Sustainability Index, FTSE4Good) helped, of course, to further 
normalise disclosure of sustainability information. The same applies to the publication of 
new generations of the GRI Guidelines in 2002 and 2006 and the 2010 ISO 26000 standard. 
In addition, the Dutch Frijns Code on corporate governance for listed companies was 
introduced in 2009 and stipulated that the material aspects of CSR for the operations of the 
business needed to be disclosed in the annual report. Together these developments 
created a conducive zeitgeist for sustainability reporting to further develop, grow and 
institutionalise (see Appendix A, also KPMG, 2005, 2008, 2011a). As one informant put it, 
“What you see is that the whole idea of sustainability as a license to produce and the need 
to report on this has been accepted and taken as a given. There is no discussion on that 
anymore among the larger enterprises, it is simply now a necessity” and “in effect by now 
an entire sustainability reporting industry has emerged” (Interview, investment specialist).  
 
Discussion 
I have explored the institutionalisation of sustainability reporting in the Netherlands by 
combining insights from garbage can decision making and institutional theory. In particular 
I have offered an account of the rise of sustainability reporting that questions the 
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assumptions of individual institutional entrepreneurs who engage in their work with 
foresight and purpose. Below I first sketch more generally ‘garbage can institutionalism’ 
(figure 1). Subsequently I discuss in more detail the role of historical contingencies that 
open up opportunities for change and how a multiplicity of actors muddle through in an 
attempt to ‘take advantage’ of the opening for institutional change that these serendipitous 
moments offer.  
Institutional change and the garbage can model 
I started this chapter with a discussion of extant work on institutionalisation and change, 
most notably a selection of studies using the institutional entrepreneurship framework. The 
concept of agency has been of great interest to these institutional scholars (e.g. Battilana, 
2006; Delbridge & Edwards, 2007; Weik, 2011). A particular aspect of interest has been the 
enabling conditions for institutional entrepreneurs to engage in change. There have been 
prevalent accounts that focus on the social position of individual and organizational actors 
(Battilana et al., 2009; Battilana, 2006; Dorado, 2005) and field-level conditions such as the 
degree of heterogeneity and institutionalisation (Dorado, 2005; Pache & Santos, 2010). 
Rather than denying the importance of these factors, garbage can thinking supplements 
thinking on possible mediating mechanisms as it highlights the at times suggested (Aldrich, 
1999; Czarniawska, 2009) but rarely explored possibility of historical contingencies as a 
serendipitous enabler of agency rather than a force that completely negates it. 
 
Historical contingencies in this line of thought are thus not to be understood as instances of 
meaningless randomness which turn institutional processes beyond actors’ control. Rather, 
over the course of history larger, and oftentimes also smaller events take place that can be 
seen as “unanticipated conjectures of powerful forces” (Padgett, 2013: 474). Whereas they 
may seem infinitely small, as institutional actors shape and change institutions “by a 
complicated ecology of local events and locally adaptive actions” (March & Olsen, 1998: 
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968) they turn out to be much greater in their consequences. In effect, these contingencies 
are not unlike the exogenous jolts that can open up space for action and precipitate 
institutional change (see e.g. Fligstein, 2001; Meyer, Brooks, & Goes, 1990), although this 
study shows their continuous occurrence throughout the process. 
 
 
Moreover, these contingencies (e.g. Shell’s Brent Spar) provided impetus for new issues or 
choice opportunities and a related constellation of people, problems and solutions. This 
emerging space for action (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011) thus helps to alter and shape 
something akin an opportunity structure (McAdam, 1982; Tilly, 1978). Still, unlike typical 
accounts using the opportunity structure concept, a fundamental difference with the 
garbage can model is that I offer an account of agency that is based on temporality rather 
than consequences (Lomi & Harrison, 2012). 
 
With historical contingencies as an enabling factor and evolving choice opportunities, next 
is the emergence of (collective) action, which works according to my analysis through the 
conducive and timely configuration of the various components of the garbage can. My 
account of institutionalism and the garbage can highlights the boundedly rational actor and 
aims to strike a balance by stipulating a type of “change driven by attempts of deliberate 
design, adaptation, and “organic” and co-evolving historical processes” (Cohen et al., 2012: 
28).Both individual as well as more collective accounts of institutional entrepreneurship 
have typically assigned actors(s) with a great deal of intentionality and active change 
management, whereas my analysis stipulates the work of various actors whose actions 
oftentimes more resemble a kind of muddling through with what is offered to them in 
terms of problems/solutions at some point in time. 
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Figure 1 Garbage can institutionalism 
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While this muddling is often rationalised away, it represents more than just handling 
random chance. Following De Rond and Thietart (2005: 17), it ultimately requires the 
“ability to ‘see bridges where others saw holes’. To see bridges, or ‘matching pairs’, is to 
creatively recombine events based on the appearance of a meaningful rather than causal 
link”. Rather than the result of careful design, it resembles the ability to construct a 
meaningful collage by combining elements, not unlike institutional bricolage (see e.g. Garud 
& Karnøe, 2003; Phillips & Tracey, 2007) which typically involves a plurality of actors.  
 
Finally, this collective and possible somewhat messy response to serendipitous events 
causes a change in the institutional environment and at the same time can help to further 
cement, in this case, sustainability reporting as a legitimate practice. That is, as my analysis 
above shows, with each response to an event, the outline and agenda of the institutional 
arena altered, leading to the possibility of new large or small events that would set in 
motion a renewed balance between problems, solutions and participants around choices 
deemed important at that point in time. To be sure though, it can be assumed that some 
cases lend themselves better to be analysed using a garbage can perspective than others. 
As discussed earlier in this paper, it was originally developed to analyse decision making in 
‘organised anarchies’ with problematic and ambiguous goals, unclear technologies and fluid 
participation of actors over time. Put in more institutional terms, it thus resonates with 
cases characterised by a high degree of pluralism and complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011). 
Relatively mature and highly institutionalised and non-fragmented fields may indeed allow 
for a large degree of strategic intentionality as institutional rules, roles and positions have 
crystallised (Dorado, 2005). New and multifaceted practices emerging in highly fragmented 
fields (Pache & Santos, 2010) or in lowly institutionalised ones with a multitude of actors 
and typically higher levels of uncertainty (Dorado, 2005; Garud et al., 2002; Maguire et al., 
2004) do not allow for as much intent and foresight though. It is in particular here that the 
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added value of the garbage can lies. In the remainder of this discussion I discuss two 
important aspects of my alternative interpretation of an example of institutionalisation and 
change, namely the importance of historical contingencies and collectivity.       
 
Historical contingencies 
The oftentimes more serendipitous meandering of history has remained undervalued (see 
Czarniawska, 2009) by extant institutional studies focusing on the strategies of institutional 
entrepreneurs and the stages of institutional change processes (e.g. Battilana et al., 2009; 
Greenwood et al., 2002). The “undercurrent of purpose, order and necessity” (De Rond & 
Thietart, 2007: 540) visible in most extant work is, in garbage can style, linked to the 
modern Western cultural context in which this research is situated (Cohen et al., 
2012).Looking at Dutch sustainability reporting though, it was partly set in motion exactly 
because of these more serendipitous moments of timing and a general conducive zeitgeist 
of first environmentalism in the 1980s that saw the simultaneous linkage around 
environmental systems. With the subsequent age of accountability and transparency of 
(corporate) life an extension of this could handily form the basis of a solution to newly 
emerging problems. Initial regulation was agreed upon among government, firms and 
NGO’s as a satisfactory solution, yet it ultimately failed as problems and solutions diverted. 
The Brent Spar ignited corporate interest in reporting though and showed the value of 
sustainability to firms, bringing the arrival of the solution of reporting to the problem of 
accountability, trust and transparency. Later, the wish of the Dutch government for a more 
active policy towards corporate transparency was rather coincidentally met by the 
Transparency Benchmark that was developed independently of the wishes of the 
government by a consultancy firm for commercial purposes. In short, these findings suggest 
things often happen because of a certain temporal constellation of people, their problems 
and solutions at hand at a particular moment in time.     
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This account of Dutch reporting stipulates the role of more serendipitous historical 
contingencies that emerge over the course of time. Rather than representing a neat 
purposeful process these “... complications tend to convert history into a meander. Rules 
and institutions become locally stable. Historical branches tend to be irreversible. The 
direction taken at any particular branch sometimes seems almost chancelike and subject to 
minor intentions, but the specific direction taken can be decisive in its effect on subsequent 
history (March & Olsen, 1998: 955). By highlighting the importance of historical 
contingencies in institutionalisation and change the interrelated role of timing, context and 
zeitgeist is flagged up as “the system of temporal coincidences at the core of the GCM may 
be viewed as one way of bringing back the causal role of context in our understanding of 
organized action” (Lomi & Harrison, 2012: 14). 
 
To be sure, I do not refer to meaningless randomness here, but rather highlight the 
importance of timing, context or zeitgeist to better understand institutionalisation and 
change. In fact, when interviewing one of GRI’s founders himself (typically heralded with 
institutional entrepreneur status), he hinted at his more modest role as he argued “I think 
sustainability reporting, the concept has been a beneficiary of movements and pressures 
that are driving business or signalling business that transparency is not an option any 
longer, it's really an expectation and you must respond to it”. It follows more closely Rorty’s 
(1989: 37) notion of contingencies and his analysis of the progress of thoughts, actions, 
practices etc. and their purposefulness and intentionality: 
“The difference between genius and fantasy is not the difference between 
impresses which lock on to something universal, some antecedent reality out there 
in the world or deep within the self, and those which do not. Rather, it is the 
difference between idiosyncrasies which just happen to catch on with other people 
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- happen because of the contingencies of some historical situation, some particular 
need which a given community happens to have at a given time. To sum up, poetic, 
artistic, philosophical, scientific, or political progress results from the accidental 
coincidence of a private obsession with a public need”.  
 
Overall, this account thus represents “… a view that is more temporally contingent and less 
powerfully intentional, but often comes closer to matching the realities of organizational 
life” (Cohen et al., 2012: 22). Still, people need to find a response to these events and 
eventually these very same people are the ones involved in the institutional process of 
sustainability reporting as well. I argue this is a collective process where problem, solutions 
and participants are momentarily combined and matched to a choice relevant at that 
moment in time. 
Collectivity 
Emphasising context and contingencies by extension problematises the hero-centric 
accounts present in many institutional entrepreneurship studies. Highlighting the 
importance of what I have labelled here historical contingencies is not to say that actors do 
not matter. On the contrary, a wide range of research has highlighted the active strategic 
agency that institutional entrepreneurs have and use (Battilana et al., 2009; Hardy & 
Maguire, 2008; Pacheco et al., 2010). Rather, based on my findings I suggest that relaxing 
some of the dominant assumptions may be useful, in this case in support of a more 
collective form of institutional entrepreneurship.     
 
My interpretation of Dutch sustainability reporting highlights that a single institutional 
entrepreneur was not driving the process. Rather, the framework of the garbage can 
applied to my case suggests the collective nature of the process. After all, analysing 
sustainability reporting longitudinally and with an emphasis on the interplay between 
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problems, solutions and participants makes clear the multiplicity and diversity of the 
process. For example, whereas at first mostly the Dutch government and civil society 
pushed for reporting, it  gradually became a topic of more active interest among firms in 
the wake of the Brent Spar incident and the persistence of the accountability and 
transparency discourse. The Dutch government proved then largely unsuccessful in further 
pushing through reporting via legislative means, but actors such as the SER and Council of 
Annual Reporting did manage to give further impetus. Still, the work of the GRI was 
instrumental for reporting’s rise, yet GRI’s visibility in the Netherlands was enhanced by 
supporting work of consultants and the socially responsible investment community (e.g. 
VBDO). The government made a soft-law comeback in the institutional process through its 
work on the Transparency Benchmark. This short overview still does not do justice to the 
multiplicity of actors involved and singling out the work of any one actor as being of 
institutional entrepreneurial status would seem to negate the role of the other.    
 
The collective aspects of institutionalisation and change get thus stipulated by a garbage 
can inspired analysis. Research attention has so far been focused primarily on the work of a 
small number of institutional entrepreneurs (Battilana et al., 2009; Pacheco et al., 2010; 
Wijen & Ansari, 2007) and in the case of sustainability reporting primarily on the GRI as an 
institutional entrepreneur (Brown, de Jong, & Lessidrenska, 2009; Etzion & Ferraro, 2010). 
My analysis thus indicates the continuous in- and outflow of a multitude of, oftentimes 
unconnected, institutional change agents (participants), problems and solutions. Dutch 
reporting rather resembles what Dorado (2005: 400) calls institutional partaking, or 
“institutional change as the autonomous actions of countless agents converging over time. 
Partakers act as a collective and no single individual or organization can be identified as 
responsible for the change”. Perhaps somewhat less ‘sexy’ than the more common heroic 
account of institutional entrepreneurs, my findings are more in line with other studies that 
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show the collective nature of institutional entrepreneurship (Czarniawska, 2009; Delbridge 
& Edwards, 2008; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007; Wijen & Ansari, 2007) and, relatedly, those 
that question the neat and linear progression through stages (Blackler & Regan, 2006; 
Delbridge & Edwards, 2008). In effect, Dutch sustainability reporting more resembles a 
situation of incrementalism or ‘muddling through’ (Lindblom, 1959, 1979). In particular the 
complexity of sustainability reporting and what it is exactly for and about (i.e. what are its 
problems and solutions and who are concerned), and the related blurred relationship 
between means and ends (Lindblom, 1959: 83), or between solutions for a problem in this 
case, makes way for the continuous incremental steps of various actors in reporting’s 
institutionalisation. 
 
Conclusion 
In this study I have analysed the institutional trajectory of Dutch sustainability reporting 
using the lexicon of the garbage can model and its emphasis on the independent existence, 
and occasional simultaneity, of a multiplicity of participants, problems, and solutions 
around choices. Exploring this model within an institutional perspective suggests the 
importance of so-called historical contingencies and collective institutional 
entrepreneurship. That is, it raises the possibility of envisioning institutionalisation as a 
more complex and historically contingent process that highlights the importance of 
serendipity, timing and context rather than the relatively neat and teleological models of 
institutionalisation and change that prevail in most studies. This enabling role of chancelike 
contingencies opens up space for institutional work of a plurality of actors. Whereas I do 
not deny the importance of strategic and intentional actors, I reduce their importance and 
add to the mix the influence of the oftentimes uncoordinated activities of a wide range of 
actors who make the most of ‘the hand they are dealt with’.  
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Taken together, this study does not claim to be “... remarkable and provides no 
extraordinary magic of interpretation, but it may not be entirely foolish” (March & Olsen, 
1998: 958). I have offered an account that relaxed dominant assumptions prevalent in 
many institutional studies (i.e. agentic individual institutional entrepreneurs who operate 
with a great deal of foresight and intent) and thereby aimed to enlarge rather than replace 
extant institutional interpretations. This on the one hand adds some welcome nuance and 
realism and thus further strengthens this line of work. Moreover, it may expand our 
understanding of institutionalisation and change, in particular in the case of multifaceted 
practices linked to complex social problems in relatively emerging, uncertain and 
heterogeneous fields where cause-effect relations remain unclear.  
 
A first contribution of this study is that it has challenged the assumption of intentionality 
and purpose present in many institution entrepreneurship studies (Czarniawska, 2009). This 
has made them look overly linear and mechanistic (Blackler & Regan, 2006). By drawing on 
the garbage can model I have highlighted the importance of historical contingencies for 
processes of institutionalisation and change (see e.g. Aldrich, 2011; Czarniawska, 2009) 
arguing they are not teleological deterministic processes. As we are hard wired to connect 
means and ends and assign purpose to events, sometimes justly so, integrating the 
assumptions of the garbage can more explicitly in institutional accounts asks us “to give up 
a tidy world in which problems imply solutions over which participants exercise choice, and 
to replace it with a world in which participants, problems, choices, and solutions each have 
the capacity to connect to any of the others” (Cohen et al., 2012: 22). This study has made a 
start with that by stipulating the importance of historical contingencies and suggesting their 
role as a possible enabling factor of institutional change.  
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A second, related, contribution is that my analysis offers an empirical account of more 
collective distributed agency (e.g. Delbridge & Edwards, 2008; Dorado, 2005; Wijen & 
Ansari, 2007) that challenges the individualised portrayal of agentic institutional actors. The 
garbage can lexicon provides an insightful framework for analysis as it highlights the 
collective aspects and how boundedly rational as well as temporally and contextually 
constrained actors muddle through the institutional trajectory. I have specified the 
considerable complexities of an institutional process over the course of more than two 
decades and shown the multiplicity of actors involved and the related changes in choice 
moments involving various problems and solutions. The garbage can thus provides a 
potentially insightful instrument in unpacking the various aspects that can help to explain 
the collective action involved in many complex institutional processes over time and how 
this process combines unintended actions with more strategic work in the wake of changes 
in the constellation of the field.   
 
To be sure though, by borrowing from the garbage can lens in my interpretation of Dutch 
sustainability reporting I do not mean to claim that institutionalisation and change 
necessarily resemble only a garbage can process. Rather, this lens makes it possible to 
analyse a phenomenon from a different angle and thus functions as a sensitizing tool that 
allows you to see things differently and highlight often neglected aspects, in this case in 
particular historical contingencies and collectivity. 
 
This research provides several opportunities for future research. First studies could usefully 
investigate the relation between institutional theory and the potential of integrating 
garbage can thinking into existing models in more detail. Studies could look at enabling 
factors. For instance, it could be helpful to compare the potential of the garbage can in 
various fields. For example, mature vs. emerging fields, heterogeneous vs. homogenous 
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fields or lowly institutionalised vs. highly institutionalised ones. As briefly discussed, it could 
be expected that depending on the nature of the field integrating garbage can thinking into 
institutional analyses holds more or less promise. Similarly, the nature of what gets 
institutionalised may also affect the appropriateness of using a garbage can inspired 
analysis. Practices that are more or rather less complex or differences in degrees of 
contestation may be interesting facets. Second, an interesting avenue for further research 
could be to compare the usefulness of the garbage can for different phases of 
institutionalisation. That is, can we expect to see differences when comparing creating new 
institutions, maintaining existing ones or destructing old ones. Third, both institutional 
studies as well as garbage can theorising are relatively silent about issues of power and 
politics. Institutional processes include power inequalities and political considerations 
though and neither do garbage can processes happen in a power vacuum. Appreciating and 
further unpacking the power dimensions of both processes may provide interesting 
research opportunities. This could in particular be helpful in peeling down the interplay 
between institutional actors and how problems and solutions get defined and/or chosen 
and thus exactly how the interplay between problems, solutions, choices and actors takes 
shape.      
 
Overall, deciding upon what counts as intentionality and purpose and what is mere 
randomness or a serendipitous contingencies remains difficult at times, in particular with 
the benefit of hindsight. Still, the inherent indeterminacy of sustainability reporting could 
be something worthwhile considering for practitioners and policy makers alike as they 
attempt to further advance the practice. It seems fair to assume that institutionalisation 
and change remain at least to some extent mounted on the horns of timing and chance no 
matter how hard institutional actors, entrepreneurs and for that matter scholars try to 
claim the contrary. Whereas on the one hand this sensitising and reflective implication of 
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my study can be worthwhile for practitioners by itself, conceptualising reporting along 
these lines may ironically serve a more strategic purpose as well. That is, recognising 
serendipity and the interplay between problem, solutions, participants and choices can be a 
versatile opening towards flexibly ‘managing’ sustainability reporting. By thinking through 
possible scenarios one can, within limits of realistic cognition, imagine to construct a 
diverse tool-box of possible problem-solution combinations, anticipate scenarios and the 
rise and fall of various participants. This could benefit policy makers as well as other people 
involved in developing reporting further. Whether this entails bringing the individual 
strategic agent back in through the backdoor remains an issue. Yet, to put this in 
perspective it is helpful to come full circle and once again turn to Tolstoy’s War and Peace 
(Tolstoy, 1957: 1342) as the author, despite his overall ambivalent stance on determinism 
and free will, ponders:  
“Why did things happen thus, and not otherwise? Because they did so happen. 
Chance created the situation; genius made use of it, says history. But what is 
chance? What is genius? The words chance and genius do not denote anything that 
actually exists, and therefore they cannot be defined. These two words merely 
indicate a certain degree of comprehension of the phenomena. I do not know why 
a certain event occurs; I suppose that I cannot know: therefore I do not try to know, 
and I talk about chance. I see a force producing effects beyond the scope of 
ordinary human agencies; I do not understand why this occurs, and I cry genius.”  
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Chapter 3 - From Values to Value: Sustainability Reporting and 
the Dynamics of Commensuration6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 This study has previously been presented at the 2013 EGOS colloquium in Montreal and 2013 Academy of 
Management Annual Meeting in Orlando. An abridged version has been included in the Best Paper Proceedings 
of the 2013 Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings.  
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‘‘Not everything that can be counted counts, 
and not everything that counts can be counted.’’ 
(Albert Einstein) 
 
Introduction 
Sustainability reporting is defined as “reporting which covers the environmental and social 
aspects of an organisation’s performance as well as the economic aspects” (Hubbard, 2009: 
3). A peripheral practice just over 10 years ago, by 2012 over 6000 firms disclosed a broad 
set of non-financial information in reports, according to the reports directory of 
CorporateRegister.com (2013). Of the largest 250 companies in the world 95% published a 
sustainability report in 2011, compared to only 35% in 1999 (KPMG, 2011a). Governments 
(e.g. Sweden, Denmark, France, UK) and stock exchanges (e.g. South Africa, Singapore, 
Malaysia) increasingly demand this type of disclosure and the financial community has 
taken up an active interest in sustainability reporting as well. For instance, the UN-backed 
Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) have by 2012 over 1000 signatories, worth US$ 
30 trillion in assets under management and the multi-stakeholder International Integrated 
Reporting Council (IIRC) has been established to develop a new integrated reporting 
framework, combining financial and non-financial disclosure (IIRC, 2011). What at first 
emerged as a normatively inspired safeguard against the unaccountability and non-
transparency of powerful firms in an age of globalisation and neo-liberalisation (e.g. Gray, 
Owen, & Maunders, 1988; Gray, 1992) has evolved into a practice that is linked to a 
‘business case’ (Buhr, 2007; Gray, 2006, 2010; Spence, 2007; Wheeler & Elkington, 2001). 
That is, sustainability aspects are believed to contribute to shareholder value and the aim is 
therefore “...  to connect them to the consideration of economic and financial matters” 
(Hopwood, 2009: 438).  
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An emerging puzzle that warrants unravelling is how to explain reporting’s development 
from a peripheral values-based practice aimed at showing corporate citizenship into a more 
mainstream and strategic value-based practice that helps to provide a true and fair view of 
a firm. Understanding this is not just of theoretical importance. It is also interesting from a 
practical perspective as in its consequences this financial rationalisation potentially dilutes 
corporate sustainability rather than enhances it (see e.g. Gray, 2006, 2010). One strand of 
extant research has relied on insights from legitimacy theory and argues that sustainability 
reporting is a purposeful and strategic tool for firms to gain legitimacy by creating ‘fit’ 
between their own value system and that of (stakeholders in) society (e.g. Aerts & Cormier, 
2009; Cho & Patten, 2007; Cooper & Owen, 2007; Deegan & Blomquist, 2006; Deegan, 
2002; Neu et al., 1998; Patten, 1992). Institutional scholars have taken issue with the 
inherent rationalism and organisation-centrism of this viewpoint though (e.g. Owen, 2008; 
Smith et al., 2011), yet share an emphasis on legitimacy. They hint at the importance of 
various institutional pressures towards conformity as an explanation for sustainability 
reporting’s trajectory though (e.g. Adams & Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2007; Bebbington et al., 
2009; Laine, 2009; Larrinaga-González, 2007), thereby possible swinging the pendulum too 
strongly towards structural isomorphism.   
 
Whereas these studies offer an account of what has changed at specific points in time 
based on compliance with external factors, they remain largely silent on exactly how 
sustainability reporting’s evolution from values to value has evolved. Recent institutional 
studies have therefore started to look more at explanatory mechanisms (Davis & Marquis, 
2005) such as strategic framing and resource utilisation (Brown, de Jong, & Lessidrenska, 
2009) and the employment of analogies to financial reporting (Etzion & Ferraro, 2010). An 
interesting but so far largely neglected mechanism in this respect (but see e.g. Berger, 1994; 
Kolk, Levy, & Pinkse, 2008; Lohmann, 2009) is commensuration. Commensuration can help 
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explain sustainability reporting’s trajectory as its focus on the construction and 
consequences of accountability technologies of measurement, standardisation and 
comparability makes it very apt for an explanation that discusses the social and dynamic 
processes typically assumed or ignored by most studies relying on strategic fit or isomorphic 
pressures. I thus aim to gain insight into the rationalisation and objectification of 
sustainability reporting by treating sustainability reporting as a project of commensuration.  
 
Commensuration, viewed as “the process whereby different qualities are measured with a 
single standard or unit” (Samiolo, 2012: 383) transforms qualities into quantities and 
differences into sameness (Espeland & Stevens, 1998). Scholars have argued that the 
purpose and appeal of commensuration rest in its potential to recreate social worlds 
(Espeland & Sauder, 2007), its considerable disciplinary power (Sauder & Espeland, 2009), 
and the erasure of uncertainty by obfuscating tensions between the metric and the 
underlying empirical reality (Quinn, 2008). We also know that successful commensuration 
can be difficult as it requires a mutual understanding of a common interest among actors 
(Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011), overcoming moral, political and cultural obstacles 
(Carruthers & Stinchcombe, 1999; Porter, 1995; Quinn, 2008; Zelizer, 2005) and agreement 
on the representation of the object and subject of commensuration (Samiolo, 2012). Extant 
studies have also shown that in addition to being a technical exercise, commensuration is a 
social and political process that requires considerable investment by various, often 
powerful, actors (Desrosieres, 1998; Espeland & Stevens, 1998; Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 
2011; Kolk et al., 2008). Previous work further suggests that commensuration contains a 
technical, cognitive and value dimension (Kolk et al., 2008; Levin & Espeland, 2002). In 
short, although we know about the potentially more and less desirable consequences of 
commensuration, the plurality of people and difficulties involved and its various 
dimensions, the dynamics between these elements have remained far less clear. 
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Thus, there remains a relative dearth of research that opens the ‘black box’ of 
commensuration and analyses how various dimensions of commensuration “build on and 
interact with one another” (Levin & Espeland, 2002: 138). Considering its transformative 
power in affecting the meaning of sustainability reporting, commensuration warrants more 
careful scrutiny though (see e.g. Davis & Marquis, 2005; Espeland & Stevens, 1998; Levin & 
Espeland, 2002; Samiolo, 2012), both in order to understand the process itself as well as its 
consequences for sustainability reporting. Stated more generally, “appreciating how these 
dimensions [of commensuration] build on and reinforce each other is key for grasping the 
significance of commensuration” (Levin & Espeland, 2002: 127), a call echoed more recently 
by Samiolo (2012: 399) when she calls for “a more systematic investigation of different 
modes of commensuration”. In this study I therefore aim to gain insight into the different 
dimensions of commensuration. Moreover, I explain the process driving the development of 
these dimensions and thus enhance our understanding of commensuration in general. At 
the same time empirically analysing sustainability reporting and its increasing emphasis on 
standards, guidelines, indicators and valorisation as a project of commensuration also offers 
insights into the pathologies, limitations as well as the potential (see e.g. Kolk et al., 2008) 
of this mechanism for a meaningful form of corporate disclosure to emerge.   
 
Drawing on a qualitative study of the history of sustainability reporting in the Netherlands, 
which has been one of the frontrunners in adopting this practice (KPMG, 2011a; PwC, 
2012), I aim to gain a theoretical and empirical understanding of the dynamics of 
commensuration. I analyse how various dimensions of commensuration have shaped and 
guided sustainability reporting. I will use a form of historical narrative analysis (Ansari & 
Phillips, 2011; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991) to map the sequences of events 
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) that took place as sustainability reporting commensurated. 
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Drawing on 94 semi-structured interviews and secondary data, I use Levin and Espeland’s 
(2002) dimensions of technical commensuration (accuracy of measurement), cognitive 
commensuration (create meaning and matching categories for metrics) and value 
commensuration (including a metric with a pricing, monetary or other valuation 
component) to identify different types of commensuration at work. I longitudinally identify 
three phases: cognitive commensuration marks the first period of environmental reporting; 
technical commensuration takes over as reporting expands into triple bottom line reporting 
and finally value commensuration marks the latest phase towards integrated reporting. I 
argue that the shifts in commensuration dimensions are driven by the rise and fall of 
various pathologies, which can be explained by means-ends disconnection, professional 
insulation and cultural contestation.  
 
This argument offers two theoretical contributions as well as a practical one. First, I extend 
existing studies of commensuration that aim to better understand the mechanisms that 
shape this powerful process (e.g. Espeland & Stevens, 1998; Samiolo, 2012). In particular, I 
provide a rich and longitudinal empirical account of a commensuration project that analyses 
its technical, value and cognitive dimension. Specifically, I suggest that their respective 
dominance over time can be explained by analysing the pathologies that accompany each 
dimension, which in turn are caused by a mixture of the people involved in the 
commensuration process and their aims through means-ends disconnection, professional 
insulation and cultural contestation. Second, I shed light on the temporal aspects of 
commensuration, until now mostly an implicit assumption rather than a more explicit focus 
(e.g. Kolk et al., 2008; Levin & Espeland, 2002). In particular, I contend that technical, value 
and cognitive commensuration appear in a specific order and, moreover, that cognitive 
commensuration can function both as a precondition for and a result of the other two 
dimensions. This sheds further light on the specifics of the commensuration process. Finally, 
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and more practically, a better understanding of the commensuration of sustainability 
reporting speaks to those interested in the practice as such (see e.g. Gray, 2002, 2006; 
Owen, 2008). My analysis shows how reporting has transformed itself into a more 
mainstream and ‘financialised’ practice and helps to better understand the ‘cogs and 
wheels’ of reporting. In particular, it highlights both the virtues (e.g. growth) and vices (e.g. 
ignoring some sustainability aspects) of commensuration and thus the potentiality and 
limitations for meaningful sustainability reporting to occur. It thereby offers a pragmatic 
middle ground between critical and managerial approaches (Burritt & Schaltegger, 2010).  
 
The paper is organised as follows. First, I discuss the literature on commensuration and 
explain its three main dimensions. Second, I will examine my data collection and analysis 
methods, and provide more details on the case of sustainability reporting in the 
Netherlands. Third, in my findings I will present a narrative account of the main phases of 
sustainability reporting and the various forms of commensuration that can be identified 
throughout this process. Fourth, I will explain why the dominant dimensions of 
commensuration shifted and discuss the implications of my findings for the 
commensuration and sustainability literature. Finally, I address implications for practice and 
possible areas for future research. 
 
Theoretical background 
The concept of commensuration 
The concept of commensuration has been used to analyse a whole range of phenomena 
including academic rankings (Sauder & Espeland, 2009), cost-benefit analyses (Lohmann, 
2009; Porter, 1995; Samiolo, 2012), the creation of new markets such as those for weather 
derivatives  (Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011) and secondary life insurance (Quinn, 2008), the 
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emergence of carbon disclosure (Kolk et al., 2008) and carbon accounting and markets 
(Lohmann, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009). Commensuration is a way to reduce and simplify 
disparate information into numbers that can easily be compared and this transformation 
allows people to quickly grasp, represent, and compare differences” (Espeland & Stevens, 
1998: 316). To be sure, although commensuration can be seen as an aspect of the broader 
literature on standardisation (see e.g. Brunsson, Rasche, & Seidl, 2012), it is unique in that it 
specifically seeks to provide a common metric (Espeland & Stevens, 1998). Commensurating 
sustainability reporting may not always lead to this ultimate consequence of complete 
quantification on a common metric (see e.g. Kolk et al., 2008). Still, the case of sustainability 
reporting shows with its development of rankings, standards, valorisation, comparability 
and sustainability key performance indicators that many practices of commensuration are 
employed.   
 
Commensuration is an apt mechanism to study the emergence and objectification of 
practices constituting modern capitalism (e.g. Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011; Levin & 
Espeland, 2002; Quinn, 2008; Zelizer, 2005). As it reduces the relevance of context, puts a 
value on and makes calculable and comparable what used to be incomparable, and thus 
underpins the development of rationality and impersonality, it helps to constitute capitalism 
(Espeland & Stevens, 1998; Weber, 1981). For instance, the commensuration of greenhouse 
gases and eventually transforming them into tradable emission rights, thereby trying to 
internalise the externalities of carbon emissions, has as its aim to construct a carbon market 
and commodify the emission of carbon, as shown by Lohmann (2009) and Mackenzie 
(2009). Commensuration is thus a typical aspect of modernity and is part of more general 
trend of a growing importance and influence of markets, comparability, transparency and 
accountability in a society where measurability and reality increasingly coalesce (see e.g. 
Meyer, Boli, & Thomas, 1994; Porter, 1995; Power, 1997). In that sense it fits well with 
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sustainability reporting’s trajectory. Commensuration as a social process demands careful 
scrutiny though, as it is susceptible to at times adverse consequences. Furthermore, it 
requires active work of various people who aim to achieve something with this 
commensurative work.    
 
First, it may often go unnoticed but in particular when relationships are forged between 
objects that are not immediately comparable (for example the social, environmental and 
economic aspects of corporate behaviour), considerable investment is required (e.g. 
Desrosieres, 1998; Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011). Commensuration is thus not a mere 
technical and neutral exercise but “requires much work and effort to accomplish, since it 
integrates disparate value systems, reconfigures them, establishes new interpretive 
frameworks (Espeland & Stevens, 1998; Stevens & Espeland, 2005) and, somehow, changes 
the world” (Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011: 1397). Simply put, commensuration involves a 
plurality of actors, yet successful execution tends to be enhanced by powerful ones. For 
example, Carruthers & Stinchcombe (1999) show the importance of the government agency 
Fannie Mae (the Federal National Mortgage Association) in standardising and homogenising 
individual home mortgages to establish liquidity in a secondary mortgage market and 
effectively achieve a form of value commensuration. Kolk et al. (2008) discuss in their study 
on carbon reporting and accounting the role of standard setters and civil society to bring 
commensuration into motion, yet suggest that to come to more definitive and binding 
metrics powerful actors such as the state and investors are in fact required. In their study on 
how procurers commodify management knowledge together with consultants and 
managers, O’Mahoney et al. (2013: 229) conclude that commensuration is “both a 
reflection of, and a medium for, powerful agents” and a “mechanism for the exercise of 
power of specific groups”.  
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The reasons of these actors to engage in commmensurative work may vary as it is a 
transformative mechanism that has the potential to affect both objects and subjects (e.g. 
Espeland & Stevens, 1998; Samiolo, 2012). For example, Owen-Smith (2005) shows how 
academic Technology Licensing Offices rely on commensuration to match new and messy 
licensing cases with existing metrics to translate new cases and thus simplify the decision-
making and management. Commensuration limits and systematises the amount and 
complexity of information to process and thereby produces and facilitates control because it 
“renders complex, heterogeneous relations more legible and more available for scrutiny” 
(Levin & Espeland, 2002: 125). Espeland and Sauder’s (2007) case study of law school 
rankings discusses the subjectification and reactive power of rankings (a form of 
commensuration) by explaining how these have influenced behaviour in law schools to 
“recreate social worlds”. They also describe how commensuration simplifies information, 
shapes attention by unifying as well as distinguishing objects and invites reflection on the 
relation between the metric and what it is supposed to represent.  
 
Despite the best of efforts and intentions, it is a difficult and at times controversial process 
as commensuration helps to establish what is considered of value and importance but at 
the same time it also marks what is considered irrelevant and gets silenced. Whereas a 
premise of commensuration is that it “... presupposes that widely disparate or even 
idiosyncratic values can be expressed in standardized ways and that these expressions do 
not alter meanings relevant to decisions” (Espeland & Stevens, 1998: 324), in reality not all 
values can easily be made commensurate. For example, certain symbolic, sacred or intrinsic 
forms of value are sometimes regarded as unique and incommensurable, as 
“commensuration issues can be defined as stemming from the uneasy encounter of 
seemingly irreconcilable moral or cognitive worldviews” (Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011: 
1413). An example is the market for human genetic material (i.e. eggs and sperm), where a 
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value is put on the fundamental building blocks of a human life which goes beyond the 
limits of commensuration for some (Almeling, 2011), or the creation of a secondary market 
for life insurance in the face of considerable moral ambivalence (Quinn, 2008). In addition 
to conflicts between these different modes of valuation, difficulties of commensuration also 
become visible when it involves threats to identity. For example, Samiolo (2012: 399) argues 
that an agreement on the cost-benefit analysis for the Venice flood protection could not be 
reached since Venice and its lagoon were considered unique and a model in itself that 
“opposed an abstract space of calculation to a specific place which could only be described 
and calculated locally”.   
 
In summary, although we know that a plurality of actors with different objectives are 
involved in commensuration processes resulting in a range of outcomes, the dynamics of 
commensuration have remained less clear. What is more, prior studies have identified 
three, at least analytically, distinct dimensions of commensuration: technical, cognitive and 
value commensuration (e.g. Kolk et al., 2008; Levin & Espeland, 2002). Whereas 
commensuration has received considerable attention in the academic literature, systematic 
analyses of these different dimensions of commensuration are relatively scant yet 
important to better understand and appreciate “its social and theoretical significance” 
(Espeland & Stevens, 1998: 315).  
Dimensions of commensuration 
Technical commensuration is particularly concerned with “measuring or classifying specific 
characteristics or practices more accurately (Levin & Espeland, 2002: 126). On the one hand 
this has a mechanical aspect. For instance, Levin and Espeland (2002) mention how in 
athletics the refinements in measuring the speed of sprinters, (finishing) times, electronic 
starting guns all are technical contributions that ultimately ease the commensuration of the 
performance of athletes in past, present and future races. In their respective studies on 
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carbon disclosure Kolk et al. (2008) and MacKenzie (2009) discuss the technicalities of 
commensurating different greenhouse gases. In particular, they discuss the technical work 
involved in establishing the global warming potential (GWP) for the various greenhouse 
gases, thereby translating very different gases into a common unit of CO2 equivalents. They 
show that in addition to the need for proper physical equipment and technologies to set up 
accurate measurements, also a social factor comes into play to reach consensus. That is, in 
the example of Mackenzie (2009: 443–447), it was not only crucial to rely on measurement 
devices and complex natural science to establish a GWP for HFC-23 (a refrigerant) to 
translate it into CO2. What is more, this technical commensuration also included a long 
process of negotiating and coming to a mutual understanding of a “correct” method of 
measurement and thus a final GWP.   
 
The second dimension of value commensuration typically, but not necessarily, involves a 
pricing or monetary component. For instance, this is achieved through attempts to quantify 
or even monetise key performance indicators from the sustainability spectrum but also by 
combining disparate elements and (e)valuating firms through rankings and ratings. The aim 
is to ease valuations by integrating different values in a common metric. For instance, prices 
have been attached to a tonne of CO2eq (MacKenzie, 2009), air pollution (Levin & Espeland, 
2002), and weather risks (Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011), but also non-monetary scales such 
as academic rankings are an instrument of quality evaluation (Sauder & Espeland, 2009). 
Value commensuration attempts to adjudicate between conflicting values and to reconcile 
and appease their differences by constructing an overarching metric. It is arguably the most 
visible aspect of commensuration and can be situated as a sub-process of the broader 
literature on (e)valuation(see e.g. Lamont, 2012) in its effort to create equivalence among 
what are often radically different meaning systems and types of value (see e.g. Fourcade, 
2011 on money and nature). Value commensuration frequently marks an instance where 
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conflict and contestation over incommensurability can be rife since this dimension makes it 
possible to emphasise variations in magnitude based on some dimensions while obscuring 
others.  
 
Finally, cognitive commensuration is a “more tacit cultural accomplishment, it involves 
reclassifying the world in terms of categories that align more closely with the new metrics” 
(Levin & Espeland, 2002: 126). This dimension of commensuration shapes how we 
understand and assign meaning to the world and categorise it, as well as the logics 
underpinning this. Developing a common understanding or discourse of the general 
accountability and responsibilities of firms and determining the elements belonging to its 
sustainability realm are examples. To better understand this dimension the concept of 
framing can be useful, as suggested by Lohmann (2009: 503) in his study on environmental 
accounting. He argues that it “focuses on what produces and sustains the objects and 
agents” and “it sees objects constantly being made and remade, and boundaries as fluid or 
poorly defined”. Previous studies have typically seen cognitive commensuration as a 
consequence of the new metrics. For example, drawing on the work of Sombart (1953), 
Levin and Espeland (2002: 126) use the example of double-entry bookkeeping that gave rise 
and meaning to the entity capital. In parallel this led to an understanding of investments as 
a balance between debt and credit which “obscures the social dimensions and idiosyncratic 
characteristics of economic exchange”. Commensuration thus determines what we see and 
value and how we understand the world. What has been less recognised is that rather than 
follow, cognitive elements may also be necessary to ignite other dimensions of 
commensuration. For example, Huault & Rainelli-Weiss (2011) analyse in their study the 
failed attempt to develop a European weather derivatives market. The authors contend that 
industrial firms and weather derivates market promoters could not construct a shared 
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problem and fitting solution that would serve the common interest and in this absence 
technical and value commensuration remained problematic.  
 
To my knowledge only two studies have explicitly addressed these commensuration 
dimensions. Kolk et al. (2008) studied whether commensuration had sufficiently progressed 
to come to meaningful greenhouse gas reporting through the work of the Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP) and Levin and Espeland (2002) looked at the creation of a futures market for 
air pollution. The latter study suggests that, as air pollution changed “from a social problem 
to a technical problem” (Levin & Espeland, 2002: 138), technical commensuration preceded 
value and subsequently cognitive commensuration. However, they both explain little about 
the explanatory mechanisms between dimensions. This further highlights the need to 
analyse the dynamics of commensuration in more detail as its transformative power and 
“ability to legitimize and institutionalize new epistemic forms” (O′Mahoney et al., 2013: 
228) makes it important to better understand how commensuration does this and, 
moreover, how the various dimensions of commensuration interact with and follow on each 
other and the explanatory mechanisms behind this. An analysis of this process explicates 
sustainability reporting’s transformation from a values-based practice towards a value-
based. 
 
Methods7 
Site selection 
To understand the commensuration of sustainability reporting I focus my analysis on the 
organisational field that has formed around sustainably reporting (see e.g. Context, 2007; 
Etzion & Ferraro, 2010; Kolk, 2010; Larrinaga-González, 2007; Levy et al., 2010). 
                                                          
7
 Some replication of the methods sections of Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 cannot be avoided here as the respective 
chapters share a lot of methodological aspects.  
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Organizational fields are defined as “… those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute 
a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, 
regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products” 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 148). Fields are relational spaces around issues (Hoffman, 1999) 
where “problems of organizing are debated” (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008: 143) and solutions 
to problems contested, negotiated and translated (Davis & Marquis, 2005; Jennings & 
Zandbergen, 1995; Zilber, 2006). For reporting, in addition to firms actors of interest are 
also NGO’s (Kolk, 2004a, 2004b), the government (Lambooy, 2010; UNEP & KPMG, 2006), 
professional services firms (Levy et al., 2010), institutional investors and standard setters 
such as the GRI which is located in Amsterdam.  
 
I focus my research on sustainability reporting in the Netherlands, keeping in mind its 
embeddedness in a wider environment. The Netherlands has been one of the frontrunners 
in reporting (KPMG, 2011a) and the “complex social setting in which causal dynamics were 
not immediately apparent and the motivations of actors were obscure” (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006: 31) make the sustainability reporting field a salient case. In addition, 
following Jennings and Zandbergen (1995) I focus on a specific country since fields of 
sustainable practices are often local in character (see also Adams & Kuasirikun, 2000; Kolk, 
2005). After a short-lived first wave of interest in primarily social aspects of corporations in 
the 1970’s (Dierkes & Antal, 1986) reporting picked up momentum in the late 1980’s when 
the first separate reports came out. By 2011, 82% of the Dutch largest 100 companies 
published sustainability reports (KPMG, 2011a). Overall, the number of published reports in 
the Netherlands has grown steadily over time (Appendix A).   
Case significance 
Sustainability reporting is a salient case study and a good example of commensuration. At 
its core, reporting is concerned with providing an account of the state of affairs in the 
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organisation. The inclusion of sustainability aspects in what used to be only financial 
accounts makes it important to turn these allegedly unrelated aspects in an understandable 
and comparable format. Putting social and environmental aspects into indicators, ratings, 
rankings and hard bottom-line financial figures makes reporting a salient commensuration 
project with various spheres claiming (in)commensurability (Espeland & Stevens, 1998). A 
financial/economic rationale is here typically set against a social/environmental one and 
these different conceptions of what is important lead to a moment in which the question of 
what is (of) value comes to the fore. Overall, this transparency allows for good theoretical 
development and offers an exemplary case as subject positions are often contested and 
“transparently observable”  (Eisenhardt, 1989: 537; Yin, 2009).   
Data collection 
I use various sources of data. Triangulating the data sources enhances trustworthiness 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985) and makes it possible to gather information about actors’ 
experiences, practices and reasoning as well as see the data in a historical context (Yin, 
2009). Data collection was managed as follows.   
 
First, to get familiar with the field, test the appropriateness of the case and determine 
prospective interviewees I closely read various documents and archival records (table 5). In 
order to get a broad impression of the field and to determine useful interviewees four key 
contacts were interviewed at first. These four contacts all had a minimum of ten years of 
diverse experiences in the sustainability (reporting) field. I also looked at attendance lists of 
past conferences on sustainability reporting. These steps resulted in a first list of 
prospective interviewees which were contacted. After this, a snowball sampling technique 
was applied based on recommendations of interviewees (Bryman & Bell, 2007). This 
approach made it possible to efficiently concentrate on contacting field actors with desired 
characteristics fitting the framing of the study, more akin to theoretical sampling (Strauss & 
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Corbin, 1998). Most prospective interviewees had multiple years of experience. In order to 
get a rounded overview of the various subject positions present in the field and to prevent 
selection bias I aimed to select interviewees from various disciplines and positions in the 
field. The potential problem of non-representativeness was minimised by actively keeping 
track of the category of actors interviewed (Malhotra & Birks, 2003). For instance, when at 
one point it became clear that the NGO’s were relatively ill-represented, potential 
interviewees were identified by actively checking conference attendance lists, making 
enquiries and searching publications, guaranteeing a range of different actor-positions were 
represented.    
 
The first interview round took place between February and September 2011. At this point 
preliminary analysis was conducted and remaining empirical blank spots identified. A 
second wave of interviews between November 2011 and February 2012 was aimed at filling 
these blank spots. This process was continued until after 94 interviews a saturation point 
had been reached (both theoretically and empirically). Table 4 provides an overview of the 
background of my interviewees (total number of interviewees exceeds 94 because some 
people are equally involved in various spheres, or have been in the past). Interviews allow 
for an account of current and historical events that provides information on actions, 
motives, strategies and their explanations (Malhotra & Birks, 2003). Interviews were semi-
structured (see Appendix F for broad outline of topics) and in total just over 100 hours in 
length. Interviews were tape recorded, with the exception of seven where extensive notes 
were taken, and transcribed. These seven interviews were included in the open coding but 
not in the subsequent rounds of coding. In particular for interviews that discussed the more 
distant history of reporting I did extensive prior research (based on internet search, 
documents, information from previous interviewees). This was done in order to ask specific 
questions, assist interviewees in structuring their thoughts and memories, come up with 
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counterfactuals in case required to test their statements and ultimately limit the risk of 
retrospective bias (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Morris, 1981).  
Table 4 Overview of interviewees 
Actor group Number of interviewees 
Public sector 12 
Civil society 24 
Investment community 13 
Reporting firms 25 
Academics 6 
Professional services firms 26 
 
Table 5 Overview of data sources 
Type of data Detail of source Amount 
of data 
Data analysis 
Interviews with 
field informants 
Interviews with firms, 
civil society, 
investors/raters, 
consultants, 
accountants, policy 
officials, academics.  
94 
intervie
ws 
(approx. 
100 
hours)  
Transcribed interviews, analysed 
and coded the material. Through 
iterative analysis of data and 
literature the main phases, 
themes and commensuration 
work emerged 
Archival and 
documentary 
material 
Newspaper articles of 
Dutch press, 
consultancy reports, 
NGO studies, 
government legislation 
and reports; investor 
statements 
3100 
pages 
Contextual reading and field 
familiarization. Setting up event 
history database; background for 
interviews; enhanced credibility 
and further validation of 
interview data interpretations; 
document summary forms.  
Conferences and 
workshops 
Dutch Annual Seminar 
CSR Reporting 2012; 
Seminar Integrated 
Reporting: ‘Measuring is 
knowing’; Roundtable 
Sustainable KPI’s   
30 
pages 
Notes from discussions, informal 
meetings and presentations 
reviewed. Helped to understand 
the commensuration practices 
and gain better practitioner 
perspective on commensuration 
and discuss proposed theoretical 
constructs and relations.  
 
In addition to interviews various other data sources were consulted (see table 5). First, 
consulting various archival records and documents is a beneficial addition to interviews (Yin, 
2009). Articles in main Dutch business and general newspapers, government reports, 
legislation on sustainability reporting, publications of professional service firms, reports and 
statements of NGO’s and investors, academic publications and sustainability reports of 
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companies were consulted. These data sources provided contextual reading and 
familiarization with the field, but also a form of “checks and balances” for the emerging 
dimensions and categories based on the coding of the interviews. I also created document 
summary forms (Ansari & Phillips, 2011) that could later be used for coding alongside 
interview transcripts. Finally, several workshops and conferences were attended. These field 
events were attended by various stakeholders. Although conference notes were not coded 
as such, in addition to gaining further insights into the reporting field and commensuration 
practices, through presentations and informal meetings emerging themes and constructs 
could be tested and further refined with people in the field.    
Data analysis 
I rely on a historical narrative analysis, an approach taken in previous studies (Ansari & 
Phillips, 2011; Etzion & Ferraro, 2010; Leblebici et al., 1991; Scott et al., 2000) that 
“presents an account of the linkages among events as a process leading to the outcome one 
seeks to explain” (Roth, 1988: 1). I combine this approach with a temporal bracketing 
strategy that works well to analyse my eclectic process data and show “how actions of one 
period lead to changes in the context that will affect action in subsequent periods” (Langley, 
1999: 703). To achieve my research aim I first used an inductive approach. I started my 
analysis by asking the very general question of ‘what happened?’ to get a broad impression 
of the evolution of the sustainability reporting field over time. More specifically, I first coded 
the interview transcripts and document summary forms very broadly using the qualitative 
data analysis software NVivo 9. This exploratory coding round was guided by a concern for 
the who, when, why, what and how of sustainability reporting. Through this more 
exploratory open coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) I coded events, actors and the activities 
they engaged in, intentions or justifications for reporting, audiences and the like. This 
expansive first coding round was only minimally driven by theory and largely inductive. It 
took place as the interviews were being conducted, marking a continuous iterative process 
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between interviews, data analysis and emerging theoretical constructs. It resulted in a large 
number (200+) of a diverse range of 1st order concepts (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013).   
 
Second, I reread all document forms and interview transcripts, analysed assigned codes, but 
now specifically with the more focused question in mind of trying to trace how reporting 
emerged and subsequently gained momentum and spread. Recurrent references to the 
need for, criticism of and moves towards standardisation, comparability, quantification, 
monetisation and financialisation were noticeable. Practices such as rankings, ratings, 
benchmarks, and performance indicators came up frequently as well. This interest in 
developing metrics out of various, often qualitative, unlikes and the relative disdain towards 
qualitative information in favour of measurable and objective quantitative data warranted a 
more theoretical explanation, even more so because as reporting’s development 
progressed this tendency seemed to get stronger. At this point in the data analysis, when a 
stronger theoretical grounding was called for, I followed Gioia and colleagues (Gioia et al., 
2013: 23) when they argue that “upon consulting the literature, the research process might 
be viewed as transitioning from ‘‘inductive’’ to a form of ‘‘abductive’’ research, in that data 
and existing theory are now considered in tandem (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007)”.  
 
Third, I consulted the commensuration literature since it appeared from the various codes 
that commensuration was potentially a process that was at play here. The data was thus 
again analysed and (re)coded, this time zooming in on commensuration aspects. By 
consulting the data and informants I identified what could be considered main 
commensuration examples and these were classified along the dimensions of value, 
cognitive and technical commensuration. I note that when classifying commensuration at 
times the same practice can encompass multiple dimensions of commensuration. For 
example, a ranking can be at first primarily a cognitive tool that shapes the meaning of what 
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entails sustainability reporting, yet in a more mature stage becomes more a value judgment 
of reporting quality. Ultimately categorisation depended on the specific context and the 
main function in the respective phase of reporting. I then tracked the occurrences of these 
commensuration dimensions throughout the history of reporting to see whether there was 
temporal variation. My analysis suggested that the various types of commensuration 
developed differently over time with a dominance of first cognitive and later technical and 
value commensuration, respectively (see also table 6 and Appendix C). 
 
To understand and explain these shifts further I also tracked the evolution of various 
contextual factors by analysing the interview transcripts and document summaries. In 
essence, this analysis led me again to consider the ‘who, what, when, why and how’, but 
this time in relation to the commensuration of sustainability reporting. In short, a story 
emerged in which the commensuration took place against a background of shifts in type of 
reports, rationales for reporting, actors involved as well as outcomes and pathologies of 
reporting. Three temporal phases were thus distinguished, each with its dominant 
commensuration dimensions and contextual factors and outcomes. An overview of these 
three phases and their specific characteristics was iteratively discussed and validated 
throughout the interviews (see also table 6 and Appendix D). 
 
Overall, attention thus shifted gradually from the raw empirical data and the voice of the 
informants to the theoretical grounding of the story that started to develop based on the 
codes and related categories identified. Starting with a broad 1st order analysis, a more 
condensed set of 2nd order categories followed, more akin to the idea of axial coding 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998) or the work of Gioia and colleagues (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Gioia et 
al., 2013). This process was repeated until the point of theoretical saturation was reached 
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(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Below I discuss and explain the three phases of sustainability 
reporting and the role of commensuration in more detail. 
 
Findings 
My analysis is structured around three main phases of reporting8. Throughout these phases 
a change in dominating commensuration dimensions can be seen. First cognitive 
commensuration was most prominent, later technical and value commensuration, 
respectively, grew in importance. Below I provide a summary of these three 
commensuration phases of sustainability reporting and sketch out the circumstances in 
which the shifts took place. Derived from the data, in the discussion section I argue that 
these phases can be explained by focusing on the importance of pathologies that ignite 
shifts in commensuration, supported by a change in the purpose of reporting’s 
commensuration and the people involved. Table 6 offers a short summary and Appendix C 
and D offer additional details and supporting evidence.    
Table 6 Summary of three phases of sustainability reporting 
Reporting phase Environmental 
Reporting (<2000) 
Triple bottom line  
Reporting (2000-
2007) 
Integrated 
reporting (2007<) 
Commensuration 
dimension 
Cognitive Technical Value 
Pathology Reporting vague 
practice for ‘values-
driven tree-huggers’ 
Reporting as a 
mindless tick-the-
box exercise 
Reporting 
impoverished 
because of ignoring 
incommensurables 
Purpose Creating awareness;  
putting reporting on 
the map; moral 
framing and an add-
on to business-as-
usual 
Business case 
(efficiency, risk & 
reputation) 
Strategic value 
creation (growth, 
innovation, comp. 
advantage); 
valuation 
People Civil society; state Standard setters and 
consultants 
Investors and 
accountants 
                                                          
8
 The periods for these three phases should not be treated as abrupt and absolute demarcations, but rather as 
transition periods in which one dominant phase with its set of aspects gets taken over by a new one. 
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Phase 1 (<2000): Cognitive commensuration and environmental reporting 
The key development in this early stage of reporting was to indicate the moral failing of the 
firm and the need for it to act responsibly and show accountability. In particular NGO’s and 
the Dutch government put a moral appeal on firms and through cognitive commensuration 
tried to establish a meaning system in which business, sustainability, corporate 
responsibility and transparency started to become related concepts. The practice ran into its 
own limits though as it was considered too vague and for ‘values-driven tree-huggers’, 
thereby limiting its appeal but at the same time giving impetus for change.  
Cognitive commensuration: combining business, sustainability and transparency  
From the late 1980s onwards Dutch firms started to introduce environmental management 
systems (Evers et al., 1991; VNO-NCW, 1987) and the first Dutch Environmental Policy Plan 
was published in 1989. Internationally, the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED) published its influential report ‘Our Common Future’ (i.e. ‘Brundtland 
Report’) on solutions to global environmental problems in 1987. In Rio de Janeiro the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), i.e. the "Earth Summit”, took place 
in 1992. Its plan of action, Agenda 21, contained a recommendation urging firms “to report 
annually on their environmental records, as well as on their use of energy and natural 
resources” (Agenda 21, 1992, art. 30.10). By no means all firms were convinced of the need 
to be transparent and accountable though, as one informant recalls some firms being of the 
opinion that “We should not start doing this! We put too much responsibility upon 
ourselves. It is up to the government to prescribe with legislation and policies, we will 
execute it and that’s it”. Nevertheless, in this period a discourse of conducting business 
responsibly and showing accountability through the disclosure of, mainly environmental, 
information to the general public started to emerge. 
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It remained largely unclear what this disclosure was supposed to look like though. This was 
perhaps unsurprising since, in the words of a former CEO of a Dutch multinational 
corporation (MNC), “people were not used to disclose information that had no, or a very 
limited, financial component. They found that soft and irrelevant”. One consultant active in 
this period recalled that “everybody was trying to find out: what do we have to report on 
and how, and can we actually report? ... Real missionary work”. Whereas some progress 
started to be made in developing indicators and reporting guidelines (examples of technical 
commensuration), cognitive commensuration played a more important role. Before serious 
progress could be made with indicators, rankings, benchmarks and the like, it was required 
to understand why this was required and what it was exactly for. That is, on a cultural-
cognitive level the categories in which people understood the world needed to be 
reclassified and concepts previously considered disparate needed to be linked. This meant 
raising often controversial issues such as what firms are exactly responsible for and the 
sense and nonsense of accountability and transparency. In sum, it involved paving the 
ground for reporting and make sure that on that more abstract foundation later concrete 
measures could be built. In particular NGO’s and to an extent also the Dutch government, 
through regulation, were driving forces behind this.  
 
In concrete terms, in times of rising corporate power, with the position of corporations in 
society changing and the number of high-profile environmental and social scandals 
mounting (e.g. Shell, Nike, Chiquita, ABN Amro), NGOs started to demand corporate 
openness, transparency and accountability as “you saw firms first being attacked by NGO’s, 
they had to disclose more and more information” (Interview, SRI investor). This openness 
allowed NGO’s to “use the information themselves but *they+ could also use it more within 
the society, like saying ‘look at those firms, these things are very unclear yet very important 
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topics for them’” (Interview, consultant). Environmental reporting thus became “a 
beneficiary of movements and pressures that are driving business or signalling business that 
transparency is not an option any longer, it's really an expectation and you must respond to 
it” (Interview, NGO). From a commensuration perspective, this activism helped to constitute 
on a more cognitive and cultural level a logic that combined previously disparate elements 
such as the current state of the environment and the influence of firms in this, and the 
future of the planet and the role and responsibility of firms towards this. Moreover, 
connections started to be made between these aspects and the actual consequences of 
non-accountability in terms of, for instance, reputation. The impactful Brent Spar case and 
boycott of Shell is a particularly relevant example.  
 
In the spirit of this zeitgeist, there also was “a push from the government, regulation on 
reporting, that had a very concrete push effect” (Interview, accountant). The clearest 
example is the Dutch Environmental Protection Act9 that stated that starting from 1999 
around 300 companies (heavy polluters) were required not only to report to the 
government and regulators on a variety of environmental aspects (technically already well 
defined), but also had to publish a Public Report. This initiative was the result of intense 
negotiations between employer associations, (environmental) NGOs and the Dutch 
government. The exact format, structure and content of the public report remained 
relatively unspecified though. This was precisely because consensus on the meaning of a 
report did not exist and most parties did not want the developing field of reporting to be 
stifled by political dictates. Too much specificity through technical commensuration by 
means of, for instance, indicators went against the opinion that a report was “context-
dependent in the eyes of stakeholders. The idea was that it was firm-specific, made-to-
                                                          
9
Wet Milieubeheer, Staatsblad 1997, nr. 170. See Chapter 12, accessed on 14-06-2012 at: 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0003245/Hoofdstuk12/geldigheidsdatum_15-06-2012 
Wet van 10 April 1997, Staatsblad 1997, nr. 170 & Besluit Milieuverslaglegging of 17 November 1998, 
Staatsblad1998, nr. 655 
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measure work” (Interview, standardisation agency). Thus, again, rather than trying to 
develop a clear-cut reporting framework through technical commensuration, the legislation 
was a relatively flexible cognitive stick that was meant to make firms reconsider and better 
understand their position in society, their responsibilities towards it as well as the possible 
implications of linkages with its environment. Thus, the legislation aimed to change the 
cultural-cognitive frame by combining these previously disparate elements. 
The limits of cognitive commensuration   
Although this new ‘reality’ resonated with some firms, it came with its limitations (or 
pathological aspects as will be discussed below), as its appeal remained limited. Reports 
were often vague, focused on the environment and had a strong moral undertone. That is, 
in the words of a partner of one of the Big Four10 firms: “When I started working on 
sustainability it was more like: you need to do good. You have to do business decently and 
ethically. You have to show that in your management and also report on it”. A consequence 
was that many reports were easily accused of being superficial, selective in their content 
and a form of ‘greenwashing’. Firms taking up reporting saw it often as an opportunity to 
finally tell some good news and “... what you saw in these earlier reports is a lot of those 
‘hurray’ stories” (Interview, sustainability journalist). Furthermore, the appeal of morally 
inspired reporting was problematic as “your idealism is different than mine and different 
than that of a manager. So when you talk about idealism that is a really difficult starting 
point” (Interview, consultant).  
 
Whereas this period of cognitive commensuration brought attention to reporting and 
helped to develop a different frame of thinking, the cognitive focus at the expense of more 
technical work also marked its limitations as “everybody talked about Agenda 21 of the Rio 
Earth Summit and about progress, but there was no set format that could measure success” 
                                                          
10
 Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PwC 
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(Interview, NGO). A clear framework for reporting and consensus on which environmental 
aspects merited the attention of reporting did not exist, and with corporate accountability 
becoming increasingly accepted and expected through the cognitive work of NGO’s and the 
government to bind previously disparate elements together, calls to bring reporting to a 
next level emerged. In sum, the idea that business, sustainability, transparency and 
accountability were perhaps all sides of the same coin started to emerge, yet how to 
concretely work that out in practice was still a different medal altogether. This change is 
well illustrated by one informant, a sustainability consultant, who recalled it as “Great that 
you report, but please report more professionally, report better and more complete, and do 
it more systematically”. In effect, sustainability reporting started to transform around the 
turn of the century.  
Phase 2 (2000-2007): technical commensuration and triple bottom line reporting 
The key development in the second phase was the emphasis on technical commensuration 
through the development of guidelines, indicators and standards that provided the 
somewhat complex and messy sustainability reporting some ‘hands and feet’. Supported by 
consultants and standard setters entering the (lucrative) market, sustainability reporting 
became defined as supporting the triple bottom line and based on a business case. 
However, over-reliance on indicators, standards and guidelines ran the risk though of 
becoming a mindless tick-the-box exercise, resulting in meaningless reports that were as 
burdensome to prepare for firms as they were to read for interested parties.  
Technical commensuration: developing sustainability measurement   
In contradistinction to the rationale of the first phase, one informant, a Big Four partner, 
captured the new spirit as “*s+ustainability is a topic that is important in the world. That’s no 
ethics or morality. It is simply that if I don’t pay attention now, I’ll have a problem later on”. 
Consultants became more active in the field as well and tried to further drive this discourse 
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and professionalise reporting. One government official recalled that “at that point in time 
consultants got a boosting function. … They actively approached corporates with the idea: 
‘should you not start doing something about sustainability’”. As consultants saw market 
potential with these newly reporting firms looking for guidance, according to some this “... 
reflects the mainstreaming of the issue. It says that there's recognition that these are issues 
that need to be worked on, and that there's money to be made in it” (Interview, 
NGO/consultant). The business community meanwhile “... was starting to understand the 
business value of sustainability as a matter of reputation, as a matter of brand, as a matter 
of attracting talent ... So they had a business mind, what's the business case?” (Interview, 
sustainability researcher). Corporate accounting scandals (e.g. Ahold, WorldOnline, 
Worldcom, Enron) at the start of the 21st century further added to the notion that 
“suddenly extra-financial or non-financial information became very interesting because it 
mirrors a behavioural component” (Interview, investor). As cognitive steps had thus been 
made, the business-case focused approach towards reporting saw firms desire something 
less fuzzy and they “were looking for certainty, something to hold on to in terms of 
reporting” (Interview, CSR manager). They wanted to remove uncertainty around reporting 
and make it more concrete and manageable. In short, aspects that technical 
commensuration could provide an answer to increased in importance.  
 
Commensurative work was needed to respond to the call for more clarity and business case 
reporting. This became most visible through the development of various standards and 
guidelines. At first the notion of the triple bottom line (TBL) by (consultant) John Elkington 
(1997) emerged. His integrated and interconnected vision on people, planet, and profit 
principles tried to make reporting more manageable and concrete. This TBL concept caught 
on in the Netherlands as stakeholders involved in reporting “almost immediately started 
getting the signals from every side that actually there is much more needed than just 
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environment, that this also has to cover social and even community, in addition to wider 
economic issues” (Interview, NGO). Of particular interest here is the extensive technical 
commensuration undertaken by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Heavily influenced by 
Elkington’s thinking (who was part of GRI working groups as well), with the start of this 
multi-stakeholder initiative in 1997 a dominant global standard started to emerge and the 
first version of the GRI Guidelines (now called G1) was released in 2000. The reasoning of 
the guidelines was “let’s instead of having 50 different standards, let’s all come together 
and try to create a global consensus among major stakeholders over what should be 
expected regarding environmental health and safety and social and economics” (Interview, 
GRI stakeholder). New versions followed in 2002, 2006 and 2013. These contained 
principles to determine your reporting content, quality, strategy and indicators as well as 
extensive guidance on the definitions and measurement of these indicators. The guidelines 
picked up momentum in the Netherlands (see table 7), as firms wondered “What do I have 
to report, how do I have to report? A little bit scared they were and they tried to follow the 
guidelines” (Interview, sustainability consultant). The move of the GRI to the Netherlands in 
2002 gave it further impetus and visibility.  
Table 7 Number of reports using GRI Guidelines in the Netherlands 
Year ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 
# of GRI 
reports 
3 7 5 7 15 24 26 30 40 51 66 96 
Source:  GRI Sustainability Disclosure Database 
The work of the GRI had a strong technical dimension in its aim to develop a standardising 
framework with measurable indicators that were preferably concrete and increasingly also 
quantitatively measurable, rather than just qualitative descriptions. There was a strong 
notion that “CSR has to become formalised and was expected to be concrete, measurable, 
comparable and quantifiable” (Interview, government official), paving the way for technical 
commensuration. This was not self-evident and easy though. Whereas required according 
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to most, in particular “the people in the social areas often were under the mistaken 
impression that what they thought should be written in there was what the company was 
going to write there, and they didn’t realise that unless you get pretty specific they’re going 
to write about anything and it’s going to be just mush again” (Interview, GRI stakeholder). 
The development of indicators was typically done in working groups comprised of 
specialists representing different constituencies. As one former GRI employee recalled, this 
was not always easy as “a lot of the times people got mixed up, what is the role of the 
reporting indicators that are meant to be disclosed, versus setting what is the standard for 
these indicators”, the latter being not the primary aim of the initiative.  
 
Furthermore, whereas economic indicators were relatively easy to construct, for 
environmental and in particular social aspects things were less straightforward. 
Environmental indicators borrowed from more established institutions such as the 
International Standards Organization (ISO). After all, “if a company is doing an 
environmental management system and they're following various aspects of the ISO 14000 
series, they're going to have results to report on. And so why don't we make it easy”, as a 
GRI employee involved argued. For example, during working group meetings “we debated 
so long about how do you number these indicators? How do you number them? Is it 1.1 or 
is it EC2 or … we would study the ISO system and see if there were something from there 
we could borrow“. Notwithstanding agreement that “especially on the social side we need 
to make it more comparable because it’s too soft and too mushy” (Interview, GRI 
stakeholder), the development of social aspects remains up to this day most controversial 
and more difficult than the environmental realm. As one sustainability manager recalled:  
“The problem was that the people in the social groups weren’t used to metrics, 
they didn’t have a comfort with metrics, they didn’t know how to design metrics, 
they didn’t know what metrics will do for you”.  
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Developing indicators that stakeholders could agree upon was thus a difficult task and also 
indicates a difference in cognitive commensuration achieved between stakeholders within 
the environmental and social realm.  
 
Whereas the work of the GRI may have been most instrumental in advancing technical 
commensuration of sustainability reporting, it was further reinforced by the technical work 
of global sustainability indices and rankings such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index 
(DJSI), the FTSE4Good Index, the Dutch Transparency Benchmark and the Council for Annual 
Reporting’s publication of its Annual Reporting Guideline 400. Although these initiatives 
may have as their ultimate aim the ‘objective’ comparison of companies and (e)valuation of 
their performance (the realm of value commensuration), before they could robustly do so 
they also needed to develop their methodologies, indicators and criteria of comparison 
which required plenty of  technical work. In fact, the technical work of these initiatives at 
times overlapped. As a former GRI employee recalled on its relation to DJSI, “we tried to 
make reporting as easy as possible by mapping where possible the indicators ... and we had 
a deal and we said ‘hey look, can we get you to say … yes, we'll take your GRI report’”. This 
reduced the burden on companies while advancing the respective initiatives and thus 
spreading a specific conception of what comprised a sustainability report.       
The limits of technical commensuration   
According to a sustainability manager, “under influence of GRI, and also the Transparency 
Benchmark in the Netherlands, reports became more professional and business-focused. 
They contained goals and targets, links were made with remuneration and bonuses for 
some firms. Reports became more factual, less cheering”. On the other hand, a limitation of 
these developments is that they invited non-reflective reporting by blindly following 
guidelines or benchmark criteria. For example, “GRI has been a great help … when we made 
our first sustainability report it was very nice to have some point of reference. Back then it 
 100 
 
1
0
0
 
 
was simply tick-the-box of the indicators. GRI tries to improve comparability. However, what 
you see is that when you look at it with a little bit of common sense the information is 
actually not comparable!” (Interview, sustainability manager). Sustainability becomes a 
simplified technical tick-the-box exercise for companies rather than a dialogue about their 
values and impacts on society. The pitfall here is that “If you restrict yourself to reporting 
the standardised information, and I think that is cause for concern, at least for me, then you 
risk that you stop the thinking” (Interview, partner Big Four). Reporting gets too broad and 
“over time it gets stuck in its own complexity and you simply are forced to make choices, if 
only to keep the reports readable” (Interview, consultant). Moreover, reporting by ticking 
boxes and following rankings and benchmarks runs the risk of not anchoring it to the core of 
the business as “sustainability will only be really relevant when it is a strategic theme that is 
managed by the Board of Directors. And by default that means you will have to restrict the 
number of indicators” (Interview, sustainability manager/consultant). So in a way the 
technical commensuration propagated by standard setters and consultants started to 
become a victim of its own success and further changes were thus required. 
Phase 3 (>2007): Value commensuration and integrated reporting 
A key development in the final, and ongoing, phase is that integrated reporting rose in 
prominence as attempts were made to integrate the financial and non-financial aspects of 
the firm. In particular investors and accountants started pushing for a clearer link between 
sustainability aspects and firm value (creation). Value commensuration through the 
development of strategic (and often valorised) KPI’s, ratings, indices and integrated reports 
became important. As a consequence of these developments, however, accusations 
emerged that sustainability reporting had become impoverished as it restricted its scope to 
the readily commensurable aspects and thereby ignores incommensurables. 
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Value commensuration: easing valuations by blending the financial and non-financial   
The limits of the previous phase were further amplified by the financial crisis that “... helped 
propel what I see as the third phase, which is where there's a lot more interest in ESG 
integration” (Interview, sustainability investor). In short, firms recognise a newly emerging 
reality with the crisis and this helps to answer the question “Why do I have to be the best in 
sustainability? You want to be the best because you want to beat the market!” (Interview, 
consultant). The purpose of reporting becomes more strategic and focused on value-adding 
aspects, thereby trying to repair the described problems with box-ticking and transparency 
on aspects not linked with the core business. In effect, the purpose of reporting can be 
characterised as “forget about the accountability of companies. If you like, forget about the 
company's own business case; let's talk about the efficient allocation of capital. Do investors 
have access to the kind of information in the right kind of format for them to be able to 
make correct valuations of companies?” (Interview, civil servant). In effect, firm valuations 
thus increasingly rest upon a mixture of financial and non-financial (i.e. sustainability) 
aspects, with the latter therefore having to be made increasingly ‘financial’ to fit existing 
frameworks. This is arguably most prolifically done through integrated reporting, see below, 
as some firms and professionals start to think that “when you are serious about the topic 
you also say ‘when we present our financial report and our strategy, than we also want to 
show what that means from a sustainability point of view’. You want to do that in one 
report” (Interview, consultant). Creating equivalence between these different value systems 
of the financial and sustainability aspects becomes paramount in this latest phase.      
 
Not just the aim of reporting and commensuration changes, also different stakeholders 
become involved which in turn affects the commensuration dynamics. First, in the 
Netherlands “slowly but surely the interest of investors has grown, and also the 
understanding that sustainability is not something that exists in and for itself, but that it is a 
 102 
 
1
0
2
 
 
way to assess the value of the firm ... this has paved the way towards integrated reporting 
(Interview, partner Big Four)”. Were the total managed socially responsible investment (SRI) 
assets of large Dutch institutional investors in 2005 €47 billion (4,7% of total AUM), by 2009 
this had grown to €396 billion (33 % of total AUM) (Eurosif, 2006, 2010). Investors are 
powerful actors for firms so “now you see that the financial world is looking at it, and then 
it suddenly becomes a lot more serious” (Interview, sustainability consultant). A second, yet 
not unrelated, group gaining influence are accountants. One informant, a Big Four partner 
confessed that, not unlike investors, “accountants have noticed that sustainability reports 
get ever closer to the core operations of the firm and therefore become also relevant for 
them ... they are starting to realise that non-financial information involves more than just 
sustainability and that it is important for the valuation of the organisation”. For example, 
Dutch Big Four accounting firms all publish so-called thought-leadership on integrated 
reporting and organise seminars and workshops on the matter (Deloitte, 2011; KPMG, 
2011b, 2012; PwC, 2012). In addition, they are closely involved with the development of an 
integrated reporting framework, GRI G4 guidelines and perform verification duties on 
reports, up from 10% to 41% between 2002 and 2011 (KPMG, 2002b, 2011a). 
 
With sustainability reporting becoming increasingly linked to firm valuation, and investors 
and accountants picking up a more active interest, value commensuration becomes 
paramount. For instance, integrated reporting and valorised key performance indicators 
(KPI’s) linking sustainability dimensions and firm value gain importance. The earlier 
technical commensuration expands into actually linking these aspects more directly with 
monetising and firm valuations. A salient commensuration example here is the International 
Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) that was set up in 2010. Although a global initiative, it 
resonates well in the Netherlands with Dutch companies being the main contributor to 
IIRC’s pilot programme. In the Netherlands 26% of the 100 largest firms already published 
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an integrated report in 2011, up from 3% in 2008 (KPMG, 2011a).  An integrated report is a 
“concise communication about how an organization’s strategy, governance, performance 
and prospects lead to the creation of value over the short, medium and long term” (IIRC, 
2011: 3). The aim of this initiative is to “start reporting more around the area of 
sustainability, but doing it in a way that was far more strategic and business focused” 
(Interview, IIRC affiliate). Integrated reporting goes further than, for instance, the GRI 
Guidelines since it introduces elements of value and valuation more explicitly. It is not just 
about finding technically valid and reliable indicators anymore, although technical work is 
part of it, but moreover about putting prices or values on these indicators through metrics: 
“... there need to be better ways in which one can either valorise non-financial performance 
or have better ways of, if you can’t valorise, to actually put non-financial elements of key 
investment cases or unchanged management strategy in the operations of organisations” 
(Interview, NGO). Financial and non-financial elements go together as elements that make 
up the overall value of the firm.  
 
A further aspect of value commensuration is the search for KPI’s and the continuing 
influence of ratings, rankings, indices and benchmarks that (e)valuate firms. Naturally, both 
these developments contain many technical elements, yet in this phase the underlying 
rationale and purpose largely rests on the idea of comparing and (e)valuating organisations 
based on a common metric rather than just developing technically sound indicators and 
methodologies. That is, typically organisations wish to answer the question of “How do we 
prove success? … But how do you do that comprehensively and really put that into our main 
financial matrix? … people love their balance sheets. They want to be able to say, ‘Where’s 
the risk? Where’s the opportunity?” (Interview, rating agency). According to one NGO it is 
possible to “... continue to improve reporting by fine-tuning these KPI’s *technical 
commensuration], that is one agenda, but for us the biggest agenda, while you have to 
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improve these, it is the connection with financial aspects that counts [value 
commensuration]. That is going to reconcile within the company the financial and non-
financial to picture the real economy of your enterprise”. The investment and accounting 
community has contributed to the debate as well by publishing various documents aimed at 
establishing a firm’s material key performance sustainability indicators (e.g. DVFA/EFFAS 
2008, 2009; EABIS 2009; FEE 2011; IFAC 2012; UNCTAD/ISAR 2008). Instruments such as 
DJSI, FTSE4Good, and the Dutch Transparency Benchmark have moved beyond a mere 
technical exercise and become treated more as objective quality and value indicators. That 
is, where emphasis was first more on technical commensuration, by now they have arguably 
become more valid and reliable instruments of measurement and firm valuation. At the 
same time, this work has a cognitive effect as others use it to determine their future 
sustainability focus areas as it guides in assessing “... what is important, what is upcoming, 
what is something we have to do something with ... a topic does not come in the DJSI 
without a reason” (Interview, sustainability manager). 
The limits of value commensuration   
Whereas for some firms reporting has thus “... developed from a kind of tick-the-box 
exercise towards reporting that is more relevant for the corporate strategy” (Interview, 
investor), the drawbacks of emphasising value commensuration are already becoming clear 
as well. In particular the question of its limits and detriments becomes prominent.  
 
Fundamentally, there is a concern about what to do with more qualitative measures that 
are hard to quantify and put in comparable metrics (i.e. commensurate). This applies in 
particular to the social aspects of the sustainability agenda as “for social it is much more 
difficult since we do not have the price for a gram or kilo of stress or discrimination. In 
environmental you have that” (Interview, NGO). The push to ‘commensurate the 
incommensurable’ leads to tensions as some wonder “*h+ow can I add drip-irrigation to 
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employee training and education? You cannot add such things. It is pointless to do so 
because ultimately you end up with a meaningless figure” (Interview, sustainability 
manager). Not only is the potential impoverishment of the sustainability idea through value 
commensuration a concern, a related issue is how to ensure that reports remain meaningful 
and not only consist of numbers but also offer a sufficient storyline and narrative on 
policies, strategies etc. Ultimately, as expressed by this rating analyst, “… the hard thing 
there is how do you interpret these things into bottom line meaningful statistics which are 
useful to financial analysts? But at the same time you don’t lose the narrative and strategic 
reporting on sustainability from both stakeholder perspective and a business perspective”.  
 
Finally, in particular among stakeholders originally concerned with sustainability rather than 
finance and valuation, uneasiness emerges about the influence of accountants and 
investors and their impact on sustainability. For instance, a sentiment where stakeholders 
say “I don't consider the accounting industry authoritative in the social performance area, 
but they will say well, we're authoritative in accounting. Well, I'm not sure that's the same 
thing” (Interview, trade union) takes hold. One sustainability consultant comments that “the 
topic of sustainability is currently being hijacked by the accountants, KPMG-type of people, 
and the raters and ISO-folks. I do not believe in that system at all. However, I do understand 
where the desire comes from, clarity, measurability, thinking in absolute terms. There is a 
limit to that though”. The above signifies an inherent tension of value commensuration in 
cases where different meaning systems, objectives and notions of what is of value are to be 
combined. In short, the problem of advancing value commensuration is, according to some 
at least, that commensuration has taken hold too strongly in the reporting landscape, with 
more emphasis on high positions in rankings, monetising KPI’s and following guidelines, 
than thinking about the impact of the firm on a more sustainable world rather than the 
balance sheet.  
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Discussion 
In this paper, I have analysed sustainability reporting’s transition from ‘values to value’ as a 
commensuration project. I did so by studying the evolution of sustainability reporting in the 
Netherlands. In analysing this case my study further develops existing accounts of the 
commensuration process and how various dimensions of commensuration interact with and 
follow on each other and the explanatory mechanisms behind this. In particular, I suggest 
that over time different dimensions of commensuration become dominant. In the 
discussion that follows, I first introduce a model (figure 2) and explain it in general terms. 
Next, I argue that the changes in dimensions of commensuration (from cognitive, to 
technical to value) are primarily driven by emerging pathologies. These pathologies instigate 
the limits of each dimension of commensuration and the need for change which results in a 
recurring pattern of pathology emergence and resolution. This is further embodied by a 
change in the actors involved in reporting as well as its aim. I also examine the temporal and 
recursive aspects of commensuration. In the final part of the discussion I address the 
implications of my study for our understanding of sustainability reporting, both practically 
and theoretically. 
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Commensuration as a project of rationalisation 
On a general level this outline of sustainability reporting’s trajectory resembles a rather 
Weberian story of society’s rationalisation under capitalism. As discussed above and shown 
in figure 2, reporting started as a moral claim on firms to become more accountable 
towards the public at large and to be transparent about their environmental and 
subsequently social impact. Once this more cognitive linking of corporate behaviour and an 
emphasis on non-core sustainability aspects became increasingly common, reporting 
became more closely linked with the business case of the firm and CSR. With this, technical 
work was undertaken through the development of indicators, guidelines and so on, making 
sustainability reporting more tangible, concrete and measurable. Subsequently, this line was 
continued, and extended, by in particular the investment and accounting community who 
tried to capture non-financial sustainability aspects through value commensuration into 
their (financial) and quantifiable metrics, thereby narrowing the conception of sustainability 
reporting to a more strategic core.    
 
In terms of rationalisation, commensuration has in particular propelled the economisation 
of sustainability and sustainability reporting, i.e. “... the processes and practices through 
which individuals, activities, and organizations are constituted as economic actors and 
entities” (Miller & Power, 2013: 560). This economising keeps firms on a continuing path 
towards rational economic profit making (Miller & Power, 2013; Weber, 1947). 
Commensuration can thus be seen here as driving the evolution of a new practice, such as 
sustainability reporting, through its economising power and thereby its contribution to the 
more general rationalisation of society. This function of commensuration has been 
recognised as instrumental by others (see e.g. Espeland & Stevens, 1998) as it “reinforces 
the hegemony of market values as the dominant mode of valuing, and threatens the 
legitimacy of other ways of valuing people and places” (Levin & Espeland, 2002: 138). 
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Whereas naturally interested parties (e.g. professions such as accountants, investors, and 
consultants) have had a helping, and beneficiary, hand in this, at the same time  my analysis 
hints at the importance of (inter)national contextual factors such as incidents (e.g. Shell’s 
Brent Spar), crises (e.g. accounting scandals, financial crisis) and the, admittedly vague, 
notion of ‘zeitgeist’ (anti-business, environmental awareness etc.) which has become in 
general conducive of accountability and auditability (see Power 1997; Miller and Power 
2013). 
Commensuration and its pathologies 
An important aspect of the model is what happened at the borders between the identified 
phases and dimensions of commensuration and can thus help to explain its sequence and 
transitions. I suggest that commensuration is driven by and gives rise to pathologies. Prior 
work tells us about the multitude of people involved and tasks and goals of 
commensuration (e.g. Desrosieres, 1998; Espeland & Stevens, 1998) but has remained 
largely silent about their interaction with the commensuration process. I contend that these 
aspects together form important factors that help to explain the mechanisms behind 
pathologies, which I label as means-ends disconnection, professional insulation and cultural 
contestation.    
 
First, viewing pathologies as a mechanism of change and development and a driving force 
behind commensuration sheds light on the interplay between its various dimensions. The 
meaning of pathology refers in this case to a deviation from a healthy, normal, or efficient 
condition. That is, following Barnett and Finnemore (1999, 2004) in their study on the 
international (bureaucratic) organizations, the forces that give them authority and power at 
the same time can be the source of “dysfunctional behavior. We term this particular type of 
dysfunction pathology” (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999: 716, emphasis in original). A similar 
understanding of the term can be found in Deutsch (1963) and Scott (2003). To draw on a 
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metaphor, pathologies in this sense could be seen as a racing car going through a turn. 
While it needs sufficient speed to smoothly round the turn as fast as possible, too much 
speed will cause the car to drift and, unable to keep its line, ultimately spin off track. 
Whereas the dominant dimension of commensuration in each phase fuelled reporting’s 
further development, within the strength of each dimension also its limits or weakness 
could be found. Below I suggest three mechanisms that are constitutive of the pathologies 
visible in the commensuration process: disconnect of means and ends, professional 
insulation and cultural contestation. Overall, these aspects indicate that “different 
constituencies representing different normative views will suggest different tasks and goals, 
resulting … in a clash of competing perspectives that generates pathological tendencies” 
(Barnett & Finnemore, 1999: 724).  
 
In practice, in sustainability reporting’s development pathologies surfaced as follows. At first 
cognitive commensuration helped to put reporting on the map by stipulating the moral 
failing of the firm and a reclassification of the way ‘proper’ business was defined, i.e. what 
was legitimate business in a moral sense. A meaning system in which sustainability, 
corporate responsibility and transparency started to play a role was created. However, 
pushing this dimension of commensuration too far resulted in accusations of vagueness and 
mere peripheral ‘add-on’ reporting without actual impact (i.e. pathology 1). Technical 
commensuration in the next phase at first served as a resolution to this pathology and 
indeed made reporting more concrete and manageable for firms. However, yet again 
pushing this dimension too far resulted in box-ticking and a form of reporting that became 
more about reporting on a wide range of indicators for the sake of reporting rather than 
reporting actually linking the firm and its social and environmental impact (i.e. pathology 2). 
As a new resolution, value commensuration meant to bring more focus and integrate the 
financial and non-financial by prioritising, strategising and ideally monetising sustainability 
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aspects into financial metrics. Whereas resonant among many firms and certainly 
professions, once again a more pathological effect emerged as this caused concern over the 
consequences of the commensuration of the incommensurables and who and what 
sustainability reporting was ultimately for (i.e. pathology 3). What results after this remains 
to be seen as this is an ongoing process. A ping-pong game of emerging pathologies and 
temporal resolutions thus emerged and one of the questions that warrants answering is 
what caused these pathologies. 
 
A first explanation underpinning the pathologies of commensuration is that over time 
means and ends started to disconnect (see e.g. Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; Scott, 2003). 
For instance, too much focus on the expansion and following of reporting guidelines and 
standards in the second phase obfuscated the ends of sustainability reporting. At first 
reporting as a means was too detached from the core goals of the organization (end) as well 
as too vague to be linked with the end of sustainable business practices. Later the rules and 
procedures of sustainability reporting guidelines became ends in themselves rather than 
guidance for accountable and sustainable business, thereby contributing to an emerging 
pathology and giving impetus to change. In the subsequent phase the focus on seeking 
strategic and material links between financial and sustainability indicators risked becoming 
an end in itself as the wider idea(l) of sustainability slowly disappeared from the horizon. 
This resembles at times the process of goal displacement, which refers to the idea that “the 
very elements which conduce towards efficiency in general produce inefficiency in specific 
instances” (Merton, 1957: 200). Each reporting phase got ‘stuck’ in a mix-up between its 
aim and the means to reach it. As noted by Scott (2003: 335), however, it may not so much 
always be an issue of displacement of ends and means, but oftentimes the “...continued 
pursuit of means that have somehow become disconnected from, or are at odds with, the 
ends they were designed to serve” that shapes the pathological aspect. This resembles 
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recent work on so-called means-ends decoupling  which examines the implementation of 
“policies and evaluating practices that have a tenuous link to core goals” (Bromley & Powell, 
2012: 496). In effect, the possibility arises of firms, operating in a discourse and zeitgeist of 
transparency and accountability, adopting sustainability reporting with the link between 
reporting and its effect on sustainability remaining opaque, yet “... when the link between 
means and ends is unclear, technical procedures of accounting ... can become ends in 
themselves, establishing an organization as responsible, rational and successful” (Bromley & 
Powell, 2012: 518). In itself this is not uncommon, and possibly not necessarily problematic 
or pathological, yet increasingly so when combined with a heterogeneous field and multiple 
vocal actors. 
 
A second mechanism of interest in the commensuration of sustainability reporting is 
therefore professional insulation of interested stakeholders, which refers to the domination 
of particular normative orientations or worldviews (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). In the case 
of Dutch sustainability reporting you see the inflow and outflow of different professions 
between phases, but the dominance of particular groups within a specific phase. In 
particular, at first NGO’s and the Dutch government played a prominent role in reporting’s 
development, which was followed in the two subsequent phases by standardising 
agencies/consultants and investors/accountants, respectively. These respective professions 
possess an inherent disposition towards the position of firms in society and the aim of 
sustainability reporting. For instance, without becoming too deterministic, it is not hard to 
imagine the differences in the wish of NGO’s to hold firms accountable for their detrimental 
social and environmental effects by promoting broad transparency, whereas the logic of 
business requires clarity, a financial focus and manageability. In addition, the financial logic 
of investors and accountants emphasises quantified and materialised data. In other words, 
these stakeholders thus make sense of the world in different ways and refer to different 
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logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) or higher-
level and commonly shared schemes of justification of what is considered to be worthy and 
good (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006). With a complex practice in a heterogeneous and 
emerging field such a dominant and insulated perspective is bound to be temporary though 
as reporting’s inherent complexity generates challenges and tensions that ask for 
reconciliation (e.g. Cloutier & Langley, 2013; Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 
2010).   
 
At some point the singularity of perspective thus reaches a limit and a situation of cultural 
contestation emerges. Throughout sustainability reporting’s development, the respective 
dominance of particular normative views evolved with reporting first being branded as out 
of touch with business and ‘too moral’, subsequently as overly focused on ‘business making 
it a check-list’ and eventually as ‘captured by accountants and investors in their quest to 
commensurate incommensurables’. In effect, as the limits of each phase of commensuration 
became apparent,  at  the borders frictions emerged that gave potential for agency and 
change (Dorado, 2005; Seo & Creed, 2002; Stark, 2009). Whereas by no means a 
commensuration war, these periods of friction and transition towards a new dimension of 
commensuration offered opportunities for new people to enter the sustainability reporting 
field (e.g. the need for clarity opened opportunities for consultants and standard setters). At 
the same time a reclassification of the purpose of sustainability reporting became possible 
that questioned what the commensuration should achieve (e.g. from showing 
accountability to building a strategic business case and finally to the link between 
sustainability and value creation). In short, the commensuration of sustainability reporting 
has seen a variety of stakeholders dominate the discourse. At some points in time 
conflicting worldviews of these stakeholders function both as the source of pathologies and 
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attempts for resolutions (i.e. new stakeholders emerging with different tasks and goals for 
reporting). 
Commensuration and its temporal sequence 
The existing commensuration literature shows that technical, cognitive and value 
dimensions of commensuration can be found in empirical settings (see e.g. Kolk et al., 2008; 
Levin & Espeland, 2002). But how these dimensions follow on each other is not clear. In the 
case of Dutch sustainability reporting initially the focus was primarily on cognitive 
commensuration, which was subsequently followed by technical commensuration before in 
the third phase value commensuration rose to prominence. To be sure, this does not mean 
that only one dimension was present in each phase, as they can typically all be seen at any 
point in time (and even reinforce each other as shown by the feedback arrows in figure 2), 
but this should be seen as a matter of degree as to the dominating dimension in each 
phase.  
 
Existing accounts of commensuration that have looked at the temporality of 
commensuration  (see e.g. Kolk et al., 2008; Levin & Espeland, 2002) also suggest that in 
order to put a value on something it is first necessary to be able to measure and thereby 
standardise the object accurately, i.e. technical commensuration preceding value 
commensuration, an assertion supported by Carruthers and Stinchcombe (1999). My 
analysis supports this as technical commensuration preceded value commensuration as first 
indicators were developed and measurement methodologies and techniques agreed upon 
before they were integrated into financial metrics and ratings.  
 
More surprisingly though, sustainability reporting in the Netherlands first went through a 
phase of cognitive commensuration prior to technical commensuration, which seems at 
odds with current theorisations of temporality. Generally, it is claimed that as a 
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consequence of first technical and subsequently value work more tacit cognitive 
commensurative effects would arise, for instance a change in thinking about air pollution 
emerged as a consequences of the creation of a market for air pollution (Levin & Espeland, 
2002). In the case of Dutch reporting before technical work could be fruitfully undertaken, a 
logic or meaning system in which business, sustainability, corporate responsibility and 
transparency started to become related concepts rather than unrelated ones had to 
materialise. Thus, on a cognitive level this required bringing together previously disparate 
elements, i.e. a reframing (Rao, 1998) of a prior logic before work on the ‘nitty-gritty details’ 
could commence. To be sure, this is not to say that value commensuration does not have 
cognitive consequences. On the contrary, as a consequence of value commensuration 
through valorised KPI’s and integrated reports the meaning of sustainability changes as it 
slowly disappears as a separate term and gets absorbed by the mainstream business 
discourse (“CSR is there to die”, as one informant eloquently put it). Value commensuration 
reinforces this newly developing logic or tacit cognitive understanding of sustainability 
(reporting).  
 
Still, a possible explanation for the observed order is that different types of cognitive 
commensuration exist. That is, cognitive commensuration can function both as a 
precondition for technical commensuration as well as a consequence of existing metrics, 
thereby closing the circle of the commensuration process. Cognitive commensuration as a 
precondition allows the construction of a discourse which enables people to think about 
metrics in the first place, whereas cognitive commensuration as a consequence of prior 
technical and value commensuration further embeds or mainstreams these metrics. In line 
with other studies that analyse dealing with complex issues (such as sustainability), often in 
relatively uncertain and heterogeneous fields that impose conflicting demands, rather than 
developing a clear-cut instrumental solution the field first has to be reorganised and the 
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problem addressed, closely akin a sensemaking approach (Weick, 1995). Stakeholders come 
together and make a start with developing solutions for complex social problems (Dorado, 
2005). Once these fields become more institutionalised, focused strategic action by means 
of technical and value work then becomes easier (Beckert, 1999). Future studies could 
usefully further examine the enabling conditions of the various commensuration 
dimensions. 
 
Conclusion 
I have explored the commensuration of Dutch sustainability reporting and have thereby 
focused on the dynamics between the various dimensions of commensuration to open the 
‘black box’ of commensuration. I have argued that in the beginning the moral failing of the 
firm was an important starting point and environmental reporting was seen as an 
instrument to combat this failing and promote corporate accountability. Through cognitive 
commensuration it were primarily NGO’s and the Dutch government who tried to create a 
new reference point of what was of value for the firm. Still, reporting remained peripheral 
and typically considered as too vague and a practice for ‘values-driven tree-huggers’. In 
response to this pathology, consultants sensed an opportunity and started to promote the 
‘business case’. At the same time standard setters tried to provide sustainability reporting 
with ‘hands and feet’ through concrete guidelines and indicators. This technical 
commensuration phase created order out of chaos and made the complex and difficult 
practice more manageable and easier to understand for a larger audience as interested 
actors got clearer points of reference. Reporting gained popularity, yet despite this success 
it ran the risk of becoming a mindless tick-the-box exercise due to its over-reliance on 
indicators, standards and guidelines. Following these became ends in themselves rather 
than means to an end. In the wake of this new pathology, in particular investors and 
accountants tried to refocus sustainability reporting to a more strategic core to really merge 
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sustainability into the business and provide a clearer link between firm value and value 
creation and sustainability aspects. Value commensuration through the development of 
strategic KPI’s, ratings and integrated reports and the importance of rankings and indices 
became important. As a consequence of these developments, accusations that 
sustainability reporting had become impoverished as it restricted its scope to the 
commensurable aspects and thereby ignored incommensurables emerged though.  
 
In analysing the commensuration process of sustainability reporting in the Netherlands I 
offer two main contributions to the commensuration literature. First, I extend the work on 
different dimensions of commensuration. Previous accounts have looked at a mixture of 
intentions, consequences and actors (e.g. Espeland & Stevens, 1998; Huault & Rainelli-
Weiss, 2011; O′Mahoney et al., 2013; Samiolo, 2012) but less at the interaction between 
these aspects. I have shown that commensuration operates through the interplay between 
cognitive, technical and value dimensions and that over time these dimensions rise and fall 
in dominance. I suggest the central role of pathologies as drivers of shifts in the dominance 
of the various dimensions of commensuration. Within the strength of each dimension lies 
also its potential downfall, and instances of cultural contestation, professional insulation 
and means-ends displacement can propel these pathologies.  
 
Second, this study provides an account of the temporal aspect of commensuration and in 
particular provides insights into the order in which types of commensuration occur.  Existing 
studies have most of the time, albeit more implicitly, assumed that technical 
commensuration precedes value commensuration and after that cognitive commensuration 
appears (Kolk et al., 2008; Levin & Espeland, 2002). Whereas my study supports the former 
conjecture, it adds to the latter that cognitive commensuration can both be a precursor of 
technical commensuration as well as a consequence of value commensuration. I have 
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further suggested that the complexity of the practice and character of the field may play a 
role here.      
 
Although my study’s main contribution is to the commensuration literature, it also speaks to 
scholars and practitioners interested in sustainability reporting as such. Fundamentally, 
commensuration appears to be a double-edged sword that has given sustainability 
reporting impetus by simplifying it and making it more tangible and concrete, yet at the 
same time has arguably also impoverished reporting by advocating those values that can be 
made commensurate at the expense of other, yet no less important, aspects. That is, this 
study shows that “*m+easurement can help us see complicated things in ways that make it 
possible to intervene in them productively (consider measures of global warming); … 
measurement also can narrow our appraisal of value and relevance to what can be 
measured easily, at the expense of other ways of knowing (consider how education became 
years of schooling in American sociology)” (Espeland & Stevens, 2008: 432). Conceptualising 
commensuration as driven by as well as propelling pathologies helps to bring these limits of 
commensuration come to life. For instance, the described pathologies emerging from 
technical and value commensuration are good examples of where it remains open to debate 
to what extent these dimensions contribute to sustainability reporting’s progress and where 
they rather signify an impoverishment of the content and impact of sustainability reporting. 
A concern for those studying and working in the reporting field is thus the possibility of 
ever-more refined sustainability indicators leading to an ever-less sustainable world. Apart 
from the theoretical relevance, an appreciation of the (side)-effects of commensuration on 
the course of sustainability reporting may thus make practitioners as well as policy makers 
more sensitive to its consequences for the state of reporting and, moreover, the state of the 
world we live in. 
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This study gives rise to several areas for future research that can contribute to our 
understanding of commensuration as a process and sustainability reporting as a practice. 
First, to further enrich our understanding of the various dimensions of commensuration, it 
could be worthwhile to combine this with finding out how various actors engage in 
commensurative work. This study has looked more closely at the various dimensions over 
time and explained the dynamics between them. To further extend this line of thought 
future research could examine exactly what kind of actions and practices actors engaged in 
while trying to resist or further advance the various dimensions of commensuration and 
overcome the emerging pathologies. In order to gain more insight into this ‘how’ question 
of commensuration, insights derived from the institutional work literature could be 
beneficial (e.g. Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009, 2011; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).  For 
instance, earlier studies on commensuration have discussed the possibility of framing (see 
e.g. Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011; Lohmann, 2009) that may play an important role in 
particularly cognitive forms of commensuration.  
 
Second, the role of pathologies warrants further research. This concept has thus far 
received relatively little attention among organisation and accounting scholars alike. For 
instance, whether sustainability reporting is particularly idiosyncratic in its trajectory of 
commensuration and importance of pathologies is something that future studies could 
usefully examine. It would be interesting to see whether pathologies play an important role 
in other fields of sustainability reporting (e.g. geographical) and, moreover, in the 
commensuration of practices other than sustainability reporting. If so, gaining further 
insights into the mechanisms behind pathologies and the influence of other drivers may be 
interesting questions for future research. In addition, as this study has looked more closely 
at the various dimensions over time and tried to explain the emergence of pathologies, 
looking more closely at how to resolve different pathologies could be valuable.   
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Third, as this study focused on the Dutch reporting landscape more geographically 
dispersed or comparative research could enhance our understanding of reporting. In 
particular, research focusing on countries or regions new to reporting or with less of a 
tradition of environmental and social advocacy, potentially also in a non-western setting, 
could be interesting. For instance, future studies could analyse how diffusion of reporting 
differs between counties, thereby tapping into the literature on practice variation in 
diffusion (see e.g. Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac, 2010; Fiss, Kennedy, & Davis, 2011; Westphal & 
Zajac, 1997) . 
 
Finally, this study took technical, value and cognitive dimensions of commensuration as its 
starting point. Still, future research could look into the presence of different dimensions 
than technical, value and cognitive forms of commensuration. In addition, could we expect 
to see these dimensions work together or are there circumstances where they would be 
present in isolation? What are determinants of these various forms of commensuration to 
be either successful or unsuccessful? Do these dimensions typically appear in the temporal 
order found in this study? These are just a few of the questions that merit attention of 
researchers interested in the process of commensuration, be it in a sustainability setting or 
not.  
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Chapter 4 - Towards a Legitimate Compromise?: An Exploration 
of Integrated Reporting in the Netherlands11 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
11
This chapter has previously been presented at a pre-Colloquium Development Workshop of the 2013 EGOS 
colloquium in Montreal and is currently under revision for the Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 
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A good compromise, a good piece of legislation, is like a good sentence; or a good 
piece of music. Everybody can recognize it. They say, 'Huh. It works. It makes sense.' 
 (Barack Obama) 
Compromise makes a good umbrella, but a poor roof. 
 (James Russell Lowell) 
 
Introduction 
By 2012, despite the absence of conclusive guidelines and frameworks, globally more than 
400 companies have started to engage with a form of integrated reporting, according to 
Global Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) Sustainability Disclosure Database. According to the 
International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) that was founded in 2010 to develop a 
globally accepted framework for integrated reporting, an integrated report is a “concise 
communication about how an organization’s strategy, governance, performance and 
prospects, in the context of its external environment, lead to the creation of value over the 
short, medium and long term” (IIRC, 2013: 8). The aim is to align financial and non-financial 
(sustainability) components more closely as to date the Annual Report and Sustainability 
Report have largely remained separate entities and processes, despite prior efforts of, for 
instance, the GRI to emphasise the strategic importance of sustainability aspects for the 
core business. In essence, integrated reporting is a pluralistic hybrid practice in which 
various conceptions of its value interact (Gray, 2006; Milne, Tregidga, & Walton, 2009) in an 
attempt to build a bridge between the logics of financial reporting and sustainability 
reporting to provide a ‘true and fair’ view of the value of a firm. Integrated reporting is thus 
a complex practice where different ‘worlds’ come together and have to be aligned in a 
compromise. In this study I analyse this pluralism of integrated reporting and focus on the 
possibility of, and impediments to, realising a legitimate compromise.     
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Integrated reporting has thus far not received much scholarly attention.  
Borrowing from related sustainability reporting and accounting studies and how their 
inherently equivocal subject of interest has gained legitimacy forms a good starting point. 
An agentic sender-based branch of work argues that firms actively seek strategic alignment 
with societal value systems (e.g. Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Cho & Patten, 2007; Deegan et al., 
2002; Deegan, 2002; Milne & Patten, 2002; O’Donovan, 2002; O’Dwyer, 2002; Patten, 2002) 
or  manage salient stakeholder demands (e.g. Cooper & Owen, 2007; Deegan & Blomquist, 
2006; Neu et al., 1998; Roberts, 1992). A more structural compliance-focused strand holds 
that sustainability reporting has become accepted thanks to institutional isomorphism and 
conformity (Bebbington, Larrinaga-González, & Moneva-Abadía, 2008; Larrinaga-González, 
2007) and more rhetoric alignment with legitimating institutions (Etzion & Ferraro, 2010; 
Laine, 2009) or ceremonious and decoupled endorsements of prevailing societal 
expectations (Cooper & Owen, 2007; O’Dwyer, 2002). Both these branches primarily focus 
on ‘doing the right thing’ and emphasise establishing (symbolic) fit with, often rather 
singular, stakeholder or societal demands. Furthermore, relations with legitimising 
audiences are hereby typically unidirectionally conceptualised, i.e. more as external 
evaluating judges than as actors in a process of communicative dialogue and co-
achievement. Not without merits, applying these insights to integrated reporting has only 
limited purchase.  
 
That is, fundamental to integrated reporting is that it seeks legitimacy in a situation where 
neither the practice itself nor the (institutional) environment is fixed and where numerous 
actors with multiple goals are present and contest over their interpretations of reporting’s 
value. This follows, for instance, Palazzo and Scherer’s work on CSR (see Palazzo & Scherer, 
2006; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, 2011) when they argue that contemporary society is 
essentially complex and pluralistic in which multiple demands are voiced by actors as 
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diverse as firms, governments, NGO’s, social movements, media and investors. These 
multiple logics of valuation need to be reconciled in search of a legitimate agreement or 
compromise as “these contests about value are highly consequential because they have 
implications for the shape of the field and of the evolution of technologies within it” 
(Kaplan & Murray, 2010: 108). Stabilising and legitimating integrated reporting goes beyond 
passive compliance and alignment with audience expectations but requires societal 
involvement in public discourses. It warrants the question of what this legitimating dialogue 
over the interpretation of what is valued and valuable for integrated reporting looks like. To 
uncover the dynamics involved in reconciling this complexity I will draw on the sociology of 
worth (SOW) framework (Cloutier & Langley, 2013; Gond & Leca, 2012; Patriotta, Gond, & 
Schultz, 2011; Ramirez, 2013)12. 
 
This framework, thus far largely unexplored in the social and environmental accounting and 
reporting (SEAR) field (but see e.g. Annisette & Richardson, 2011), is most notably 
popularised by the work of Boltanksi and Thévenot (1999, 2006). It not only presupposes 
the complexity and plurality that characterises integrated reporting,  “... it also assumes that 
different actors coexist in a shared world, and it pays particular attention to the 
understanding of how those actors can reach an agreement, either within a specific logic or 
even if they share different logics” (Gond & Leca, 2012: 7–8). SOW offers a ‘tool box’ to 
analyse the settlement of these differences and legitimacy is gained in situations of 
uncertainty in which actors face the imperative to justify their actions by either voicing 
critique themselves or by responding to criticism. This process follows rules of acceptability 
that can be found in ‘orders of worth’13 which are all based on a notion of the common 
                                                          
12
Different labels have been used, such as conventionalist theory (Denis, Langley, & Rouleau, 2007; Kaplan & 
Murray, 2010), economies of worth (Gond & Leca, 2012), justification theory (Patriotta, Gond, & Schultz, 2011), 
French pragmatist sociology (Cloutier & Langley, 2013; Jagd, 2011; Reinecke, 2010) and sociology of worth 
(Annisette & Richardson, 2011). For reasons of clarity and consistency I use sociology of worth. 
13
Worlds, economies of worth and orders of worth have been used alternately. For reasons of clarity and 
consistency I use orders of worth. 
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good. One of the typical ways to settle disputes is through a compromise of such orders of 
worth. We know that sustainability reporting, and by extension integrated reporting, is 
“implicated in numerous compromises in society as multiple orders of worth are 
juxtaposed”, but we have developed few “insights into the limits and fragility” of this type 
of reporting (Annisette & Richardson, 2011: 243–5). The SOW framework is very suitable 
not just for analysing the different perspectives around integrated reporting. Moreover, it 
makes it possible to gain insight into the possibilities of, and impediments to, constructing a 
broadly legitimate compromise as multiple logics of valuation need to be reconciled. 
 
Based on the above I aim to answer three main questions in this article. First, in order to 
better understand the complexity of integrated reporting I ask which rationalities or value 
articulations (i.e. orders of worth) can be identified. Second, I proceed by posing the 
question of how a legitimate compromise is attempted to be forged out of these multiple 
orders of worth and the difficulties involved in this. Third, I ask what the consequences are 
of integrated reporting’s current attempts of compromise. Together, using the framework of 
SOW helps to enhance our understanding of integrated reporting and also sheds a better 
light compared to extant SEAR work on the process of gaining legitimacy by collectively 
reconciling pluralism around a complex practice. I aim to answer these questions by 
conducting an explorative qualitative case study on the configuration of integrated 
reporting in the Netherlands. I argue that integrated reporting contains elements of civic, 
green, market, and industrial orders of worth. My analysis further suggests that integrated 
reporting finds it difficult to settle as a durable legitimate compromise as it violates the 
principle mechanisms of finding a common interest, avoiding clarification and maintaining 
ambiguity. In particular, accountants and investors find themselves accused of capturing the 
dialogue and seek private interest rather than search for a common interest. 
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By making my argument I seek to offer two main contributions. First, I intend to progress 
our understanding of integrated reporting itself. Potentially an influential new accounting 
practice, my analysis shows the complexities of this novel practice, its potential benefits, yet 
also the difficulties and limitations it entails. In particular, my empirical analysis suggests 
that integrated reporting runs the risk of being denounced for privileging the powerful 
discourse of the market (through market/industrial worth) at the expense of seriously 
advancing social and environmental justice (civic/green worth). Integrated reporting risks 
resembling a private arrangement rather than a legitimate compromise. However, on a 
positive note, precisely because of this friction that arises from integrated reporting’s 
complexity potential for creative solutions emerges as well. Second, following calls in the 
SEAR literature (e.g. Annisette & Richardson, 2011; Ramirez, 2013) I offer an empirical 
contribution that applies SOW to sustainability accounting research. The value of the SOW 
framework is that it provides a theoretical lexicon that helps to better understand 
accounting practices in pluralistic contexts in general (e.g. Guerreiro, Rodrigues, & Craig, 
2012; Lander, Koene, & Linssen, 2013) and in particular helps to unpack the dynamic 
process through which complex new practices, such as integrated reporting, gain legitimacy 
as compromises are negotiated in a dialogue between orders of worth. 
 
To make my argument, I will proceed as follows. I will first briefly discuss extant work on 
forms of non-financial reporting and its shortcomings. Next, I explain the main tenets of the 
sociology of worth perspective and discuss the core aspects of the different orders of worth 
and possible ways to settle clashes of worth. Then, I will discuss my research site and the 
data collection and analysis in more detail. In the findings section I will portray the orders of 
worth visible in the discourse on integrated reporting in the Netherlands, how social actors 
attempt to establish a workable compromise and the outcomes of this. In the discussion 
section I consider the implications of such a compromise for integrated reporting as well as 
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the possible alternatives for situations of compromise. This should make clear the 
possibilities as well as limits of integrated reporting. Moreover, I will address the wider 
theoretical implications of my study for the literature on social and environmental 
accounting research. I finish with some implications for practitioners and suggestions for 
future research.   
 
Theoretical background 
Perspectives on reporting 
Unlike integrated reporting that is still in its infancy, scholars have analysed social, 
environmental and sustainability reporting more extensively. The forging of agreements 
around this latter type of disclosure, defined as “reporting which covers the environmental 
and social aspects of an organisation’s performance as well as the economic aspects” 
(Hubbard, 2009: 3) has been variously explained and can be of help in understanding 
integrated reporting (see also Chapter One). 
 
Arguably most dominant have been studies using the twinned frameworks of legitimacy 
theory (e.g. Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Cho & Patten, 2007; Deegan et al., 2002; Deegan, 2002; 
Milne & Patten, 2002; O’Donovan, 2002; O’Dwyer, 2002; Patten, 2002) and stakeholder 
theory (e.g. Cooper & Owen, 2007; Deegan & Blomquist, 2006; Neu et al., 1998; Orij, 2010; 
Roberts, 1992). In both cases the primary concern is gaining legitimacy, or “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” 
(Suchman, 1995: 574) through strategic alignment with societal values. Firms are thought to 
have a ‘social contract’ with broader society and strategically seek to achieve ‘fit’ between 
their value system and that of society (Deegan, 2002, 2007) or try to manage a mix of more 
or less salient stakeholder demands, resulting in legitimating reporting (as well as the 
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firm).As these accounts are typically organisation-centric (Smith et al., 2011), for the field-
level construction of integrated reporting this work would overstate the strategic agency of 
organisations as legitimating compliance with values is typically expressed through a 
sender-model of communication that regards outside norms, values and the like as social 
entities with almost a thing-like status, i.e. very much as a resource (Dowling & Pfeffer, 
1975; Suchman, 1995).  
 
Alternatively some scholars have therefore started to explain reaching a legitimate 
agreement on the form and adoption of varieties of non-financial reporting through an 
institutional lens (e.g. Bebbington et al., 2009; Brown, de Jong, & Lessidrenska, 2009; Etzion 
& Ferraro, 2010; Larrinaga-González, 2007). Whereas it shares the quest for legitimacy as 
the heart of organisational activity, it typically sees coming to a legitimate agreement on the 
meaning of a practice rather as a more passive compliance with broader ‘rationalised 
myths’ (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) than an purposeful strategic process (see also Suchman, 
1995). For instance, Bebbington et al. (2009: 615) analysed the influence of cultural-
cognitive, normative and coercive isomorphic pressures on how sustainability reporting was 
shaped in six New Zealand firms. This compliance-model of communication thus suggests 
integrated reporting’s trajectory is largely determined by outside legitimating forces.  
 
Overall, whereas these lines of work may help to provide reasons why to engage in 
integrated reporting, they remain largely silent on exactly how legitimate compromises are 
negotiated. Thus, they are ill-equipped to explain the more dynamic aspects of the 
development of integrated reporting (e.g. Owen, 2008; Smith et al., 2011) and how to 
evaluate and reconcile the inherent difficulties and complexities involved. Moreover, all 
these extant studies see legitimising audiences more as external evaluating judges than as 
one out of a range of actors in a process of communicative dialogue and co-achievement 
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(Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Reinecke, Spicer, & Van Bommel, 2012). This is particularly 
noteworthy as new multifaceted practices such as integrated reporting develop in a 
complex and pluralistic environment where multiple logics of valuation need to be 
reconciled in search of a legitimate agreement or compromise. In order to start to unpack 
the repertoires of evaluation at work around integrated reporting and the difficulties in 
bringing them durably together I turn to the sociology of worth framework of the French 
pragmatist school.  
Sociology of worth 
A fundamental assumption of SOW is that pluralism and complexity are the norm. As long 
as violence is to be avoided, social actors are confronted with an imperative to justify 
themselves in the face of moments of uncertainty or dispute. To be sure, other regimes of 
coordination such as love, familiarity and violence can equally be called upon to suspend 
justification, as Boltanski (1990) differentiates between an institutionalised ‘state of peace’ 
(“paix en justesse”) and a contested ‘state of justification’ (“dispute en justice”). Justification 
though is needed “when more local regimes of coordination based on either ‘personal 
convenience’ or ‘conventional utilization’ are not sufficient to deal with the misfortune of 
the situation and determine what is convenient or appropriate” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 
1999: 362). It is through justification that “we come to understand how social coordination 
is achieved and how institutions are constructed and stabilized” (Annisette & Richardson, 
2011: 231). Essentially, social actors make reference to a limited number of "broad-based 
sets of values and conceptions of the common good" (Cloutier & Langley, 2013: 364) or 
“moral anchors” (McInerney, 2008: 1092) when making justifications. That is, in order to 
make one’s critique and actions comprehensible and ultimately reach a state of agreement, 
reflexive actors draw on so-called ‘orders of worth’. There is thus no singular form of 
justness or rationality, but worth or legitimacy can be shown by alluding to the various 
orders of worth.  
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Actors establish worthiness, or legitimacy for that matter, by referring to these orders of 
worth which are comprised of a set of material, cognitive and symbolic elements that make 
up unique ‘worlds’ and they make thus “reference to different sorts of value, principles, or 
models for judging what is good, worthy, and right” (Thévenot, Moody, & Lafaye, 2000: 
236). Orders of worth are broad values-based Weberian ideal-type constructions resting 
upon notions of the common good. The moral basis of an order of worth is embedded in 
philosophical and political traditions, which have become engrained in everyday social life. 
Actors need to justify that a certain practice promotes the ‘common good’ – being 
beneficial to all – rather than individual gain. Neither should it be just ‘instrumentally’ in 
line with a dominant logic. Worthiness thus relates to a sense of justice so that the “notions 
of worth and of the common good are merged, combined in the higher common principle” 
(Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 77). The capability of reaching legitimate agreement through 
justifications thereby rests on the recognition of a shared, common humanity, which 
surpasses the particular interests of each participant in a dialogue. 
 
The orders of worth identified by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) include a market worth 
which has a short-term focus and is based on the scarcity of goods and services and the 
mode of evaluations rests on price and costs. In the industrial worth efficiency, rationality, 
professionalism and planning reign supreme. Together they typically form the sphere of 
economic relations (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999: 372). The civic worth is based on 
sacrificing personal interest for the collective common good and the formalised equality 
and rights of members of society. The inspired worth is based on creativity, being artistic, 
singularity and grace. Worth is not attained from outside recognition but from an 
“immediate relationship to an external source from which all possible worth flows” 
(Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999: 370). The domestic worth is based on kinship, paternal 
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authority, traditions and a person’s presence in a network of (local) dependencies in which 
trust and reputation is valued. In the world of fame or renown worth is based on 
reputations on opinions from the outside. You are measured by the recognition of others 
rather than your own esteem or relations, unlike in the two worths discussed previously. 
Subsequent work has documented the emergence of a projective worth based on 
connectivity and flexibility and providing the new spirit of capitalism (Boltanski & Chiapello, 
2005), and green worth based on principles of environmental friendliness (Lamont & 
Thévenot, 2000).  
 
As shown in Appendix E, the framework of worth consists of several interrelated dimensions 
that “define the parameters for legitimacy tests” (Patriotta et al., 2011: 1809). Any order of 
worth is “... based on a superior principle which specifies what needs to be valued or 
respected in any social situation, the qualities of attributes that social agents must 
demonstrate, the type of effort or investments that individuals must make to gain respect, 
and a test (‘epreuve’) that is considered to be fair in order to determine or restore 
legitimacy within a given world” (Denis, Langley, & Rouleau, 2007: 191 emphasis in original). 
Encoded within each order of worth are situations where one is asked to demonstrate their 
worthiness in a particular peak moment which is called a ‘test’ where “*t+ests perform the 
evaluative operations that assign worth and allow the common identification of a good as 
belonging to a particular economy of worth. They do so by establishing equivalencies 
according to the organizing principles specific to the economy of worth that the test belongs 
to” (Reinecke, 2010: 565). For instance, market worth is based on the higher common 
principle of competition. It is associated with buyers and sellers (subjects) generating 
wealth and objects of luxury (objects). A state of worthiness is shown by being an affluent 
market winner and the deal or transaction functions as a test of worth. As noted by 
Boltanksi and Thévenot (1999: 373), in the case of industrial order of worth experts are 
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revered and persons or objects “are said to be worthy when they are efficient, productive, 
operational. They implement tools, methods, criteria, plans, figures, graphs etc. Their 
relationships can be said to be harmonious when organized, measurable, functional, 
standardized”. According to Annisette and Richardson (2011: 242), “The idea of tests of 
worth provides a key concept at the level of interaction to explain how disputes over the 
relevance of orders of worth in a given social setting are resolved and how distinctions 
among people and objects within a setting are justified”. For example, in a university exam, 
one cannot pay with money to pass, but needs to prove one’s worthiness through 
knowledge.  
Settling the dispute: agreement and orders of worth 
An essential aspect of SOW is that the full array of orders of worth can apply in any given 
situation and social actors have the capacity to draw on each order of worth. Orders of 
worth are thus potentially always in conflict and the attainment of worth or legitimacy is a 
constant achievement that reflects a settlement, a “temporary truce” (Hoffman, 1999), 
between multiple orders of worth. Contestation and instability are hereby the norm rather 
than the exception. One type of dispute flagged up by SOW is concerned with which order 
of worth applies to a specific situation and how to reconcile these orders of worth 
(Annisette & Richardson, 2011; Gond & Leca, 2012; Stark, 2009). In the case of integrated 
reporting it is thus unclear “what kind of test, relevant in a certain world, would really fit 
the situation” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999: 374). The SOW framework suggests that a 
settlement can be reached by resorting to one dominant order of worth, constructing a 
local arrangement or by reaching a compromise between various orders of worth (Boltanski 
& Thévenot, 1999, 2006; Cloutier & Langley, 2013; Jagd, 2011).  
 
A first way to reconcile difference is when actors may attempt to (re)assert the order of 
worth they champion as the dominant one, in particular when power is unevenly balanced, 
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and close the dispute by resorting to one test only that brings coherent equivalence to an 
order of worth. This can happen either more or less peacefully, where in the latter case 
active force can be exerted to overwhelm proponents of alternative orders of worth akin to 
Bourdieu’s 'symbolic violence'. For instance, Spicer and Sewell (2010) discuss the 
emergence of public broadcasting in Australia that can be reinterpreted as a class of worth 
between managers, the broadcaster and the broader public. To justify its stance of 
providing public goods such as education (gaining civic worth), rather than giving customers 
what they wanted (gaining market worth), the nascent public broadcaster engaged in public 
actions of justification where ultimately it positioned itself largely in terms of the civic good 
of nation building (Spicer & Sewell, 2010). However, senior management sought to assert 
the market as the most important criterion that the organization’s actions should be judged 
upon and all other criteria were made subordinate to this over-arching market based 
criterion.  
 
A second way to reconcile differences is through private arrangements, i.e. “contingent and 
local agreements, oriented towards private interests” (Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011: 1411). 
For instance, in their study on the failed attempt to construct a European market for 
weather risk, Huault and Rainelli-Weiss (2011) argue that promoters of the derivatives, 
working within a market world, and firms faced with weather risks, working in an industrial 
world, resorted to this form of settlement. That is, in the absence of a general financial 
market individual industrial firms construct case-specific transactions with market 
promoters. These arrangements however “remain local, contingent, oriented towards 
private interest, and, as such, difficult to generalize” (Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011: 1411) 
as they ignore the common good or general interest. In order to forge a more sustainable 
compromise in the form of a market for weather risk, the authors follow Boltanksi and 
Thévenot in arguing that reconciling different orders of worth requires a problem of 
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common interest that actors can agree upon as well as a degree of ambiguity and avoidance 
of full clarification of interests and motives (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; Huault & Rainelli-
Weiss, 2011).  
 
A third way to reconcile differences is to appease contestations between orders of worth 
through a compromise where “people agree to come to terms, that is, to suspend a clash – 
a dispute involving more than one world – without settling it through recourse to a test in 
just one of these worlds” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 277).  Stakeholders may stick to their 
preferred order of worth, but treat competing orders of worth as equivalent and compatible 
and thus “act as if they could rely upon a higher-level principle” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 
1999: 375) as long as they avoid full clarification which leaves the underlying differences 
and tensions too exposed. For example, Patriotta et al. (2011) studied the justifications 
made by various stakeholders in the aftermath of a controversy resulting from an incident 
with a nuclear plant. Trying to repair its legitimacy, the energy company went through 
several rounds of justifications based on various orders of worth as did other stakeholders. 
Interestingly, these “were not prisoners of their own institutional worlds; rather, they were 
able strategically to combine justifications from various worlds in order to strengthen their 
support for (or criticism of) the institution at stake (Patriotta et al., 2011: 1828). Ultimately, 
a new arrangement was reached in the form of a compromise that was adequately 
ambiguous and avoided too explicit a clarification, yet was still linked to a common interest 
and this compromise thus suspended the dispute for the time being. When such 
compromises are established they lead to a degree of legitimacy since they are able to 
provide an account of why particular activities are judged to be acceptable. The stability of 
the compromise varies though and is inherently unstable since the settlement does not 
meet the demands of the test. The tension between multiple orders of worth is never 
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completely resolved and ambiguous situations containing multiple orders of worth are easy 
to denounce (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999).  
 
Methodology14 
In this paper, I am primarily interested in identifying the various orders of worth and 
justifications brought forward by actors to legitimise integrated reporting through a form of 
compromise. This in turn ought to enrich our understanding of the potential and limitations 
of integrated reporting. Integrated reporting has rarely been studied so far and this new 
practice is not well understood yet. A more explorative and in-depth qualitative approach 
that is able to provide a rich understanding of the complexities and justifications around 
integrated reporting in its real-life context is therefore appropriate (Bryman & Bell, 2007; 
Yin, 2009). The SOW framework sits well with integrated reporting thanks to its attempt to 
juxtapose distinctly different ways of valuing the role of the firm and of a report and thus 
shows the multiplicity of how the value and use of integrated reporting changes as it 
becomes differentially objectified within multiple orders of worth.  
 
To be sure, the universe of SOW comes with an expansive ‘toolkit’ in which each order of 
worth is populated with various attributes (Appendix E). In this more explorative setting 
where the aim is primarily to better understand integrated reporting I intend to show what 
it means when one conceptualises a practice such as integrated reporting as constituted by 
various orders of worth. An analysis in minute detail of the workings of each dimension of a 
world is for now beyond the scope of this chapter.  
                                                          
14
 Some replication of the methods sections of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 cannot be avoided here as the 
respective chapters share a lot of methodological aspects.  
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Case selection 
For SOW a typical unit of analysis is a case that shows the “uncertainty of the critical 
moment” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 15) which “aims at identifying the justificatory 
resources that actors mobilize in order to make sense of situations that involve conflicting 
principles of valuation, to substantiate decisions, but also to criticize, challenge and re-
negotiate the rules and instruments of evaluation themselves” (Reinecke, 2010: 568). In 
short, the introduction of integrated reporting invokes such a critical moment where 
controversy arises and agreement or compromise has to be reached for legitimacy to 
emerge. 
 
I focus my analysis on integrated reporting in the Netherlands. I follow Jennings and 
Zandbergen (1995) here in their suggestion that sustainable practices are often local in 
character (see also Adams & Kuasirikun, 2000; Kolk, 2005), making a focus on a particularly 
country very apt. Moreover, by now an entire field with actors and subject positions has 
formed. Borrowing from institutional theory, fields are defined as “… those organizations 
that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, 
resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce 
similar services or products” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and it is here that “collective 
rationality” (Scott, 2008: 217) is constructed. For reporting, in addition to firms actors of 
interest are NGO’s (Kolk, 2004a, 2004b), the government (Lambooy, 2010; UNEP & KPMG, 
2006), professional services firms (Levy et al., 2010), institutional investors and standard 
setters such as the Dutch-based Global Reporting Initiative. Moreover, out of the 80 
companies participating in the IIRC pilot programme, 12 are Dutch, which makes the 
Netherlands the frontrunner in this pilot. Overall, this transparency of the field allows for 
good theoretical development and offers an exemplary case as subject positions are often 
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contested and “transparently observable” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 537; Yin, 2009) thus making 
the Dutch example of integrated reporting a salient case.  
Data collection 
I consulted various data sources. Triangulating the data sources enhanced trustworthiness 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985), contextualised the data (Yin, 2009) and made it possible to better 
analyse actors’ justifications and attempts at compromises. Data collection was managed as 
follows. 
 
First, I consulted four key contacts, all with a minimum of 10 years of experience in the field 
and involved in the developments around integrated reporting. These conversations 
provided not only an overview of the field, helped to better grasp integrated reporting but 
also resulted in a list of prospective interviewees who were contacted. After this, a snowball 
sampling technique was applied based on further recommendations of interviewees 
(Bryman & Bell, 2007). This approach made it possible to efficiently concentrate on 
contacting field actors with desired characteristics fitting the framing of the study, more 
akin to theoretical sampling (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In addition to snowball sampling also 
conference attendance lists and documents were consulted in order not to exclude 
potentially important and useful actors. A fair representation of various stakeholder 
positions was controlled for in order not to skew the data and provide heterogeneous 
perspectives (Jacobides, 2005). Keeping track of potential non-representativeness 
prevented selection bias and ensured a rounded overview of the various subject positions 
present (Malhotra & Birks, 2003). Still, as table 8 shows in particular investment specialists 
and public sector officials were interviewed less frequently yet are important for the 
development of reporting. The congruency of the message among these interviewees 
brought simply earlier saturation than with other stakeholders.  
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Table 8 Overview of interviewees 
Actor group Number of interviewees 
Public sector 10 
Civil society 21 
Investment community 10 
Reporting firms 25 
Academics 6 
Professional services firms 21 
 
Table 9 Overview of data sources 
Type of data Detail of source Amount 
of data 
Data analysis 
Interviews with field 
informants 
Interviews with 
firms, civil society, 
investors/raters, 
consultants, 
accountants, policy 
officials, academics.  
64 
interviews 
with a 
total 
duration 
of approx. 
75 hours  
Transcribing, analysing and 
coding of interviews. Through 
analysing the references made 
to specific orders of worth and 
compromise mechanisms a 
SOW story of integrated 
reporting emerged.  
Documentary 
material 
Newspaper articles 
of Dutch press, 
consultancy reports, 
NGO studies, 
government reports; 
investor statements 
500 pages Contextual reading, 
familiarisation with integrated 
reporting, background for 
interviews and enhanced 
credibility and further 
validation of interview data 
interpretations. 
Conferences and 
workshops 
Dutch Annual 
Seminar CSR 
Reporting 2012; 
Seminar Integrated 
Reporting: 
‘Measuring is 
knowing’; 
Roundtable 
Sustainable KPI’s   
30 pages Notes from discussions, 
informal meetings and 
presentations reviewed. 
Showed justifications and 
orders of worth ‘in situ’, 
possible to validate results from 
interviews and documents, 
discuss proposed theorisations.  
 
In total 6415 interviews were conducted between February 2011 and late 2012, after which 
a saturation point had been reached (both theoretically and empirically). Table 8 provides 
an overview of the background of my interviewees (total number of interviewees exceeds 
64 because some people are equally involved in various spheres). Interviews allow for a 
                                                          
15
This study is part of a larger project on the history of sustainability reporting in the Netherlands for which 94 
people were interviewed and a broad collection of documents were consulted. The analysis in this paper rests 
on a subsection of this data pool, in particular those sources where integrated reporting was specifically 
discussed. In addition, some overlap with methods section of pervious chapters cannot be avoided.  
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direct account of events, opinions, motives and attitudes and their explanations (Malhotra 
& Birks, 2003). Interviews were semi-structured, about 75 hours in length, tape recorded 
and transcribed (except five for which extensive notes were taken). The interviews focused 
on the following main question areas: (a) understanding of integrated reporting and 
stakeholders involved; (b) the goal of integrated reporting; (c) their general opinion of 
integrated reporting; (d) important or critical moments in the development of integrated 
reporting; (e) existence of conflicts or problems and ways to overcome them. 
 
Second, I combined my main body of data from interviews with other data sources (see 
table 9). I consulted a broad collection of documents. This not only allowed for contextual 
reading and further field familiarisation, but is also a form of “checks and balances” against 
which I could test insights derived from interview material (Yin, 2009). Yet, no major 
contradictions were observed. Articles in main Dutch business and general newspapers, 
government reports, publications of professional service firms, reports and statements of 
NGO’s and investors, academic publications and integrated reports of companies were 
consulted. Finally, I attended several workshops and conferences on integrated reporting 
that were attended by various stakeholders. Although these events were not coded directly, 
I observed proceedings and took extensive notes. This allowed me to experience the 
process of justifying value positions and compromise building directly, allowing a further 
refinement and testing of earlier analyses.     
Data analysis 
To achieve my research aim I analysed the data as follows. First, I read all documents, 
reports, articles, notes and interview transcripts to familiarise myself with the Dutch field 
and its main stakeholders, events and developments. In particular this was done to get a 
better ‘feel’ for the case prior to the actual coding and analysis.  
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Second, I identified the dominant orders of worth visible in the case of integrated reporting. 
For this I used a form of qualitative content analysis in Nvivo, a programme for qualitative 
data analysis software. This involved reading the interview transcripts and documents, 
identifying the moments where actors rely on justifications and subsequently code these 
justifications to orders of worth. This aspect warrants some additional description though, 
since for SOW studies a common difficulty is “defining a real-life situation and its attribution 
to a given world of reference” (Ramirez, 2013: 854). Patriotta et al. (2011) tried to overcome 
this challenge with a more mechanical form of coding, akin to content analysis, based on a 
list of semantic indicators derived from the work of Boltanksi and Thévenot complemented 
with the authors’ own empirical data. I follow instead the broader interpretative  approach 
of, for instance, Ramirez (2013: 855) in his SOW study on the consequences of a shift 
towards an accountability logic for the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales (ICAEW). He tried “by making use of observations that are not fully captured or 
explained by the available terms or by reference to evidence outside the situation itself, to 
relate the micro-aspects of a situation to broader, more contextual elements that help make 
sense of the story” and thus include a more interpretative element rather than making it 
just a counting exercise.  
 
While reading the documents and interview transcripts with the SOW framework and 
keeping semantic indicators in mind (see Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 159–211; Patriotta et 
al., 2011: 1815–6), it is thus important to look for instances where actors “move beyond 
stating a particular or personal viewpoint toward proving that the statement is generalizable 
and relevant for a common good, showing why or how this general claim is legitimate” 
(Thévenot et al., 2000: 236). I paid hereby attention to the discursive as well as the material 
and organisational aspects visible when appeals to the common good are made. For 
example, when asked why to engage in integrated reporting, a CSR manager professed that 
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“it’s time to fully integrate CSR in the business and integrally link it to profit maximization”, 
thereby clearly making reference to the market order of worth. It soon became apparent 
that references were predominantly made to the market, industrial, green and civic orders 
of worth, and I will focus my analysis mainly on these. This zooming in is not uncommon in 
SOW studies, following for instance Reinecke’s (2010) focus on industrial and civic worth 
and Patriotta et al. (2011) on industrial, market, civic and domestic. The outcomes of this 
stage are discussed in the first part of the findings below and relate to the first research 
question (see also table 10).  
 
Third, I focused my analysis on the attempts to reconcile differences into an agreement. 
Here I more closely followed prior SOW work, in particular the study of Huault and Rainelli-
Weiss (2011: 1402) on the market for weather derivatives and the different forms of 
agreement involved. In this part of the analysis I coded transcripts and documents for “the 
emergence of disputes, i.e., of debates and discussions regarding the usefulness” of 
integrated reporting and followed this by analysing “the search for an agreement, i.e. the 
different attempts to overcome conflicts through compromise”.  
 
I used here an abductive (Peirce, 1978) method by iteratively comparing the raw data with 
the various types of agreements identified by the SOW framework and previously discussed 
in the theoretical section of this paper. I hereby operationalised the compromise further in 
instances of seeking a common interest, avoiding clarification and ambiguity within the 
compromise. For example, one CSR manager expressed the wish that “We would like to, 
and that is a real challenge, serve all our stakeholders with this one integrated report. This is 
a real challenge indeed to find this commonality but I think the external community is 
slowly getting ready for this”, thereby alluding to the constructing of a compromise rather 
than a single dominating order or local arrangement and seeking of a point of common 
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interest. This analytical focus on the attempts to reconcile the various modes of valuation 
identified through orders of worth makes it possible to gain insight into the potential as well 
as the “limits and fragility” (Annisette & Richardson, 2011: 243) of integrated reporting. The 
outcomes of this stage are discussed in the second part of the findings below and relate to 
the second and third research question (see also table 11). 
 
Findings 
Research setting: Context and background of the Dutch reporting landscape 
After a short-lived first wave of interest in primarily social aspects of corporations in the 
1970’s (Dierkes & Antal, 1986) reporting picked up momentum in the late 1980’s when the 
first separate (environmental) reports came out, mainly as a consequence of the early Dutch 
interest in environmental management systems. This interest continued in the wake of the 
1987 Brundtland Report and the Earth Summit in 1992, government regulation on 
environmental reporting16 and the emergence of the first standards and guidelines17. At the 
turn of the century a transition took place from environmental reporting to forms of triple 
bottom line reporting, given further impetus by the emergence of a dominant standard in 
the form of the GRI and work of sustainability consultants. By 2011, 82% of the Dutch 
largest 100 companies published sustainability reports (KPMG, 2011a), up from 35% in 2002 
(KPMG, 2002b). Moreover, reporting gets increasingly linked with the “business case” and 
goes beyond its initial appeal on corporate values and reputation. In the language of SOW, it 
is here that in particular the market, industrial, green and civic orders of worth become 
more prominent. As noted by accounting scholars more generally (e.g. Milne et al., 2009), in 
                                                          
16
See Wet Milieubeheer, Staatsblad 1997, nr. 170. See Chapter 12, accessed on 14-06-2012 at: 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0003245/Hoofdstuk12/geldigheidsdatum_15-06-2012 
Wet van 10 April 1997, Staatsblad 1997, nr. 170 & Besluit Milieuverslaglegging of 17 November 1998, 
Staatsblad1998, nr. 655 
17
For example, the CERES Principles, the work of the European Chemical Industry Council’s (CEFIC), the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) manager’s guide to environmental reporting, the 
European Union’s Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) and the joined work of the consultancy 
SustainAbility and the United National Environment Programme (UNEP). 
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practice the triple bottom line is less interlinked than in theory, yet with the next step 
towards integrated reporting and the explicit development of an accounting framework that 
tries to combine these different orders of worth.  
 
In the aftermath of the accounting scandals at the start of the first decade of the 21st 
century, and the financial crisis a few years later, recognition that non-financial aspects 
needed more corporate attention became increasingly commonplace in the Netherlands 
and beyond. The reason was that these so-called non-financial aspects could have 
substantial financial consequences after all. The updated Dutch Frijns Code18 on corporate 
governance introduced CSR more specifically, for example. As analysed in detail by Lambooy 
(2010: 107–46), this Code, applicable to listed companies with a Dutch registered office, 
firmly puts CSR (strategy) as a core strategic part of the firm that falls under the 
responsibility of both the management and supervisory board. Combined with investor 
interest (among others the large Dutch pension funds), the sustainability-adjusted annual 
reporting Guideline 400 and the Guide for Sustainability Reporting of the Dutch Council for 
Annual Reporting, as well as international developments around integrated reporting 
through the Prince’s Accounting for Sustainability (A4S) Project, GRI and the IIRC all sparked 
an interest in integrated reporting in the Dutch reporting field. Without the stick of 
regulation integrated reporting has picked up momentum in the country. For instance, 
companies such as Philips (2009), DSM (2010), Rabobank (2009), AkzoNobel (2008) were 
among the first to make the switch, but also less well known and more recent reporters 
such as the waste management company Van Gansewinkel (2010) and the Port of 
Rotterdam (2009) have started to use a form of integrated reporting. Whereas only 3% of 
reporting companies published an integrated report in 2008, 26% already did so by 2011 
                                                          
18
See Staatsblad 2009, nr 545, (“Besluit van 10 december 2009 tot wijziging van het Besluit van 23 december 
2004 tot vaststelling van nadere voorschriften omtrent de inhoud van het jaarverslag (Stb.747”). 
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(KPMG, 2011a). Below I examine the various perceptions of integrated reporting’s value and 
how to reconcile the differences to gain legitimacy.  
Orders of Worth 
Below I address the first part of my research aim and examine the rationalities or value 
articulations (i.e. orders of worth) that can be identified in the case of Dutch integrated 
reporting. Table 10 provides additional data evidence. The second part of this findings 
section discusses in more detail the attempt to reconcile these orders of worth in a 
negotiated compromise.  
Table 10 Overview orders of worth 
Order of 
worth 
Representative data source 
Market “we have been improving brand reputation, and we have been improving sales 
thanks that activity or KPI, because we have found a way or equation to tell 
that this communication engagement activity has also participated in 
increasing the number of clients. Ah bon, this is becoming high attention and 
value” (NGO) 
 
“We want to know the social return on investment of our core activities and 
link this to our return on investment. That is our business case for shared 
value” (CSR manager) 
Industrial “I think that firms who have really integrated this topic, sustainability, in their 
strategy eventually all publish an integrated report with very clear and 
measurable SMART goals and targets” (Investor)  
 
“I mean the short of it is people in the world of sustainability reporting tend to 
be values driven, tend to be mission orientated. In their hearts they're social 
change people, and this is just an instrument for achieving that. ... And 
financial reporting, that's simply not the case. Financial reporting is very much 
a mechanical exercise that's getting the numbers in the right columns and 
getting the accounts straight and the balance sheets and income statements. 
So there are really no values there (NGO)   
 
Civic “It has everything to do with a belief or conviction that disclosure and honesty 
is something that is a social responsibility. After all, you operate as a firm in 
the public domain” (NGO) 
 
“Of course to also build a little bit more trust towards the outside” (CSR NGO) 
Green “Accountants are very good at assessing the correctness of quantitative 
information. But whether it’s a kilogram of dioxin or of CO2 does not mean 
anything to them. So you have people who argue that accountants do not 
know anything about the environment and the impact of substances, and 
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therefore they cannot possible work with these reports” (Standardising body) 
 
“For them environmental was and remains the main issue, it was the main 
emotional issue because it was things like three mile island and climate change 
and o-zone layer and deforestation, they're all environmental” (Consultant) 
Integrated reporting and efficient firm valuation (‘industrial’ worth) 
Much of the work of standard setters and accountants has its fundaments in the industrial 
order of worth in which professional expertise, efficiency, long term growth and planning 
are key components. The long-term temporal dimension distinguishes integrated reporting 
from more traditional financial reporting in the sense that “the integrated report definitely 
is required to provide a more holistic view of the performance and to see whether or not 
the organisation is going to be sustainable in the sense of being around for the long term” 
(Partner Big Four). Accountants and investors typically find many of their justifications in 
this realm. For example, the accountant typically is the professional and methodical expert 
who through careful planning and following of procedures is able to be set up or audit 
accounts and thereby gives its seal of approval with regards to the value of the firm. In the 
case of integrated reporting, a central task for this profession is thus to find out “how do we 
arrive at one report (or more), which provides a strategic picture of the business, explaining 
how it creates and preserves value now and in the future?”, according to a report of the 
Dutch PwC branch (2012: 12). The methodical work of the accountant has an impact on the 
development of indicators as a measurement tool as well since “they have noticed a very 
logical effect, namely that by thinking through what indictors should look like it becomes 
possible to check them by relying on IT and controllers. That is of great additional benefit to 
the architecture and design of indicators” (director Big Four). 
 
A further aspect belonging to this world that is frequently raised in the case of integrated 
reporting is the rigorous and often scientific development of KPI’s and ways to valorise 
these indicators. Propagated by the financial community who argue that “to make sure that 
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reports become an integral part of the portfolio- analysis and decision-making further steps 
are required. In particular regarding comparability and the financial usability” (investor), 
technically robust measures are developed to show the linkages between the financial and 
non-financial. For example, as one informant of a research NGO argued: “I think that’s our 
focus, so that we can demonstrate for example a company can show how increasing its 
employee engagement will drive an additional sales performance, you know, the causal 
relationship. It should be possible to integrate that into your financial forecast as part of 
your coherent strategy”. A similar emphasis on indicators is expressed by an investment 
specialist arguing that “a point of improvement is the standardisation of these reports, and I 
foresee a large role for KPI’s here. ... The best would be of course a direct feed-in function, 
that the reports are immediately transferred into the excel-sheets of the portfolio 
managers”.   
 
Finally, firms themselves also make frequent reference to not only professional standards 
that have to be developed, but also to robust and efficiently manageable data management 
systems that have to be in place and can support these standards and provide the necessary 
data. In the words of one CSR manager:  “We have developed a web-based tool, it is still 
under development but quite mature and stable by now, because we need this data of 
course”. In short, the worth of reporting is here thus evaluated on the basis of measurable 
and reliable indicators, long-term value creation (a compromise with the market worth), 
and professional expertise.  
Integrated reporting and the competitive firm (‘market’ worth) 
The market order should not be confused with the industrial order, even though these are 
often entangled. Whereas the focus of the latter is more long-term and primarily on 
efficiency, planning and expertise, the former is concerned with prices and economic values 
in a competitive market with a short-term horizon. One informant, working for a NGO 
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promoting CSR, explained this market argument aptly by stating that “the main objective is 
to move towards the so called integrated report. Because what is the real agenda? It is how 
enterprises can picture the real economy and value the enterprise by better linking and 
even integrating financial and non-financial performance. So that is their end-goal”. Thus, 
the worth of integrated reporting is based on more valid monetary valuations that live up to 
the test of better functioning markets and competitiveness. 
 
Arguably the most visible subject here is the investor who has taken a prime position as to 
who an integrated report is actually made for, as it is also a primary target of the IIRC itself, 
and seems to have helped, to some extent at least, “the financial column of the firm to 
suddenly look with interest at sustainability information” (senior manager Big Four). 
Investors seem fairly pragmatic on the more industrial issue of the rigour of KPI 
development and more concerned with having the financially material and impactful 
sustainability indicators as part of integrated reporting: “We can continue to improve 
reporting by fine-tuning reporting these KPI’s etc, that is one agenda, but for us the biggest 
agenda, while you have to improve these, it is the connection that counts with financial 
aspects. That is going to reconcile within the company the financial and non-financial to 
picture the real economy of your enterprise” (investment specialist). Yet, compromises here 
between market and industrial arguments are also already visible when “investors want to 
know whether profits [market] are sustainable or whether short-term performance is being 
achieved at the expense of long-term [industrial] success (Big Four partner).  
 
Not only investors, also firms themselves use market justifications for integrated reporting 
since as a consequence of the interest of the financial world “everything becomes suddenly 
a lot more serious” (senior manager Big Four). For example, one CSR manager stated:  
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“We have not solved any problems with this marginal definition of CSR based on 
ethical assumptions and ‘doing the right thing’. ... We are in an economic, social and 
environmental mess. Get rid of the old-style CSR, it’s time to fully integrate CSR in 
the business and integrally link it to profit maximization. Let’s look at society’s 
problems through capitalist glasses and try to solve these problems by making lots 
of money. Capitalism 2.0”. 
 
From a SOW point of view this shows that integrated reporting is justified by denouncing 
‘doing the right thing’ (a civic aspect) in favour of market justifications of money-making 
and competitiveness. An informant remarked that although a small portion of employees 
support integrated reporting for more emotional reasons and a desire to make the world a 
better place (inspirational world) most can be persuaded by “the business case, cost 
reductions. The challenge is to make this business case beyond a doubt and very concrete. 
That you show the Euros involved and that you can show that frontrunners are really 
performing better in the market” (CSR manager). Again, the arguments that help to put 
market arguments to the test are a better competitive position and profitability.      
Integrated reporting and collective welfare (‘civic’ worth) 
Whereas the industrial and market order are the orders of worth more commonly 
associated with standard setters, financial specialists and accountants, integrated reporting 
is also justified by evaluation of worth based on notions such as equality, fundamental 
rights, solidarity and collective welfare. Unsurprisingly, this logic is more drawn upon by civil 
society and NGO’s. For example, as one experienced NGO reporting professional argued 
when comparing the intentions of financial and sustainability reporting: “I mean the short 
of it is people in the world of sustainability reporting tend to be values driven, tend to be 
mission orientated. In their hearts they're social change people, and this is just an 
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instrument for achieving that”. In this world broad transparency and stakeholder 
inclusiveness typify worth rather than market value and KPI’s.   
 
Whereas justifications based on a market or industrial worth focus in particular on 
developing and reporting on material indicators for the financial value of the firm, reasoned 
from a civic point of view “the function of the report should be broadened in order to 
include information material to the impacts on society as a whole. If that will happen 
integrated reporting is a preferable option” (NGO). What is of value in these arguments is 
thus a more general societal justness and welfare that goes beyond particular financial 
concerns. For example, as stated by the Dutch Friends of the Earth chapter in a response to 
an EU public consultation:  
“annual reports should include an analysis of the financial risks for a company of 
human rights and environmental abuses resulting from the company's operations. 
However, this should not limit the requirement to report on non-financial issues to 
only those that are perceived as relevant to a company’s financial performance. This 
could produce undesired effects, potentially marginalizing important issues that do 
not directly affect the financial position of a company but that could have great 
negative impacts for communities or the environment”. 
Thus, integrated reporting is not rejected outright, yet its market-industrial emphasis is put 
into question by raising the issue of solidarity, typically in relation to the powerless, poor 
and exploited, for instance those people deeper in the supply chain who are affected by the 
actions of the firm.   
 
To be sure, in this regard the issue of trust, more typically associated with the domestic 
world, gets usually combined as an aspect promoting the general interest and well-being of 
society. Interestingly, not only NGO’s resort to this justification but also for instance a Dutch 
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accounting body states that “integrated reporting, because of its focus on transparency, 
should be considered a critical element of market reform, and for rebuilding public trust. It 
provides insights into how a company views itself and its role in society”. It thus combines 
here elements of a market and civic order.  
Integrated reporting and environmental care (‘green’ worth) 
As described in the previous section, much of what subsequently became sustainability 
reporting had its roots in attempts to protect the environment and hold firms accountable 
for their detrimental ecological effects. Here integrated reporting is considered worthy 
when it reflects environmental principles such as sustainability and environmental 
protection but also includes “... a temporal extension of humanity by way of an implicit or 
explicit reference to future generations” (Thévenot et al., 2000: 257). In particular this latter 
point seems salient in the Dutch reporting landscape. Expectedly, NGO’s use this line of 
argument, when one informant stated the wish “that the children of your children grow up 
in a clean world. The whole idea of nature and the environment and biodiversity”. 
Integrated reporting ought then to play a role in this. Yet, also within firms environmental 
and generational arguments are heard. For example, one CSR manager confided about a 
section of reporting proponents that “They use arguments like: “Yes, but think of my 
children in the future. What about the environment and nature! They are emotionally very 
attached to the topic. Often these people are the champions of reporting in the 
organization and really push for it”. Here arguments from the green order of worth are 
combined with those based on inspiration and emotion (inspired worth).  
 
To be sure, the latter worth is indeed noticeable in the case of Dutch integrated reporting, 
yet in this particular case study was relatively infrequently utilised. The same applies to 
arguments based on renown, image and public opinion (opinion worth). Whereas it can be 
hypothesised that these were more frequently used when discussing stand-alone 
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sustainability reports which were typically seen as a PR tools and window-dressing, once 
integrated into financial annual reporting these justifications and critiques became arguably 
less salient and have thus featured less in this particular analysis. Interestingly, even these 
green or environmental arguments were expressed relatively infrequently compared with 
the ones previously discussed whereas it was the bread and butter of previous reporting 
modes.  
Mechanisms of compromise 
The above thus indicates the multiplicity of orders of worth implicated in the case of 
integrated reporting. For integrated reporting to successfully progress these various views 
need to be juxtaposed in such a way that the outlook of the practice becomes acceptable 
and legitimate to a broad audience. I thus continue my discussion of integrated reporting by 
examining the question of how a legitimate compromise is attempted to be forged out of 
these multiple orders of worth and the difficulties involved in this (see also table 11). In 
theory domination of one order of worth could be attempted, but neither does the data 
suggest a realistic attempt of this, nor does it seem realistic as, for instance, even purely 
financial reporting already blends a market and industrial worth. I will thus focus the 
remainder of this section on the other two ways to reconcile competing orders of worth, 
namely the private arrangement and the compromise. Whether ultimately a more durable 
compromise is forged or rather a local and temporary private arrangement depends on at 
least three criteria that have to be met: establishing a common interest, avoiding 
clarification and maintaining ambiguity and plasticity. 
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Table 11 Mechanisms of compromise 
Mechanism  Representative data source Significance 
Common 
interest 
“A problem still is that when you want to show to WWF how 
well your sustainability performance is that sending them your 
annual report will not be very fruitful. That includes for 90% 
financial data that is not of interest to WWF. So how do you 
make integrated reporting relevant for a broad audience other 
than investors and financial specialist is a concern” (CSR 
consultant) 
 
“Now it’s a question of I think materiality of reporting against 
transparency and that’s shorthand for this view that this ought 
to be about understanding better the performance of 
companies for some people; whilst for other stakeholder 
groups it’s more about the transparency and integrity of 
companies” (NGO) 
A common interest in a compromise answers in a nutshell what 
the purpose of integrated reporting is and who it is for. Difficult 
to find a broadly shared common goal for integrated reporting 
that transcends private interests, in particular with an often 
perceived dominance of the financial agenda rather than a 
concern for sustainability.  
No 
clarification  
“We can continue to improve reporting by fine-tuning 
reporting these KPI’s, that is one agenda, but for us the biggest 
agenda, while you have to improve these, it is the connection 
that counts (with financial aspects). That is going to reconcile 
within the company the financial and non-financial to picture 
the real economy of your enterprise. But that is than much 
smarter with regards the way you communicate with 
shareholders and investors” (CSR NGO) 
 
 “There are some companies that have gone to that extent to 
actually demonstrating the valorising of non-financial, some 
people said, ‘That’s quite interesting,’ and others said, ‘Well 
that’s a bit cranky.’ So there’s a lack of credibility there and 
that’s the issue I think they’re going to have to confront (CSR 
think tank). 
The common interest being unclear, actors seek clarification to 
reduce uncertainty. In particular KPI development, materialising 
sustainability and valorising the non-financial into the financial 
complicates the emergence of a durable compromise. The risk is 
that the perception of market/industrial private interests taking 
over from common interests takes hold.      
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Ambiguity 
and plasticity 
“The question mark is what is integrated? Is it converting… is it 
simply reporting financial or non-financial in the same report 
or is it actually demonstrating the relationship between the 
non-financial and financial in a balance sheet way? And I think 
that’s the issue” (NGO) 
 
“You can try to figure out the impact of various oil price 
fluctuations and carbon price fluctuations on power plants that 
depend on different types of fuel mixes, and therefore you can 
… a good analyst like Goldman Sachs can come out with those 
figures, but when it comes to human rights, how you quite 
quantify potential impacts of human rights is more challenging. 
It doesn’t come with the neat numbers. You can do it, but it’s 
that much more difficult I think, and it’s that much more open 
to scrutiny and questioning and so on and so forth” (Rating 
agency) 
Integrated reporting in theory can meet the test of multiple 
orders of worth in a compromise. However, in practice it often 
loses its aim in ambiguous appeal since it gets pulled into a 
market and/or industrial worth which makes it potentially invalid 
and not a legitimate compromise. 
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Establishing a common interest 
A first mechanism to establish a compromise is a shared reference to a common good and a 
focus on a common or general interest. According to Boltanksi and Thévenot (2006: 278) a 
compromise “aims at a common good that transcends from the two different forms of 
worth in presence by including both of them”. This was aptly and optimistically phrased by 
one informant, a sustainable investment specialist, when she argued that “everybody will 
realise that all themes that have something to do with sustainability, so as environmental 
and social and good governance, that they all have financial consequences so they are all 
material. That is the reason why I think we will eventually end up with integrated 
reporting”. Integrated reporting thus becomes a practice that is meant to absorb the 
tensions between elements of, in particular, the market, industrial and civic worth in the 
name of a more sustainable and transparent world. It thereby almost transcends these 
orders of worth as a device that does not belong to one particular world but becomes 
rather a way to reinforce the compromise. The following quote of a Big Four partner shows 
this compromise mechanism clearly and therefore deserves to be shown in full: 
“We are in essence with integrated reporting trying to bring two worlds together, 
the financial world and the sustainability world. It seems they really more often 
collide than actually stand side by side looking at what lies ahead. They almost seem 
opposites. That causes a situation in which you have two directions that push 
against each other and you try to look which one is the most important. In my 
opinion, however, the solution can be found in looking again at what the 
performance of the firm actually is and what aspects are in play and make that 
central to integrated reporting. You should not call these aspects sustainability, so 
that’s why I say you remove sustainability from the agenda, because if you don’t 
you are back at the same discussion again”.     
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Whether all stakeholders share this belief in integrated reporting as constituting the general 
interest can be questioned though. For instance, the issue of materiality and financial 
consequences may be an obvious common interest for accountants, ratings agencies and 
investors, for NGO’s, but also for firms themselves the issue is not as clear. According to the 
corporate secretary responsible for the integrated reporting process at a Dutch firm an issue 
of concern is that “with integrated reporting you have to consider whether you are still 
sufficiently informing your broad group of stakeholders. In particular those stakeholders 
who were well-served with a people, planet, and profit report may be put off by an 
integrated report with lots of financial information”. This concern of who the integrated 
report is for, and by default which common interest it thus serves, is expressed by one 
experienced informant, working for a sustainability NGO, as “...  these are two cultures that 
are very different, the financial reporting and the sustainability reporting … the origins, the 
genesis, the culture of these ideas are very different, and there's a lot of work to do in 
bringing the two together into a harmonious and unitary or unified vision for what 
integrated reporting ought to be”.  
Avoiding clarification 
Related to this importance and difficulty of creating a common interest is a second 
mechanism of a successful compromise, namely the need to avoid clarification. That is, a 
compromise “... will not hold up if the parties involved try to move ahead toward 
clarification, since there is no higher-ranking polity in which the incompatible worlds 
associated in the compromise can converge. An attempt to stabilize a compromise by giving 
it a solid foundation thus tends to have the opposite effect” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 
336), which means “clarification is the enemy of compromise” (Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 
2011: 1413). A fundamental characteristic of integrated reporting is, however, that it 
combines financial and sustainability elements, yet not everybody agrees on what it should 
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ultimately look like, as explained above. For one informant, a director at a sustainability 
research and rating agency, a central dilemma of integrated reporting is “... how do you 
interpret these things into bottom line meaningful statistics which are useful to financial 
analysts? But at the same time you don’t lose the narrative and strategic reporting on 
sustainability from both stakeholder perspective and a business perspective. And I think it’s 
a genuine challenge, not a cynical remark”. This tension not only makes it difficult to agree 
on a common interest, it also seduces some into trying to ‘solve’ this tension by seeking 
clarification of the principle of the agreement.  
 
This urge for clarification and clarity is, perhaps unsurprisingly, most clearly visible among 
investors and accountants. For example, accountants “… know who pay them at the end of 
the day. More and stricter rules makes life for them better in the sense that it means more 
things to control and advise on” (employer organisation). Yet also firms often hold that “CSR 
data needs to reach the same level as financial data in terms of data integrity, reliability and 
robustness of the process” (CSR manager). Explained by an accountant, the sustainability 
systems “… are not nearly as robust in terms of process and control as their financial 
reporting systems. So one of the first steps that a company has to take that will require 
change is improving these systems. A problem here is that many sustainability people or 
people in the operating end of the business don't understand controls”. This indicates a 
desire by these promoters of integrated reporting to define quite clearly the boundaries of 
this practice and develop, within an industrial worth, indicators, processes and 
measurement techniques. Whereas useful in its own right, this clarification can complicate 
the compromise situation with other orders of worth as it forces those looking at integrated 
reporting from more civic and green perspectives into the market and industrial realm. This 
tends to cause discomfort and, for instance, the claims of these powerful actors are typically 
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denounced as “they are just selling stuff, some of these guys, the big companies are selling 
stuff” (NGO).   
Maintaining ambiguity and plasticity  
A third and final mechanism of importance for integrated reporting to solidify a compromise 
and establish legitimacy is maintaining a degree of ambiguity and plasticity. That is, 
compromises can refer to a common interest or include beings or qualities “that may 
derive, depending on the way they are understood, from more than one world” as “figures 
of the common good also lend themselves to compromises” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 
279–80). Integrated reporting would thus need to mean enough to everyone to work with it 
and it would be solid enough in substance yet at the same time contain enough plasticity to 
withstand tests of various orders of worth. To a certain extent sustainability reporting had 
this required ambiguity. It appealed to a broad range of stakeholders and was able to 
flexibly include industrial, market, civic and green aspects under the umbrella of 
sustainability. Sustainability as a compromise object was thus offered as a solution to a 
problem of common interest and the ambiguity was “a means of allowing this compromise 
to be maintained” (Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011: 1413). As made clear above, the problem 
of common interest is in the case of integrated reporting far less clear and widely agreed 
upon, even though in theory integrated reporting potentially “... is an integral story with a 
binding element that basically tells us that when we do it this way we will all benefit” (civil 
servant).  
 
This notion of “integrated reporting” is thus, for instance, supposed to qualify the relation 
between the firm and the financial market in a market worth, but also between the firm 
and social justness from a civic worth. However, in particular stakeholders valuing reporting 
from the latter angle find integrated reporting often acutely skewed to a dominating 
market/industrial logic, thereby losing its ambiguous appeal. For example, one labour union 
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representative argued that “there will be a desire by the accounting industry to come up 
with quantifiable indicators and statistics and things like this. And most, that's more than 
half, most of the quantifiable indicators in the social area are not valid indicators of what 
they're supposed to be indicating”. In other words, the wish to determine the meaning of 
integrated reporting through (industrial) indicator development makes it less appealing 
from the civic logic since the test of worth does not match anymore.   
 
To be sure, also among Dutch firms there seems to be recognition that integrated reporting 
may be a practice possibly too unambiguous to function as the basis of a compromise and is 
rather a more focused private arrangement among a few stakeholders. According to one Big 
Four partner, firms: 
“fall into one of two camps. One says, ‘We’ll produce this integrated report and we 
will not be producing a sustainability report, a standalone sustainability report 
anymore.’ And others who say, ‘Yes we’re going to produce an integrated report, but 
we recognise that that integrated report’s primary audience is probably the investor 
and consequently we believe that there are still other important stakeholders to the 
business.’ Which means that the sustainability report, the standalone sustainability 
report still has a role in the future but it will be targeted much more at a different 
audience”.  
Towards a legitimate sustainable compromise? 
Having depicted the various orders of worth at work in the case of integrated reporting and 
discussed the compromise mechanisms of establishing a common interest, avoiding 
clarification and maintaining ambiguity, I next examine the question of the outcomes of this 
and the meaning which has been given to integrated reporting. To be sure, this is by default 
somewhat speculative as integrated reporting is still very much work in process and the first 
generation of an official framework will not materialise before late 2013. Still, my analysis 
 159 
 
sheds light on the possibility of, and impediments to, reconciling the multiple demands that 
exist around integrated reporting and how it moves between becoming a private 
arrangement or compromise. 
 
A particularly striking outcome based on my analysis of the Netherlands is that integrated 
reporting runs the risk of becoming a private arrangement as it is typically denounced for 
privileging the concerns of the market (through market/industrial worth) at the expense of 
seriously advancing social and environmental justice (civic/green worth). This complicates 
reaching a durable and shared compromise on the meaning, purpose and outlook of 
integrated reporting.  
 
In this line of thought the required common interest fails to transcend the multiple orders 
of worth that need to be reconciled. In SOW terms, whereas some actors may indeed 
believe that a common ground can be found that leads to a compromise, others suggest 
that this may be more difficult to achieve since the differences are too substantial. 
Integrated reporting for them is rather a private arrangement between primarily market and 
industrial concerns as the practice gets “hijacked by accountants and investors” (Interview, 
consultant).The imbalance in power between actors/orders of worth was remarked upon as 
one Big Four senior manager argued that “the financial stream is quite dominant compared 
to the sustainability stream. This causes difficult discussions and complicates the process, of 
course”. This problem of the dominance of the market/industrial orders of worth, 
propagated by predominantly accountants, investors etc. also has repercussions for the 
perceived ambiguity of integrated reporting. That is, although integrated reporting qualifies 
the firm’s relation with the market and investors, it often does so rather unambiguously and 
thereby risks losing its social and environmental appeal and impact. It thereby risks 
highlighting the continuing function and value of the stand-alone sustainability report as a 
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safe beacon of sustainability. Finally, attempts to prevent sliding into a private arrangement 
by clarifying what integrated reporting is ‘really’ about risks being counterproductive. My 
analysis above suggests that such a clarification of the exact terms of integrated reporting 
risks leading to a denunciation where “… the compromise is reduced to a private 
arrangement that benefits the parties involved” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 337–8). That 
is, the basis of the compromise is not a common good of many anymore, but rather a 
specific interest of some making it difficult to generalise and achieve widespread legitimacy 
for it.  
 
In short, my analysis suggests that the required mechanisms towards a legitimate 
compromise are at best partially fulfilled and that integrated reporting thus potentially 
typifies a private arrangement between firms, investors and accountants on the basis of a 
market and industrial worth rather than a durable legitimate compromise and a solution or 
pathway towards an economically, socially and environmentally sustainable world.   
 
Discussion 
Understanding integrated reporting 
First, what does the analysis presented above tell us about the value of integrated 
reporting? Many scholars interested in sustainability accounting and reporting are not 
necessarily interested in whether integrated reporting improves firm valuations, but rather 
whether it actually improves the quality of current accounting for sustainability. In other 
words, does it help to solve current environmental and social crises? Some studies have 
questioned this potential of various forms of sustainability reporting (see e.g. Gray, 2006; 
Laine, 2009; Tregidga & Milne, 2006), arguing that it is primarily used as a sustainability 
cloak that disguises the still primarily unsustainable ‘business-as-usual’. In the case of 
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integrated reporting this idea of ‘reporting as a smokescreen’ applies as well as the critique 
on the privileging of the more market and financial aspects of integrated reporting. In 
particular accountants and investors, as they “mobilized a wide range of evidence, 
established tests that matched their evidence and attempted to influence the interpretation 
of evidence provided by others” (Kaplan & Murray, 2010: 137), find themselves accused of 
capturing the dialogue and seeking private interest rather than searching for a common 
interest. 
 
This fragility and impediment to integrated reporting’s success can be understood as an 
instance of managerial and professional capture (see e.g. Power, 1991, 1994; Smith et al., 
2011). That is, the dialogue between actors in the integrated reporting field seems to be 
strongly influenced by professionals, namely accountants and investors, who, either more or 
less insidiously, propagate their market/industrial agenda and thereby advance their own 
commercial position. Whereas this has been remarked upon in relation to forms of 
sustainability reporting more generally, in-depth empirical analysis of the matter has been 
scarce. In addition to this form of professional capture (Power, 1991, 1994), managerial 
capture by corporates through a focus primarily on those non-financial aspects deemed 
financially material and supporting the ‘business-case’ of the firm rather than general 
accountability, social justice or ecological sustainability further makes the possibility of a 
shared compromise increasingly problematic as well. 
 
This idea of capture by powerful constituents such as management and professionals draws 
parallels with recent additions to the SOW framework in which Boltanksi and Chiapello 
(2005: 8, emphasis in original) describe the ways in which firms renewed the capitalist spirit 
through revamping “the ideology that justifies engagement in capitalism”. Studying the 
social movements in the 1960s and 1970s and their critique on capitalism, the authors 
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argue that rather than ending the capitalistic reign it reinforced its supremacy by 
reinventing itself into a new ‘networked’ societal order of worth. That is, instead of 
bureaucracy and the ‘organizational man’, the post-Fordist neo-management regime started 
simply to celebrate the values of expressive creativity, fluid identity, autonomy and self-
development. Applying this logic to the Dutch integrated reporting field, it is possible to see 
integrated reporting indeed not as a liberating practice towards a more sustainable and 
accountable business community, but in an ironic twist of events rather as a practice that 
“helps the capitalist market to incorporate the critique that was meant to destabilize it” 
(Reinecke, 2010: 578). In other words, with the initial hope of integrated reporting being a 
Trojan horse towards corporate sustainability, it seems the Trojans have managed to keep 
the Greeks inside the horse (see also Spence, 2007).  
 
Alternatively, and also on a more positive note, one can still argue there remains a truly 
liberating or emancipatory potential in integrated reporting, despite its difficulties in 
becoming a broadly shared legitimate compromise. That is, from a practical point of view, 
when actors face a situation of uncertainty over a new practice such as integrated reporting 
my analysis suggests they seek to justify their position by drawing on various widely shared 
‘orders of worth’. Because of the multiplicity of orders of worth, actors face the problem of 
bringing together these different and often clashing orders of worth. To do this, it is thus 
imperative for promoters to be able to establish and create dialogues between these 
different positions. Whereas the current shift tends to be toward a more restricted private 
arrangement, Stark (2009) suggests that rather than regarding this process as problematic, 
it also functions as a source of opportunities as it creates creative friction between the 
various principles of evaluation that in turn induces compromises between orders of worth.  
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Integrated reporting may not be a panacea for a sustainable future, the powerful actors 
involved (e.g. accountants and investors) that have started to put demands on firms do have 
an influence on these firms. As cynical as it may seem, informants widely acknowledged 
that the voice of a large investor is perceived differently than a disgruntled far-away 
community of obscure NGO. This ‘sense of dissonance’, to use Starks’s words, forces firms to 
start reflecting on the impact of previously insignificant non-financial indicators, thereby 
invoking productive reflection and offering the potential of integrated reporting as a 
‘mirror’ or an internal management tool that forces firms to start considering various 
sustainability aspects. Multiple principles of evaluation may cause the required “societal 
friction that generates a reflexive cognition capable of recognizing innovative solutions” 
(Stark, 2009: 212). However, once again, a balancing act between the specificity of a shared 
common interest and the need to maintain plasticity and ambiguity determines whether 
integrated reports  will ultimately be “stabilized enough to circulate across sites, yet plastic 
enough to adapt to the local constraints and needs of the disparate parties deploying them” 
(Stark, 2009: 194). 
Sociology of worth, legitimacy and SEAR 
On a more general theoretical level my focus on SOW has implications for understanding 
how increasingly complex accounting practices, such as integrated reporting, gain legitimacy 
in pluralistic environments (Annisette & Richardson, 2011; Lander et al., 2013). I stated 
earlier that for integrated reporting to succeed it needs to be regarded as a legitimate 
practice, but that prior work on legitimacy within SEAR has so far typically emphasised 
audience evaluation, alignment and fit rather than viewed legitimacy as a form of dialogue 
or co-achievement through justifications over the interpretation of what is valued and 
valuable. This idea of dialogue goes beyond passive normative compliance and coping with 
stakeholder pressure as it “changes the modus of responsibility from the reactive model *…+ 
to a proactive concept of societal involvement” (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007: 1110). My analysis 
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of integrated reporting offers thus the possibility to focus on legitimacy’s processes and 
motivations (see e.g. Owen, 2008; Smith et al., 2011) and ultimately on how conflicts 
between contesting scripts are negotiated and resolved, thereby contributing to the 
possibility for sustainability accounting scholars to start opening up the legitimacy black-
box. In particular, through my SOW analysis I have not only shown the multiplicity of 
perspectives that exist around integrated reporting. Moreover, I claim that this framework 
also provides an elaborate theoretical lexicon that helps to assess attempts to come to a 
settlement and eventual stabilisation of the meaning of a practice and thereby extend 
current work on legitimacy theory.  
 
On the one hand the multiplicity inherent in orders of worth refines the conceptualisation 
of society of being a coherent entity that is often more or less explicitly present in many 
SEAR studies on legitimacy (Deegan, 2007). Instead, it adds to recent work that sees 
accounting (practices) situated in pluralistic institutional environment (Guerreiro et al., 
2012; Lander et al., 2013). Moreover, it offers a conceptual tool box that allows researchers 
to get a better understanding of exactly how this process of gaining, maintaining or 
repairing legitimacy works. Framing accounting practices in a SOW vocabulary of contesting 
orders of worth, private arrangements and compromises and thereby paying attention to 
mechanisms such as maintaining a common interest, ambiguity and avoidance of 
clarification could usefully extend current work on legitimacy theory and make us better 
understand how accounting practices or organisations using these practices fail or succeed 
in establishing themselves. It makes possible an analysis of the dilemmas and difficulties 
associated with gaining legitimacy for complex practices, which will be beneficial for 
academics and practitioners alike.    
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Future research and practical implications 
As with all studies, this one also comes with limitations that in turn give rise to future 
research. First, an obvious consideration is that this study focuses on the Dutch integrated 
reporting landscape. Although defensible theoretically and methodologically, the possibility 
of the Netherlands being an idiosyncratic case should not be ruled out and this study thus 
comes with limits to its generalisability. Therefore, future research could usefully analyse 
other geographical areas, possible non-Western ones too. Furthermore also the role of 
broader national institutions on the development of practices could be considered in this 
respect (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Although this particular study is based on an extensive 
collection of empirical data, combining both interviews and documents, the field-level 
scope remains quite broad and explorative. Future studies could for example also use 
ethnographic methods that would allow a more fine-grained account of the SOW 
framework (see e.g. McInerney, 2008; Reinecke, 2010) and how contestation in accounting 
practices constituted by multiple orders of worth works out in practice.  
 
Second, related to this latter point is the potential that recently researchers have 
investigated combining insights from the SOW framework with institutional theory. For 
instance, blending insights with the literature on institutional logics (see e.g. Cloutier & 
Langley, 2013; Gond & Leca, 2012; Thornton et al., 2012) or institutional work (e.g. 
McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Ramirez, 2013) could provide interesting opportunities here. In 
cases of institutional pluralism still “little is known regarding the micro-level processes of 
how organizations and actors respond to competing institutional pressures” (Lander et al., 
2013: 15) and thus seek to establish legitimacy (Cloutier & Langley, 2013; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005). Where logics focus on macro-level structures, work looks specifically at 
the enactment of these demands at the micro-level and SOW aims to integrate both in one 
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framework. Ultimately, all have an interest in creating, maintaining or destructing legitimacy 
and further research could see where they convert and diverge and the relevance of this.  
 
Third, although SOW tells us a lot about the various types of settlements that can be agreed 
upon and the mechanisms to forge a compromise, we still know less about the respective 
strength of these settlements and the contingencies of their success. That is, future studies 
applying a SOW perspective on SEAR (or accounting more generally) could explore the 
conditions under which compromises are successful. For instance, what type of actors rely 
on which orders of worth, are there temporal elements of changes in this process and do 
some types of agreement lead to higher legitimacy than others or perhaps to variances on 
different dimensions of legitimacy (see e.g. O’Dwyer, Owen, & Unerman, 2011; Suchman, 
1995)?  
 
Finally, analysing an accounting practice such as integrated reporting through the lens of 
SOW has practical implications as well. That is, on the one hand it has a toolbox-like quality 
that can help policy makers and other practitioners propagating integrated reporting to 
more systematically assess the multiplicity of demands around the practice. Moreover, with 
its elaborated lexicon that characterises each order of worth (e.g. the test, subjects, objects, 
proof, mode of evaluation) a state of equivalence can be easier conceptualised, i.e. the 
purposive alignment of human, material and ideational factors in the field. However, as the 
pluralism of the field will most of the time make a compromise the more likely and 
preferable solution, the mechanisms of compromise discussed in this article provide 
practical guidelines on how to actually forge such a compromise (or how to insidiously 
frustrate one from materialising) and prevent being accused of making private arrangement 
that dampen the broad legitimacy of the practice. With this, the SOW applied to, for 
instance, integrated reporting provides a framework that combines picturing macro-level 
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repertoires with more micro-level ‘management tools’. Hopefully a better understanding 
and appreciation of the complexities, difficulties and sensitivities of integrated reporting 
makes it possible for academics and practitioners alike to further develop this practice in a 
way that supports a sustainable economic, ecological and social future. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I empirically analysed integrated reporting, the latest form of sustainability 
reporting that aims to combine and merge financial and sustainability reporting. Drawing on 
the sociology of worth perspective (e.g. Annisette & Richardson, 2011; Boltanski & 
Thévenot, 1999, 2006), I analysed the pluralism of integrated reporting and focused on the 
possibility of, and impediments to, reconciling its multiple logics of valuation, or orders of 
worth, in order to forge a legitimate compromise. I showed that integrated reporting as a 
new practice claims considerable promise towards attaining financial, social and ecological 
sustainability, yet is still emerging and riddled with uncertainties. It contains elements of 
market, industrial, civic and green orders of worth, which need to be reconciled in order for 
integrated reporting to become a legitimate practice. Whereas such a compromise requires 
finding a common interest, avoiding clarification and maintaining ambiguity, in the case of 
integrated reporting these mechanisms seemed only partially in place which impeded 
integrated reporting’s development and legitimacy. In particular, I argued that integrated 
reporting is typically denounced for privileging the concerns of firms, investors and 
accountants on the basis of a market and industrial worth, rather than seriously engaging 
with the civic/green worth of those interested in social and environmental justice. This 
capture of integrated reporting complicates reaching a durable and shared compromise on 
the meaning and purpose of integrated reporting and instead suggests the presence of a 
limited private arrangement. At the same time, tension at the borders between orders of 
worth may give room for creative action.  
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Finally, the SOW framework furthermore helps to unpack the dynamic process through 
which complex new accounting practices, such as integrated reporting, gain legitimacy in 
pluralistic contexts as compromises are negotiated. Fundamentally, the SOW framework 
shows that legitimacy is not just about, for example, firms publishing reports strategically in 
response to scanning of legitimacy threats in its environment. Neither is it about the 
constrained compliance with institutional scripts. SOW makes clear that a complex practice 
such as integrated reporting, at its very core subject to a plurality of institutional demands 
or logics of valuation from a variety of stakeholders, gains or loses legitimacy through 
engaging in a dynamic ‘dialogue’ with actors in the field where these orders of worth need 
to be reconciled in either a compromise or a more local private arrangement. This 
theorisation of a complex new accounting practice thus helps to understand better the 
dynamic process of how some accounting practices prevail and other succumb to obscurity.   
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Summary 
In Chapter One, the introduction of this dissertation, I discussed the rise of a sustainability 
discourse. I argued that a particular example of a corporate answer to sustainability has 
been demands for stronger and better accountability and transparency of firms through 
sustainability reporting. I explained the complex nature of sustainability reporting and the 
overall aim of this study to offer an explanation of how sustainability reporting has 
developed from a peripheral practice into a more widely accepted and adopted one. I 
aimed to do so by examining its development over the last 25 years in the Netherlands. 
Most prominent accounts to date have relied for their explanations of sustainability 
reporting on the potential financial benefits or business case of reporting or on attempts of 
firms to strategically seek legitimate ‘fit’ between their value system and that of society. 
Others saw reporting as either an ethical accountability instrument or an instrumental 
strategic management tool with which to respond to demands of powerful stakeholders. 
Still, these accounts typically remained rather functionalist and instrumental and 
overplayed the strategic agency of individual firms, making them ill-equipped to explain the 
more field-based historical process dynamics that help us understand how sustainability 
reporting has developed into its current meaning and form.  
 
I therefore situated my study more broadly in a tradition of sociologically oriented 
organisational institutionalism and its emphasis on the enabling and constraining role of 
structural institutional pressures as well as the possibility of agency within this. I stipulated 
sustainability reporting’s status as a pluralistic practice that brings together concerns of a 
range of constituencies in an institutionally complex environment. This complexity is pushed 
further by reporting’s embeddedness in a more general discourse of rationalisation with its 
emphasis on accountability, assessment and transparency and confusion over, or decoupling 
of, the exact means and ends of reporting. Together, notwithstanding being a multifaceted 
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practice that has developed in a pluralistic institutional environment, sustainability 
reporting has grown steadily and established itself firmly in the corporate landscape. The 
three studies included in this dissertation ultimately all fit in this larger context and examine 
aspects of how such complexities are dealt with at the field level. In addition to their 
respective contributions, together they add theoretically, empirically and practically to our 
understanding of sustainability reporting as such as well.  
 
Although each respective chapter had its particular use of data sources and analysis, overall 
I qualitatively researched sustainability reporting’s development in the Dutch reporting 
field. The Netherlands has been an early adopter of the practice and remained a 
frontrunner with over 80% of its largest 100 companies reporting (KPMG, 2011a) and also 
being at the forefront of the latest developments around integrated reporting (PwC, 2012). 
The complex Dutch sustainability reporting field is still under continuous development 
though and populated by a variety of different actors (e.g. government, firms, consultants, 
accountants, standard setters, NGO’s, investors) working on further developing a 
multifaceted practice. This made sustainability reporting a good exemplary case in which 
various subject positions, events, activities and decision moments were “transparently 
observable”, allowing for theoretical development (Eisenhardt, 1989: 537). I conducted 9419 
semi-structured interviews of typically 1-1,5 hours in length and combined this with an 
analysis of a large number of secondary data sources (reports, laws, newspaper clippings 
etc.) on (the history of) sustainability reporting.   
 
In Chapter Two I asked how the institutionalisation of sustainability reporting has been 
achieved despite it being a multifaceted practice focusing on complex social problems in a 
relatively emerging, uncertain and heterogeneous field where cause-effect relations remain 
                                                          
19
 Chapter Four used only 64 of these interviews because of its particular focus on integrated reporting, which 
was not discussed with all interviewees.  
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unclear. I questioned the dominant assumptions of institutionalisation and change being 
fairly smooth and linear processes driven by a single heroic institutional entrepreneur 
blessed with great foresight and purpose. I instead offered an alternative interpretation by 
applying insights from the garbage can model. This model has at its core a concern for 
behaviour and decision-making in a complex and uncertain environment where a largely 
unstructured, loosely-coupled and serendipitous interplay between problems, solutions, 
decision makers and decision moments shape social order or institutions. I drew on a 
qualitative analysis of the history of sustainability reporting and analysed 94 semi-
structured interviews and secondary data. I emphasised the importance of so-called 
historical contingencies and collective institutional entrepreneurship. A range of actors 
muddled through and were involved in the enactment of contingencies that enabled action 
and change as problems, solutions, and participants were momentarily matched. Overall, in 
this chapter I did not aim to negate the role of human agency and purpose in processes of 
institutionalisation and change though. Rather, I relaxed some assumptions and contributed 
a lens that specifically makes room for the role of serendipity, timing, collectiveness and 
context rather than the relatively neat and teleological models of institutionalisation. I 
thereby added a touch of realism and nuance to currently popular depictions of 
institutionalisation and change processes.  
 
In Chapter Three the problematic was to chart the different dimensions of commensuration 
as they emerged in the field of sustainability reporting and its shift from a values-based 
practice into a value-based one. I explained the process driving the development of these 
dimensions and thereby offered a theoretical and empirical understanding of the dynamics 
of commensuration. I drew again on a qualitative study of the history of sustainability 
reporting in the Netherlands. Various dimensions of commensuration could be seen to 
shape and guide sustainability reporting historically. Cognitive commensuration marked the 
 173 
 
first period of environmental reporting; technical commensuration took over as reporting 
expanded into triple bottom line reporting and finally value commensuration marked the 
latest phase towards integrated reporting. I presented a process model as a starting point to 
better understand the dynamics and temporal aspects of commensuration and argued that 
the shifts in the dominant dimensions of commensuration can be explained by emerging 
pathologies that drive the development of the succeeding phase. These pathologies can be 
explained by instances of means-ends disconnection, professional insulation and cultural 
contestation. At the same time, this study highlighted the temporal aspects of the various 
dimensions of commensuration as well as their potential to reinforce each other. Finally, I 
discussed the implications of commensuration for sustainability reporting’s development as 
it on the one hand helped reporting’s development, but at the same time commensuration 
also impoverished the practice by advocating those values that can be made commensurate 
at the expense of other, not less important, aspects.   
 
In Chapter Four I zoomed in to the present and considered integrated reporting and the 
attempts to build a bridge between the ‘worlds’ of financial reporting and sustainability 
reporting, which contest over their interpretations of the purpose and value of integrated 
reporting. In this chapter I analysed the pluralism of integrated reporting and focused on 
the possibility of, and impediments to, reconciling these multiple logics of valuation and 
coming to a legitimate compromise. I empirically applied the sociology of worth (SOW) 
framework of Boltanski and Thévenot to analyse integrated reporting in the Dutch reporting 
field, drawing on 64 semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis. This framework 
combines different repertoires of (e)valuation, or so-called orders of worth, and can be used 
to analyse the settlement of differences and how to gain legitimacy through expressing 
justifications and building compromises. I first suggested that integrated reporting 
combined disparate domains that are organised by, most prominently, a market, industrial, 
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civic and green order of worth. A second point following from this was that these orders of 
worth represent different logics of valuation that need to be reconciled in order for 
integrated reporting to become a legitimate practice. Whereas a solidified compromise 
required finding a common interest, avoiding clarification and maintaining ambiguity, in the 
case of integrated reporting these mechanisms seemed only partially in place which 
impeded integrated reporting’s development and legitimacy. Finally, the outcome of the 
above was that my analysis suggested that integrated reporting risks being captured by 
investors and accountants, leading to a local private arrangement rather than a durable 
legitimate compromise. Taken together, this chapter helps us to better understand the 
potential benefits of integrated reporting, yet also highlights the difficulties and limitations 
it entails. The focus on the SOW framework furthermore helps to unpack the process 
through which complex new accounting practices, such as integrated reporting, gain 
legitimacy in pluralistic contexts as compromises are negotiated.          
 
Taken together, in Chapter Two I focused more broadly on the general historical trajectory 
of sustainability reporting’s institutionalisation. In the subsequent Chapter Three I focused 
more on a specific mechanism, commensuration, which underpins reporting’s 
institutionalisation and how it copes with complexity and pluralism. In Chapter Four I 
zoomed in even further on attempts to reconcile the inherent complexity of integrated 
reporting in forging a legitimate compromise. In these respective chapters I have made 
several contributions to current knowledge. First, I contributed to the institutional 
literature, most notably institutional entrepreneurship. By questioning the role of the heroic 
purposeful individual institutional entrepreneur I instead suggested the importance of 
enabling historical contingencies and collective institutional work. Second, I have also 
contributed to come to a deeper understanding of the dynamics between dimensions of 
commensuration and the mechanisms driving this process. Finally, I have enhanced our 
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understanding of integrated reporting and the possibilities of, and impediments to, reaching 
a legitimate compromise and shown how this is a communicative dialogue around finding a 
common interest, avoiding clarification and maintaining ambiguity. Together, this has 
helped to better understand how sustainability reporting has developed from a peripheral 
practice into a more widely accepted and adopted one. 
 
Sustainability reporting as a complex accounting practice 
Although the studies that are included in this dissertation resemble related lines of inquiry 
rather than an unitary conceptual paradigm (Powell & Bromley, forthcoming), they have in 
common that they go beyond simple functionalistic rational actor explanations. They also all 
share an interest in the importance of context and external institutional influences. Finally, 
they pay specific attention to the consequences of pluralism and complexity for 
sustainability reporting. The specific contributions of the respective papers included in this 
dissertation have been previously discussed. Still, the preceding chapters on the history of 
sustainability reporting have some more overarching implications for our understanding of 
sustainability reporting as an accounting practice that prior SEAR studies have insufficiently 
addressed. Below I address some the theoretical and empirical implications of my study for 
our understanding of this practice as well.  
 
First, the preceding chapters hinted at the multiple roles of sustainability reporting as both 
a consequence and driver of rationalisation, economisation and transparency pressures in 
its environment. That is, my study highlights the important role of sustainability reporting as 
an accounting practice that helped to organise the abstract idea of “sustainability” into an 
economic entity. I stipulate though that in this rationalisation and economisation (Miller & 
Power, 2013) of the field, sustainability reporting has not just been a technical and 
instrumental tool developed as a consequence of its institutional environment, but has at 
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the same time also actively constituted this environment and its particular discourses and 
rationales and thus perpetuated its own existence.  
 
This goes beyond extant studies that have typically offered an undersocialised view of 
sustainability reporting and focused on either how it actually goes against the notion of 
sustainability (Gray, 2010), or instead claimed the opposite by arguing it has great potential 
for firms and the environment alike (Burritt & Schaltegger, 2010). In both cases there is a 
focus on considering functionalist technical demands rather than acknowledging the 
(historical) importance of cultural, normative, cognitive or regulative influences (Miller & 
Power, 2013). My research on the one hand has shown that various rationales, discourses or 
logics in the institutional environment propagated or even enabled the diffusion of 
accounting practices and procedures in the sustainability landscape. These forces are typical 
manifestations of Western modernity and manifest themselves, for instance, in clarion calls 
for rationality, accountability and transparency (Bromley & Powell, 2012). These eventually 
helped to constitute sustainability as an accounting subject as it transformed from an 
abstract concept into a more concrete and manageable one, creating an entire industry 
with it. 
 
At the same time though, sustainability reporting as an accounting practice has a pivotal 
position as it is not only a consequence of such institutional pressures, but also constitutive 
of this very institutional environment in which these are at work. My chapters have shown 
in various ways the constitutive nature of this accounting practice as it helps to further 
rationalise business and society relations and ultimately enables an environment in which 
“economization of organizational life becomes elaborated and institutionalized” (Miller & 
Power, 2013: 558). For instance, technical commensuration makes possible value 
commensuration, and value commensuration makes it easier to start talking about 
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integrated reporting. Contingencies such as Brent Spar incidents and corporate scandals in 
turn clear the road for stringent accountability and transparency even more. In short, 
sustainability reporting risks becoming a self-reinforcing mechanism that eventually gets 
stuck in an increasingly complex web of its own making as the institutional pressures 
towards accountability, transparency etc. fragment the reporting field.  
 
Second, related to this self-perpetuating tendency is that the complexity it brings along 
potentially leads to the decoupling of the means and ends of sustainability reporting. Either 
through a more focused form of reporting (e.g. integrated reporting) or the continuation of 
appealing to a broad spectrum of stakeholders (e.g. GRI based) the question emerges for 
what reason again reports are actually published. For example, as integrated reporting and 
commensuration progressed, sustainability reporting became less about values and the 
position of the firm in society, but much more focused on value and the linkage between 
the financial and non-financial aspects of the firm. With a nod to Weber, it shows how the 
instrumental means (sustainability reporting) that used to serve a more substantive end 
(corporate accountability and a ‘better world’), became gradually ends in themselves as 
reporting became decoupled from its initial purpose, or became an end tailored at a very 
different and narrow need (corporate success). Similarly, reporting that aims to include 
everything ends up saying nothing, thereby going against its initial aim of advancing 
corporate sustainability.  
 
These risks hold particularly true for sustainability reporting as it develops as a multifaceted 
practice in a rationalised environment in which a focus on measurement and 
financialisation easily leads to confusion over reporting’s actuals goals or ends (Bromley & 
Powell, 2012; Pache & Santos, 2010). An outcome creeping through in my study is reporting 
for the sake of reporting to comply with calls for accountability and transparency, but 
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whether it actually adds to the core business of either the firm or sustainability remains 
unclear. What is in fact measured or financialised may have in reality little to do with, or 
effect on, sustainability. In fact, the work on the garbage can discussed previously aptly 
highlights this means-end confusion as well, of course. In short, the more traditional policy-
practice decoupling as a response to rationalised myths (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) is replaced 
by a form of practice-outcome (means-end) decoupling, which may be a more general 
tendency as some have noted (Bromley & Powell, 2012). A related point here is that my 
work also suggests that, perhaps contrary to popular belief, not only the active work of 
professions (e.g. investors, accountants, consultants) has instigated this development, but 
also a general zeitgeist conducive of accountability and auditability (see Power 1997; Miller 
and Power 2013) played its role here.  
 
Taken together, a more comprehensive picture of sustainability reporting emerges that 
highlights its functional elements, constitutive power and its potential to become a ‘force by 
itself’ detached from its initial goal. These various roles of accounting practices such as 
sustainability reporting are important to properly understand. Not only because extant 
SEAR studies have relatively ignored them, but moreover because of “…  the important roles 
it plays in shaping the world in which we live, the institutions that make up this world, the 
ways we understand and act on the choices open to individuals and organizations, and the 
ways in which we administer the lives of others and ourselves. If management without 
accounting has become unthinkable, accounting also makes management thinkable and 
actionable in specific ways” (Miller & Power, 2013: 561).  
 
A final more overarching implication of this project is empirical and more specific to the 
literature on social, environmental and sustainability reporting and accounting. Scholars in 
this field have noted a dearth of rich qualitative studies (Gray, 2002; Owen, 2008; Parker, 
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2005). Leading interdisciplinary research journals have instead focused on literature studies, 
commentaries and other theoretical observations (Parker, 2005). Although not without 
value, the result has been a need for more “direct researcher engagement in the field, via 
qualitative research and inductive theorising” (Parker, 2005: 856). With my research I have 
aimed to indeed empirically “report, reflect upon, analyse and communicate” (Gray 2002: 
702) on sustainability reporting. Moreover, I did so in such a way that my observations have 
been accompanied by fitting theorisations, be it from an institutional, commensuration, or 
SOW perspective. Considering the immediate practical relevance of sustainability this more 
empirical focus is arguably even more important. Still, a plurality of perspectives exists 
among researchers of sustainability reporting on which purpose this research should 
actually serve.    
 
In a recent contribution Burritt and Schaltegger (2010) distinguished in this respect the 
critical path from the managerial path. The former sees reporting mainly as a problem not 
contributing to true sustainability or simply a corporate smokescreen that hides business-
as-usual. The latter sees sustainability reporting rather pragmatically as a more positive 
problem-solving tool. The three main empirical studies included in this dissertation actually 
show the value of both the managerial path and the critical one, suggesting the simplistic 
dichotomy is neither useful nor realistic. Thus, my theoretically grounded empirical research 
makes it possible “to become more than an awareness building exercise and to move into 
problem solving” (Burritt & Schaltegger, 2010: 843). That is, by an actual in-depth 
engagement with the sustainability reporting field, focusing on past and present, it has 
become possible to combine empirically based critical observations (e.g. limits of 
intentionality, risk of ignoring incommensurables and the darker consequences of 
integrated reporting) with more practical suggestions for coming to meaningful and 
inclusive form of sustainability reporting (e.g. cherishing collectivity, stages of 
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commensuration and creating compromises). This shows the richness and potential of 
closer empirical engagement with (organisations in) the sustainability reporting field for 
both theory and practice.  
 
Future research 
My analysis points to several potentially interesting directions for future research. In 
addition to the areas discussed in the previous chapters I briefly discuss several below.  
 
Firstly, it is important to remember that I studied sustainability reporting in the Netherlands 
at the field level. This particular focus has been theoretically and methodologically justified, 
yet also raises several interesting questions that warrant further work. For example, 
relevant for all three studies included in this dissertation is the question of whether the 
findings are specific to sustainability reporting or can they be extended to adjacent issues? 
It thus opens up research possibilities to gain insight into garbage can institutionalism, 
commensuration and compromise building around a variety of practices. Do we see 
variances between more or less morally loaded issues, or perhaps between practices that to 
a lesser or greater extent question the status quo?  
 
Similar limits to generalisation apply to my focus on the Dutch context. As a country in 
Western Europe, situated geographically as well as practically somewhere between the 
Rheinland model of Germany and the Anglo-Saxon world further west it could be interesting 
to see whether my observations can be extended to different geographical contexts. We 
know that varieties of capitalism affect the outlook of practices, structures and ideas within 
countries (Hall & Soskice, 2001) and prior work on sustainability reporting has hinted at the 
importance of national cultures (Orij, 2010). Has sustainability reporting developed 
different in, for example, Germany, France, Japan, UK or US compared to the Netherlands? 
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How exactly and what can be the explanatory factors or mechanisms here? What can we 
say about sustainability reporting in a non-Western context, e.g. South America and Asia? 
This latter point may even be more interesting as studies are largely missing in this respect. 
In some emerging markets reporting is starting to take off (India, China, South Africa), but 
can we expect to see the same emphasis on rationality and measurability or witness rather 
different trajectories? These are both theoretically and empirically interesting questions to 
explore more deeply.  
 
Not unrelated, a final note on my field level focus should be made. A typology of fields 
could be useful to more systematically analyse institutional, justification as well as 
commensuration processes. That is, could we expect differences in the mechanisms 
identified in my dissertation based on the type of field in which they take place? For this 
purpose distinguishing, for instance, degree of fragmentation and degree of 
institutionalisation could be useful (see e.g. Battilana et al., 2009) to analyse 
commensuration, institutionalisation and constructing compromises in different contexts.  
In addition, whereas the field is an important institutional level of analysis and one where 
meaning is typically created for new practices (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008), studying 
sustainability reporting as well as my various theoretical frameworks at different levels of 
analysis can be useful  (Scott, 2008). Field level practices are at the end of the day enacted 
at the organisational or even intra-organisational level as various departments within an 
organisation can clash as well. Shifting the focus of analysis to these levels could help to 
explain more precisely how commensuration takes place, serendipity is dealt with and 
various orders of worth are reconciled, and also how various stakeholders are involved in 
the development of sustainability reporting (e.g. the work of investors, professions or 
firms). In addition, distinguishing between how larger firms (the focus in my study) and 
small and medium-sized experience and enact the pressures for sustainability reporting and 
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the theoretical mechanisms behind it could lead to a more fine-grained understanding.  
Drawing on the emerging institutional work literature could be a potential route here 
(Lawrence et al., 2011; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Finally, the Dutch reporting field is in 
turn part of a larger trans-national reporting field. Peeling down these layers of levels of 
analyses, their interactions, enabling and constraining effects seems worthwhile.  
 
Secondly, all chapters in their respective ways pointed to the tendency that reporting has 
moved closer to value and by extension to investors, accountants, analysts and the like. 
Whereas I have discussed the collective aspects of this shift and the role of distributed 
agency, the focus was primarily on human actors. Potentially interesting is to further 
explore the role of non-human aspects such as machines (e.g. Bloomberg-type terminals) 
and technologies (e.g. reporting software and XBRL taxonomies) and artefacts (e.g. reports). 
A potentially fruitful avenue of inquiry would be to link discussions of social media to 
reporting. For example, if you make information more continuously available via social 
networks rather than annually in a report, could this perhaps act as a sort of ‘social vetting’ 
mechanism that helps to assess the integrity and (financial) viability of firms and thereby 
lead to better informed decision, both in terms of financial and sustainability value?  In 
addition, obviously insights from actor-network theory could be helpful in this respect as 
well with its specific focus on human and non-humans aspects as network actors (e.g. 
Latour, 2005) 
 
Thirdly, related to this latter point is the potential for a more explicit inclusion on power as 
both in institutional theory as well as justification theory politics and power are typically 
underplayed. Lawrence et al. (2001: 629) argue that “a central feature of the 
institutionalization of an innovation is the set of power relations that supports the process”. 
Similarly, commensuration and justifications do not happen in a vacuum. Similar to the 
 183 
 
structural and agentic aspects that I discussed throughout this dissertation, a distinction can 
be made between episodic power that links with agency and actions of individual 
organizational actors, and systemic power that links with (institutional) structure and 
practices prevalent here (e.g. Clegg, 1989; Lawrence et al., 2001; Lawrence, 2008). Aspects 
that could be worthwhile focusing on are the kind of power struggles taking place in these 
processes, the critical actors that engage in particular power mechanisms, the significant 
factors of how issues came to be issues, how non-issues were constituted and superseded, 
and who is and is not involved in decision-making. Together, this enhances the theoretical 
perspective of concern in this dissertation, and when applied to sustainability reporting 
sheds a more revealing light on the (possibly murkier) motives of actors involved. Again, 
insights from institutional work or actor-network theory, possibly in combination (see 
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006), could be helpful.  
 
Implications for practice 
To conclude, in addition to the practical implications discussed in the specific context of the 
preceding chapters, my study more broadly also offers several implications for policy makers 
and practitioners in the sustainability reporting field.  
 
First, all substantive chapters in this dissertation indicate that the institutionalisation of 
sustainability reporting should not be seen as a smooth, linear process. The garbage can 
analysis highlights this very clearly, but also the dynamics and tensions around reporting’s 
commensuration and the various perspectives on integrated reporting show the muddled 
and contested nature of sustainability reporting. Whereas one may expect that after more 
than two decades of development the meaning and shape of reporting should have 
crystallised by now, this ongoing tension and messiness is possibly not particularly 
surprising as the practice includes such a wide (and oftentimes expanding) range of aspects. 
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For instance, whereas the buzz was all about CO2 several years ago, by now water, 
biodiversity and tax evasion have become high profile topics on the sustainability reporting 
agenda. In particular for policymakers this indicates that it could be wise to more readily 
accept, if not embrace, this messy reality. It makes legislation around reporting that defines 
specifically all reporting parameters not only unlikely to emerge in the near future, but 
possibly also unwanted. Unlikely because of the (political) differences on whether this is 
possible or useful. Unwanted because the limits and unintended consequences of, for 
instance, commensuration and integration, indicate that it has proved difficult to capture 
the essence of sustainability reporting. Policies and legislation that dictate too rigidly the 
content of sustainability reporting could thus stifle development rather than contribute to 
more sustainable business. In this respect it is interesting to note the non-prescriptive and 
relatively flexible approach the European Commission has taken in its before-mentioned 
recent proposal on non-financial reporting. This may in fact be a rather more sensible 
approach than regulated reporting on a broad range of issues (a typical NGO wish), or a 
more restrictive set of valorised core indicators that investors and accountants prefer.    
 
Second, the previous chapters have shown the multitude of parties claiming an interest in 
sustainability reporting. Whereas to some extent it has developed by more chance-like 
events, within the confines of these events actors still have had room to manage and 
influence the trajectory of reporting. For the more managerially inclined practitioners or 
supporters of sustainability reporting, my study also offers some practical pointers for how 
to popularise sustainability reporting-like complex peripheral practices with a more moral or 
values-driven undertone. After all, disclosing sustainability information went against 
mainstream business logic which largely saw these non-financial aspects as unrelated to 
business-as-usual and did not recognise their strategic (and financial) importance. In order 
for sustainability reporting to survive and thrive it needed to change, as by remaining close 
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to its more moral and values-driven underpinnings it risked becoming a peripheral ‘tree-
hugger practice’. The case of sustainability reporting suggests the importance of gaining 
acceptance by forging closer links with powerful actors (e.g. world of finance and 
accounting) and through that focus on showing strategic and financial value. It essentially 
required translating the values-based roots into a more value-based language. Combining 
elements of my analyses, three key strategies emerge. First is to secure importance and 
awareness by establishing a business case link with performance, operational efficiency, risk 
analysis, reputation, innovation and the like. Second is supporting the credibility of this 
business case through guidelines, indicators and other measurement techniques that 
improve concreteness and measurability. Third is the validation of the core strategic 
importance of the practice for value-creation and firm survival.  
 
Third, the chapters on commensuration and integrated reporting have made the 
contestation that has emerged over what sustainability reporting should look like and, 
moreover, whom it should (not) serve very clear. As said, sustainability reporting is a 
complex practice that brings together actors that are at heart social change activists fighting 
for a better world and more pragmatic or business-driven actors that see sustainability as a 
fortunate side effect of a business reality in which firms have to deal with the financial risks 
and opportunities that sustainability aspects offer. Accusations of reporting as a corporate 
smokescreen to protect and advance hegemonic business interests and to ensure the 
hegemony of market values at the expense of other modes or ways of valuing are still 
frequently made (e.g. Spence, 2007). Compared to its beginnings, sustainability reporting 
has undeniably been subject to rationalisation as it has become associated with indicators, 
guidelines, auditing regimes and business cases. Whereas this has thus undoubtedly helped 
to make sustainability reporting more accessible to a broader audience, my analysis has also 
made clear the unintended consequences of this in the form of narrow and impoverished 
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reporting, box ticking and means that become ends. This makes sustainability reporting 
thus a double-edged sword and requires a careful balancing act of firms, policy makers and 
other stakeholders such as NGO’s, professional service firms and standard setters. My 
analyses suggest the importance of a broadly agreed upon common interest, which may in 
fact explain the success of the GRI, a truly multi-stakeholder initiative from its very 
beginning with a strong emphasis on this shared interest. Despite the difficulties involved, 
continuous communication based on multi-stakeholder approach may not be the fastest, 
yet the most durable road for sustainability reporting.  
 
Difficult to capture in a ‘how-to guide’, appreciating the dysfunctioning of, for example, the 
mechanisms behind commensuration (i.e. professional insulation, cultural contestation and 
means-end confusion) and how to reach durable compromises puts current developments 
around sustainability reporting in a broader context. It shows the potential as well as 
limitations of further rationalisation, commensuration and economisation. Realising what 
can lead to the detriment of sustainability reporting can be an important factor in 
preventing this from happening. I earlier argued that for sustainability reporting to flourish 
it should offer a solution to a problem of common interest despite conflicting worldviews 
(Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011). A deeper understanding of the potential and perversities of 
current sustainability reporting may thus lead to commonality outweighing differences and 
thereby lead to policies and corporate behaviour that can truly be called sustainable.  
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Appendix A Number of reports published in the Netherlands 
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Appendix B Chronology of events 
Year Description event 
1962 Publication of Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring on the consequences of pesticide use for humans and the environment 
1972 Club of Rome publishes “Limits to Growth” that discusses interaction between economic and population growth and finite resources  
1974 Creation of an Emission Register database of pollutant releases to air, water and soil of major polluting facilities, thereby improving 
environmental policies and corporate accountability and transparency. Extensions in scope and geographical reach were the IPPC 
(1996), EPER (2000) and global PRTR (2003/2009).  
1987 The UN Brundtland Commission publishes “Our Common Future” on global environmental problems and its possible solutions, 
specifically using the term ’sustainable development’. 
1987 Dutch multinational chemical company DSM publishes its first, then, environmental report 
1988 Netherlands National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) publishes first integral, and alarming, study “Zorgen voor 
Morgen” (Concern for Tomorrow)  on the state of and trends in the Dutch environment and proposes drastic environmental 
improvement measures 
1989 Institute for Environmental Management (WIMM) founded at the University of Amsterdam 
1989 The first National Environmental Policy Plan, a political document prepared by the Ministry of the Environment that describes the state 
of affairs of the environment in the Netherlands and the national environmental policy for the years to come.  
1989 UNCTAD’s Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting (ISAR) starts 
developing recommendations for environmental disclosure in financial statements (published in 1991/1998). 
1992 The UNCED (‘Earth Summit’) in Rio de Janeiro, a large-scale UN conference on various sustainability issues (e.g. climate change, water, 
energy, toxins), is held.    
1994 Publication ‘Guidelines Company Environmental Reporting, a measure of the progress of business & industry towards sustainable 
development’, published by UN Environment Programme and SustainAbility, which contained guidelines for reporting topics. 
1995 Brent spar incident for Shell: creates momentum and visibility for sustainability issues 
1995 The EU Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) is a voluntary management tool for companies to evaluate, report and improve 
their environmental performance, developed by the European Commission and revised in and 2001 and 2010 to include all sectors on a 
global level. In 2005 the EMAS award was introduced.  
1995 ACC Award (Accountancy Award) for the best Dutch report was introduced by the NIVRA (Netherlands Institute of Registered Auditors) 
and the Vereniging voor Milieuaccountancy (Association of Environmental Accountancy). In 2011 merged with Transparency Benchmark 
Award.  
1996 ISO 14000 series for environmental management introduced. Standard 14001 most influential in providing guidance for setting up 
environmental management systems, raising awareness and commitment to the environment and supporting (internally) measurement 
and reporting of progress and results.   
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1997 John Elkingtons’s book ‘Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century Business’ introduces the integrated and 
interconnected vision on people, planet, profit principles  
1999 Dutch Environmental Protection Act changed to include a Government Report and Public Report. A selection of approx. 300 firms with 
high environmental impact is obliged to disclose environmental data to both the government but also publish a separate report for the 
general public. This latter requirement was abolished in 2005.  
1999 Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) was established. It evaluates the sustainability performance of listed companies and subsequently 
ranks them and tracks market capitalization as a guide for sustainability investors.     
2000 The Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands (SER) publishes ‘De Winst van Waarden’ (‘The profit of values’). This main advisory 
body of government publishes report that stresses the importance of disclosure, however also stipulates the value of non-compulsory 
disclosure of companies.  
2000 First full version of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) published: GRI Guidelines 1.0 
2000 United Nations Global Compact is founded. It is a voluntary code of behavior. Firms can become signatories, committing themselves to 
the core principles of the Global Compact (economic, social and environmental ones) and a yearly Communication on Progress on these 
principles.  
2000 OECD Guidelines revised in order to account better for CSR issues. It forms a framework of business management norms on economic, 
social and environmental aspects and encourages reporting on these issues. A national Contact Point (NCP) has to be established in 
participation countries to promote the knowledge and application of the Guidelines.  
2001 The FTSE4Good Index Series measure the performance of a selection of firms that meet a set of corporate responsibility criteria, 
assisting financial specialist interested in responsible investment products.    
2002 MVO Platform founded. Platform for cooperation between NGO’s to promote sustainable development and CSR, thereby bringing more 
centralization in the NGO approach towards this subject.  
2002 Second version of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) published: GRI Guidelines 2.0 
2003 The Dutch Council for Annual Reporting revised Annual Reporting Guideline 400 (RJ-400) and explicit attention was paid to economic, 
environmental and socio-ethical aspects and it recommended large and medium-sized companies to account for these aspects in the 
annual report. In addition, a practical Guide for Sustainability Reporting was published. In 2009 these were renewed again to account 
better for international supply chain issues.  
2003 The European Modernisation Directive (2003/51/EC) asks for the inclusion of non-financial indicators when necessary for an 
understanding of the company's development, performance or position. The Dutch law was revised in 2005 in order to comply with the 
Modernisation Directive that applies to larger enterprises only. 
2004 MVO Nederland (CSR the Netherlands) was established under impetus of the Dutch government. This knowledge and network centre 
was to propagate CSR in the business community, for both small and large firms, and among others focus on sustainability reporting.    
2004 Introduction of the “Transparency Benchmark” that ranks companies (500 by 2012) on their level of transparency on sustainability 
aspects. The award associated with the benchmark was in 2011 merged with the ACC Award.  
  
 
2
2
1
 
 
2004 A manual for the Preparers and Users of Eco-efficiency Indicators that guides systematic reporting on environmental performance vis-à-
vis financial performance is published by ISAR. 
2005 United Nations backed initiative Principles for Sustainable Investment (UN PRI) is introduced. Investors can become signatories and 
thereby commit themselves to the six core principles of sustainable investment. By 2012 over 1000 investment institutions had 
becomesignatories.  
2006 Third, and most expansive, version of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) published, with an updated 3.1 version published in 2011: GRI 
Guidelines 3.0 
2006 The UN Global Compact for the Netherlands was founded in 2006 in order to raise the profile and awareness of the Global Compact 
among Dutch companies and as an exchange platform for participants (90 by 2012).   
2006 The Dutch Association of Investors for Sustainable Development (VBDO) introduced its ‘Responsible Supply Chain Award’, a benchmark 
of companies on the responsibility shown in their supply chain management based on their publicly disclosed information. 
2008 The SER publishes an advisory report on the international aspects of CSR for Dutch enterprises, focusing among others on human rights 
and the supply chain. Further progress and evaluation reports were published in 2009, 2011 and 2012. The Council for Annual Reporting 
was asked to revise its Annual Reporting guidelines accordingly.  
2008 UNCTAD/ISAR published “Guidance on Corporate Responsibility Indicators in Annual Reports” that aims at the director’s report of the 
annual report and the inclusion and development of concise and comparable corporate responsibility indicators within annual financial 
reports. 
2009 Revised version of the Annual Reporting Guideline 400 and the Guidance Document published by the Council for Annual Reporting to 
account better for international supply chain management issues.  
2009 The Frijns Code on corporate governance is introduced. This updated version of the 2003 Tabaksblat Code on Corporate Governance for 
Dutch listed companies, stipulates that the material aspects of CSR for the operations of the business needed to be analysed, discussed 
and communicated by and among the management and supervisory board, as well as disclosed in the annual report.  
2010 The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC)is founded and aims to develop a global framework for Integrated Reporting 
through a multi-stakeholder approach combining academics, firms, standard-setters, accountancy firms, investors, regulators and 
NGO’s.  
2010 In 2010 the ISO, the International Organization for Standardization, launched ISO 26000, an International Standard providing guidelines 
for social responsibility (SR). It is a voluntary non-certifiable standard for organizations that want to integrate CSR in their operations. 
Reporting is also a component of ISO 26000. 
2010 MVO Prestatieladder (CSR Performance Ladder) introduced. This Dutch certification scheme that sets a set of criteria at various 
performance levels (five) on CSR and CSR management system in a firm. The aim is to make CSR better measurable, more objective and 
visible and based on international guidelines.  
2010 The European Commission conducts a public consultation on companies' disclosure of non-financial information, exploring the 
possibility of changing the Fourth Company Law Directive on annual accounts that is part of the Modernisation Directive of 2003. 
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2011 Article by Michael Porter and Mark Kramer on Creating Shared Value appears in Harvard Business Review, linking CSR and corporate 
strategy as a way to face the crisis of capitalism and boost growth and innovation.  
2011 Updated version OECD Guidelines published, with additional focus on human rights, international supply chain responsibility and 
reporting on these aspects.  
2011 The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights (John Ruggie) develops the United Nations 
Guiding Principles for Business and Humans Rights (the so-called Ruggie Framework) that looks at human rights in value chain.  
2013 The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) publishes consultation draft on its integrated reporting framework  
2013 The European Commission adopts a proposal for a directive enhancing the transparency of certain large companies on social and 
environmental matters. 
2013 Latest version of the guidelines published: GRI Guidelines 4.0 
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Appendix C Commensuration dimensions and sustainability reporting 
Phase Commensuration 
dimension 
Event Representative data Significance 
Environmental 
reporting 
(<2000) 
Cognitive Push for corporate 
(environmental) 
accountability and 
transparency  in 
society    
 
Emergence of 
sustainability as a logic 
of ‘license to produce’ 
through regulation 
with a role for 
transparency 
 
Publication reports 
linking the state of the 
environment with 
corporate behaviour 
(e.g. Agenda 21 & 
Brundtland)  
“I think sustainability reporting, the concept has been a 
beneficiary of movements and pressures that are driving 
business or signalling business that transparency is not an 
option any longer, it's really an expectation and you must 
respond to it” (NGO) 
 
“Here you talk about a relation primarily with the 
government: license to produce. It’s about regulation, 
permits and compliance. If you do well, you can go about 
your business, if you don’t follow the rules you will get a 
fine or lose your permit” (sustainability manager)  
 
 
“Sustainability is broadly shared and considered as 
important. Particularly sustainability in the broad sense: 
don’t do things that harm the next generation. The 
Brundtland definition of sustainability” (CEO MNC) 
Shows emergence of 
a meaning system in 
which both 
sustainability/ 
corporate 
responsibility and 
transparency start to 
play a role. 
Reclassification of the 
outlook of the future 
and the role of 
corporations in 
society and their 
responsibilities 
towards 
accountability and 
transparency.  
Triple bottom 
line  
reporting 
(2000-2007)  
Technical  GRI guidelines and 
expansion of indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“They went through a kind of teenager situation where 
they became almost obese with their KPI’s. Fine, it is a 
normal child or teenage disease, every organization goes 
through that type of thing” (NGO) 
“If you design GRI, even version 1.0 or G1, as a purely 
environmental framework you will be behind the curve, not 
ahead of the curve. You must shift your thinking to 
sustainability, and while G1 may still be dominated by 
environment content, think ahead, keep an eye ahead of 
the curve, and by the time you do G2 you must be more 
comprehensive” (GRI founder) 
Emergence of 
dominant guidelines 
for reporting and 
demarcations of what 
sustainability 
reporting entails and 
how to measure its 
aspects. 
Sophistication of 
indicators and 
measurement 
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Development of 
indices, benchmarks 
and national 
accounting standards  
 
“The call for standards and all increases also from 
companies themselves. They get more and more requests 
for data and questionnaires etc on various topics. It is more 
efficient to have standards for that so they do not drown in 
requests with various requirements (rating agency) 
The Council for Annual Reporting was asked by the SER to 
assess whether “in addition to financial-economic 
guidelines for reporting, the Council can also develop 
methodologies that can improve the transparency of 
corporate policies on all three dimensions of CSR” (SER, 
2001) 
techniques.  
Integrated 
reporting 
(2007<) 
Value Development of KPI’s 
linked to value-added 
by firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ratings and rating 
agencies gain 
prominence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Initiatives of many investors who are working on KPI 
development. So per sector they say that these ten or 
twenty indicators are simply financially relevant” 
(consultant) 
“It’d be very useful if there was one figure that immediately 
makes clear: this company you have to buy … but that does 
not exist yet. It’s a challenge for companies and investors I 
think to find indicators in the environmental, social and 
sustainability areas that are reliable enough and also timely 
enough to use in more quantitative processes” (investment 
specialist) 
 
“There’s a lot of confusion in the marketplace about what is 
sustainability and what is ESG and what is SRI … so they’re 
like, ‘Well I want a ranking that tells us what the most 
responsible investments are’ and that’s quite a subjective 
thing. But if you can get that criteria given to you in the 
form of a rating or anything, you can just say, ‘I don’t have 
to think about it’” (rating agency) 
 
The main objective is to move towards the so called 
Demarcation 
between financial 
and non-financial and 
between 
sustainability and 
more mainstream 
traditional reporting 
becomes increasingly 
blurred. Valuation of 
firms takes onboard 
sustainability criteria 
which thus have to be 
simplified and 
quantified in order to 
make them 
measurable and 
comparable.  
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Rise of integrated and 
impact reporting  
 
 
 
Reported data gets 
treated as a valuation 
instrument 
 
integrated report. Because what is the real agenda? It is 
how enterprises can picture the real economy and value 
the enterprise by better linking and even integrating 
financial and non-financial performance (NGO)  
 
“this will become sort of the norm because it will show a 
fully integrated report around all the business risks  ...  and 
they will be quantified around providing a value of that risk 
or opportunity” (partner Big 4) 
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Appendix D Pathologies, purpose and people in sustainability reporting 
   Driver of change Contextualaspects 
Reporting 
phase 
 Dominant 
commensurationdimensio
n 
Pathology Purpose People 
Environmental 
Reporting 
(<2000) 
Description Cognitivecommensuration Reporting for ‘ values-
driven tree-huggers’ 
Creating awareness;  
moral framing and an add-
on to business-as-usual 
Civil society; state  
Representative 
data 
“investors and the NGOs 
are like this is rubbish! And 
the companies actually said 
well, tell us what you want. 
And it was like ding! So 
well, these are the things 
we want and the 
companies would say well, 
that's just unfeasible, that 
this is the data we already 
collect, would you like to 
know that? … And it just 
started a dialogue” (NGO) 
“Various actors were 
involved, but in the early 
stages most had a very 
ethical and normative 
viewpoint” (analyst) 
 
 “Well, when firms make 
moral appeals I get tears 
in my eyes! I think, yes, 
but that is not how things 
work. ... As long as there is 
no business case 
supporting it...” 
(sustainability manager)  
“As we approach the end 
of the 20th century the 
position of companies in 
society has changed 
dramatically compared to 
the 1950s and 1960s. 
Companies are not only 
expected to operate in a 
responsible manner, but 
are increasingly asked to 
demonstrate this publicly” 
(KPMG 1999, p.7) 
“The societal pressure 
was very strong. From 
NGO’s in particular 
and the government, 
investors far less” 
(sustainability 
specialist) 
Triple bottom 
line  
Reporting 
(2000-2007) 
Description Technical commensuration Reporting as a mindless 
tick-the-box exercise 
Business case (efficiency, 
risk & reputation) 
Standard setters and 
consultants 
Representative 
data 
“let’s all come together and 
try to create a global 
consensus among major 
stakeholders over what 
should be expected 
regarding environmental 
health and safety and social 
and economics” 
(sustainability manager) 
“Generally speaking, I 
contend that firms use 
guidelines such as the GRI 
too much as a checkbox” 
(consultant); 
 
“reporting becomes 
reporting in which you do 
not say much but you are 
“It is of course a business 
case. The world is 
changing, markets are 
changing, so we have to 
prepare ourselves for these 
new markets” 
(sustainability manager) 
 
“That means that 
 “Of course, the work 
of consultancies 
pushes this further as 
well, as does the 
direction that for 
example the GRI 
provides” (civil 
servant) 
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“What is the scope, what 
are we talking about? What 
are the themes? What are 
the KPI’s?” (sustainability 
manager). 
simply organizing all kinds 
of sources. And, once 
again, the strategic 
importance evaporates, 
than it is only for a public 
relations or reputation 
world!” (consultant) 
somewhere there has to be 
a business case, because 
otherwise it simply will not 
happen. It is as simple as 
that” (employer 
association).   
 
Integrated 
reporting 
(2007<)  
Description Value commensuration Incommensurablesimpov
erishreporting 
 
Strategic value creation 
(growth, innovation, 
comp. advantage); 
valuation 
Investorsand 
accountants 
Representative 
data  
The main objective is to 
move towards the so called 
integrated report. It is how 
enterprises can picture the 
real economy and value the 
enterprise by better linking 
and even integrating 
financial and non-financial 
performance” (NGO)  
[on commensuration]: 
“this stuff is very scary, 
because it creates false 
impressions, it isn't valid 
and it's a big problem” 
(trade union 
representative) 
 
“for social it is much more 
difficult since we do not 
have the price for a gram 
or kilo of stress or 
discrimination. In 
environmental you have 
that” (civil society) 
“Ultimately, the goal of 
sustainability reporting and 
moreover integrated 
reporting is to evaluate and 
value the quality of the 
firm” (investor) 
 
“CSR is not something you 
do for fun, it is no free for 
all. No, it is an adaptation 
of your strategy to the new 
global mid-markets. 
Important investors want 
to know whether you as a 
firm are prepared for that. 
So we have to move 
towards integrated 
reporting” (sustainability 
manager). 
“Slowly but surely the 
interest of investors 
has increased, 
together with the 
belief that 
sustainability cannot 
be seen on its own, 
but as a valuation 
pillar for a firm” 
(partner Big 4);  
 
“with the integrated 
reporting there will be 
a real strong push 
from the accounting 
industry” (trade 
union) 
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Appendix E Overview orders of worth 
‘Common 
worlds’ 
Market Industrial Civic Domestic Inspired Opinion Green Projective  
Mode of 
evaluation 
(worth) 
Price, cost Technical 
efficiency 
Collective 
welfare 
Esteem, 
reputation 
Grace, 
singularity, 
creativeness 
Renown, 
fame 
Environmental 
friendliness 
Easy and flexible 
connectivity  
Test Market 
competitive-
ness 
Competence, 
reliability, 
planning 
Equality and 
solidarity 
Trustworthi-
ness 
Passion, 
enthusiasm 
Popularity, 
audience, 
recognition 
Sustainability, 
renewability 
Mobilization of 
network 
Form of 
relevant 
proof 
Monetary Measurable: 
criteria, 
statistics 
Formal, 
official 
Oral, 
exemplary, 
personally 
warranted  
Emotional 
involvement 
and 
expression 
Semiotic Ecological 
ecosystem 
Number of 
connections 
Qualified 
objects 
Freely 
circulating 
market good 
or service 
Infrastructure, 
project, 
technical 
object, 
method, plan 
Rules and 
regulations, 
fundamental 
rights, 
welfare 
policies 
Patrimony, 
locale, 
heritage 
Emotionally 
invested body 
or item, the 
sublime 
Sign, 
media 
Pristine 
wilderness, 
healthy 
environment, 
natural habitat 
Projects 
Qualified 
human 
beings 
Customer, 
consumer, 
merchant, 
seller 
Engineer, 
professional, 
expert 
Equal 
citizens, 
solidarity 
unions 
Authority Creative 
Beings, artists 
Celebrity Environmentalist 
& ecologist 
Partners and 
brokers  
Time 
formation 
Short-term, 
flexibility 
Long-term 
planned 
future 
Perennial Customary 
part 
Eschatological, 
revolutionary, 
visionary 
moment 
Vogue, 
trend 
Future 
generations 
Flexibility/temporal 
Source: Thévenot et al., 2000: 241; Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005 
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Appendix F Interview guide 
 
1. Introduction of the project, interviewer & interviewee. 
 
2. What have been the most important changes/developments over time in a) the 
development of the sustainability field in general and b) disclosure and reporting 
on sustainability aspects in particular that you have witnessed during the time of 
your engagement with the subject? 
 For example: 
 Development in content of disclosure/reports  
 Developments of standards/guidelines 
 Developments in approach/view within organizations towards the 
subject  
 Developments in expectations of various stakeholders  
 
3. What has been the role and impact of you/your organization in this respect? 
 
4. Emphasis on how the interviewee tried/tries to achieve his/her aims. 
 For example: 
 Consideration of strategies employed; actions undertaken; 
participation in initiatives and collaborations; engagement in public 
debates, stakeholder consultations etc.   
 How to deal with potential conflicts and discussion points with 
other actors; 
 Main arguments brought forward to support case/position. 
 
5. Which other main parties (e.g. NGO/consultancies/government/academics/firms 
/standards setters etc.) have been primarily involved in your view and what did/do 
these parties do to achieve their aims in the development of sustainability 
disclosure? 
 
6. What are the main current and future challenges for sustainability and in particular 
reporting in your particular field? 
 
7. What is the role and impact of the interviewee is this respect? 
 
8. Overall, what would you consider to be the biggest successes as well as problems 
and how were these achieved/overcome? 
 
9. Any document (magazine/research report/publication/book) that in one way or the 
other has played an important role in the development of sustainability reporting? 
 
10. Do you know other important players in the field who would be useful participants? 
 
